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Voice, Exit or Disloyalty: Democratic backsliding and the Rule of Law in 
Poland and Hungary 
Nick Sitter
The  notion  that  political  developments  in  EU  member  states  might  threaten  the 
integrity of  the organization is  as  old as  the EU – or  rather  EEC – itself.  European 
integration was in no small part an effort by the original six member states to impose 
some restrictions on their own freedom of action in the aftermath of three decades of 
war and international crises.  Pooling sovereignty would help Germany, Italy,  France 
and  the  three  Ben-Ne-Lux  states  achieve  peace  and  prosperity,  and  safeguard 
democracy. Two of them were recent dictatorships. Enlargement in the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s  brought  in  both  long-established  democracies  and  the  recently  authoritarian 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. Despite one or two tense moments, such as the attempted 
coup d’état in Spain in 1981, all three new democracies consolidated rapidly. The EU is 
often accredited with playing an important part in this. After the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, the prospect of enlargement to a dozen or more formerly communist dictatorship 
prompted new questions about how to ensure that these ex-authoritarian regimes could 
take  their  place  in  the  EU’s  liberal  democratic  legal  and  normative  system.  The 
immediate result was the Copenhagen Criteria, laid down in the June 1993 European 
Council meeting in the Danish capital, which were designed to ensure that new member 
states  were  liberal  democracies,  respected  human  rights,  had  a  functioning  market 
economy and were capable of implementing the Acquis Communautaire. Combined with 
the obligation that all member states must be members of the Council of Europe, and a 
lengthy transition process, these rules should ensure that no new member state reversed 
its commitment to liberal democracy, free markets and the rule of law. 
A quarter of a century later, backsliding has become a commonly accepted term both in 
journalism and in academia to describe reversals in transitions to liberal democracy. 
More  to  the  point,  elements  of  democratic  backsliding  have  been documented in  a 
variety of member states, old and new, across a series of themes. The first policy paper in 
TransCrisis Work Package 6 analysed patterns of backsliding across the EU since the 2008 
financial crisis, across three broad domains: the rule of law, corruption and corruption 
Moreover,  Viktor  Orbán’s  Fidesz  government  had  the  2/3  majority  in  parliament 
necessary unilaterally to change the constitution. It soon used this to centralize political 
power, and draw up a new tailor-made electoral system. The OSCE report on the 2014 
elections  concluded  that:  “The  main  governing  party  enjoyed  an  undue  advantage 
because  of  restrictive  campaign  regulations,  biased  media  coverage  and  campaign 
activities that blurred the separation between political party and the State”.  Five years 3
later the Polish government enjoyed less formal power, but lost no time to emulate its 
Hungarian role model. Both governments have been on the receiving end of substantial 
criticism from the EU, the Council of Europe and a range of member states, as well as 
non-EU states from Norway to the USA. And some of the language has been so severe 
as to be highly unusual among western allies. After the Hungarian prime minister set 
out his vision of an ‘illiberal state’ in a speech in 2014, Newsweek memorably labelled 
Viktor Orbán ’Hungary’s Mussolini’.4
The first section of the paper elaborates on the definition of backsliding in the field of 
the rule of law, and the most important issues related to assessing backsliding in Poland 
and Hungary. The second section runs thought the substantial points on which the two 
governments have been charged with backsliding in terms of what they set out to do 
and the limits to the independence of the judiciary, media, independent agencies and 
civil society that have arisen from new laws and policies. This section also explores the 
causes of backsliding in Poland and Hungary, and concludes that this has more to do 
with domestic party politics than with the financial crisis. The third section turns to the 
EU’s reaction to backsliding in Poland and Hungary. Backsliding with respect to the 
rule of law is a potential cause of transnational crisis because it undermines the laws 
and/or norms on which the EU is based. Several actors have pointed this out, but there 
are important differences between the Hungarian and Polish cases in three respects: 
First,  although Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) share an 
ideology that is identical in many important respects, the former is a member of the 
European People’s Party and the latter is not.  Second, in 2010 the Hungarian issues 
could be interpreted as a one-off problem, the result of Hungary’s electoral system and 
a  social  democrat  government  worn  out  after  eight  years  in  office.  Parties  on  the 
European  centre-right  could  dismiss  Victor  Orbán’s  posturing  as  hype  rather  than 
 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “Hungary: Parliamentary Elections 6 April 3
2014”, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 11 July 2014, p.3.
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substance. By the time PiS took over in Poland five years later, the Hungarian case was 
more serious, and backsliding began to look like a pattern in the EU. Once (Slovakia in 
the 1990s) could be an accident, twice (Hungary in 2010) a coincidence, but by 2015 
three time was – to borrow Ian Fleming’s phrase – “enemy action”. Third, Poland is too 
big a state to be ignored quietly.  In addition,  geopolitics  and history meant that  no 
Polish government could hint – as Orbán did – that too harsh a response from the EU 
might  drive the country into the open arms of  Vladimir  Putin.  Hence the focus on 
backsliding and the EU’s reaction to this in terms of EU crisis management, including 
analysis of the core elements in crisis management in the TransCrisis project: detection, 
sense-making,  decision-making,  coordination,  meaning-making,  communication  and 
accountability.
Part 1 - Backsliding and the Rule of Law in the EU 
The rule of law is a fundamental building block of liberal democracy: the rule of the 
majority within legal and constitutional limits and constraints. All EU member states 
are  committed  to  constitutional  safeguards  of  democracy  as  a  prerequisite  for 
membership.  If  leaders of  national governments in the EU invoke a crisis  (be it  the 
financial crisis, refugee crisis or the threat of terrorism) to limit the power of the courts, 
restrict  media  freedom,  reduce  the  power  of  independent  regulators  or  harass  civil 
society, this may become a matter of democratic backsliding. If it breaches primary or 
secondary EU law,  this  can be defined as  hard backsliding,  whereas  it  is  primarily  a 
matter of a breach of EU norms (or EU laws that are not about democracy and the rule 
of law) then it can be defined as soft backsliding.5
Defining backsliding in the context of the rule of law is relatively unproblematic given 
the clear commitments to the rule of  law that are laid down in the EU treaties,  EU 
legislation,  the  requirements  of  membership  of  the  Council  of  Europe  and  the 
Copenhagen Criteria.  The Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership,  Article 2 of  the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty’s  preamble state  these norms clearly and 
precisely,  and provisions to act  against a member states that violate these rules and 
norms is set out in Article 7. In 2014 – in response to the European Parliament’s request 
that  "Member  States  be  regularly  assessed  on  their  continued  compliance  with  the 
fundamental values of the Union and the requirement of democracy and the rule of 
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law” and Justice and Home Affairs Council’s emphasis that "respecting the rule of law 
is a prerequisite for the protection of fundamental rights" and call for the Commission 
"to take forward the debate in line with the Treaties on the possible need for and shape 
of a collaborative and systematic method to tackle these issues" – the Commission set 
out “new framework to ensure an effective and coherent protection of the rule of law in 
all Member States”.  This has become known simply as the Rule of Law Framework.6
• The  Copenhagen  Criteria  require  that  the  candidate  country  much  achieve, 
among other things, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.7
• In  the  Treaty  Preamble,  the  signatories  of  the  EU  Treaty  confirm  “their 
attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law.”8
• Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union states that: “The Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.”
• Article 7 establishes the procedure for dealing with breaches of the values set out 
in Article 2: “On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the 
European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a 
majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament,  may determine that  there is  a  clear  risk of  a  serious breach by a 
Member  State  of  the  values  referred  to  in  Article  2.  Before  making  such  a 
determination,  the Council  shall  hear the Member State in question and may 
address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same procedure.”
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2014) 158 6
final/2, “A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law”, 19 March 2014.
 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, (21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93)12.7
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Preamble.8
• The Rule of Law Framework of 2014 established a three-stage process, designed 
as a dialogue between the Commission and the member state in question: first, a 
Commission  assessment;  then  a  Commission  recommendation;  and  finally 
monitoring  of  the  Member  State’s  follow-up  to  the  Commission’s 
recommendation. The first step entails collecting and examining information and 
assessing whether there are clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of 
law, and if necessary issuing a Rule of Law Opinion. At the second stage, if the 
matter  is  not  resolved,  the  Commission  can  issue  a  Rule  of  Law 
Recommendation, including a fixed time limit for the state in question to address 
the  matter.  In  the  third,  follow-up  stage,  the  Commission  (or  European 
Parliament or a group of 10 Member States) may resort to the Article 7 Procedure. 
The Rule of Law framework thus does not include any sanctions other than the 
threat of action under  Article 7. 
• Finally, Article 50 establishes the procedure for termination of membership: “Any 
Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own  constitutional  requirements”  and  specified  that,  unless  the  European 
Council extended the deadline, membership would terminate within two years 
of  an Article 50 notification.  The British diplomat John Kerr,  who drafted the 
original  text,  later  pointed out that  this  was written to avoid legal  chaos if  a 
government that had turned authoritarian “stormed out” in reaction to the EU 
suspending its membership under an Article 7 procedure.9
The core of any definition of backsliding in the EU should therefore involve a member 
state  developing  policies  or  acting  in  a  way  that  involved  going  back  on  EU 
commitments to the relevant part of the EU rules and norms as set out in the Treaty. If 
backsliding is defined as unilateral and systematic acts by a member state government 
that violates the laws and/or the norms of the EU, this means that there are several 
ways  in  which  governments  can  backslide.  The  first,  and  most  obvious  way,  is  by 
government’s  adopting  policies  (laws,  decrees,  guidelines  etc.)  that  limit  the 
independence  of  national  courts,  independent  national  agencies  (if  independence  is 
required by EU law), the media, or civil society institutions. The second involved the 
government putting forward policy agendas that are incompatible with EU law and 
norms, i.e. declaring an open rejection of EU values. The third, and least common, is a 
 “Article 50 author Lord Kerr: I didn’t have UK in mind – The EU’s divorce clause was designed amid 9
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government’s  use  of  executive  power,  e.g.  by  making  political  appointments,  in 
violation of EU norms. 
An act that qualifies as backsliding can be classified as either hard backsliding  or soft 
backsliding: If it violates both EU rules relating to the rule of law and EU norms, it falls 
under  the  definition  of  hard  backsliding.  If  it  violates  EU  norms,  but  only  violates 
ordinary EU rules set out in, for example, directives on age discrimination, this could be 
categorized as soft backsliding. The central point here is that when it comes to the rule 
of law, the borderline between hard and soft backsliding is blurred and depends very 
much on the response by the European Commission, Council or European Parliament. 
If  any of  the three call  for  an Article  7  procedure,  this  would be indicative of  their 
perceiving an act as a matter of hard backsliding: a violation of the rule-of-law related 
acquis.  The  same  holds  if  the  Commission  begins  a  Rule  of  Law  procedure.  If  the 
Commission  opts  for  ordinary  infringement,  or  EU  leaders  merely  express  concern 
about  developments  in  a  member  state,  this  can  be  taken  as  an  indication  of  soft 
backsliding. 
Two developments in the late 1990s indicated that the EU might one day face problems 
in terms of some of its member states’ commitment to the rule of law – whether in the 
form of hard or soft backsliding. The first was the Commission’s 1997 assessment of 
Slovakia’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen Criteria: “Slovakia does not fulfil 
in  a  satisfying  manner  the  political  conditions  set  out  by  the  European  Council  in 
Copenhagen, because of the instability of Slovakia’s institutions, their lack of rootedness 
in political life and the shortcomings in the functioning of its democracy.”  Slovakia 10
was thus sent to the back of the queue for EU membership – the only country to be 
relegated in this was on the grounds of limited progress toward liberal democracy (as 
opposed  to  relegation  on  the  grounds  of  limited  institutional  or  administrative 
capacity). Only after a change of government in Slovakia, when the nationalist populist 
government  led  by  Vladimír  Mečiar  was  replaced  by  a  broad  anit-Mečiar  coalition 
government, did the Commission proceed to recommend negotiations with Slovakia. 
The second warning came after the Austrian elections of October 1999, when the far-
right  Austrian  Freedom Party  (FPÖ)  joined  the  conservative  Austria  People’s  Party 
(ÖVP) in government. The other 14 member states were at a loss to how to respond to 
this, and ended up with a combination of bilateral boycotts of the Austrian government 
 European Commission, “Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for 10
Membership of the European Union”, DOC/97/20, 17 July 1997.
and  a  committee  of  three  “wise  men”  appointed  to  report  on  developments.  In 11
September 2000 the member states followed the recommendations of the former Finnish 
president Martti  Ahtisaari,  former Spanish foreign minister Marcelino Oreja and the 
German lawyer Jochen Frowein, and lifted the sanctions.  
The Slovak and Austrian crises foreshadowed the political and economic debate about 
backsliding  in  the  2000s.  The  term  has  now  come  to  encompass  both  political 
developments that threaten the EU’s core values (notably democracy and human rights) 
and  policy  developments  that  challenge  the  coherence  of  the  acquis  communautaire. 
Three  developments  –  all  in  formerly  communist  member  states  –  have  been 
particularly contentious in this respect:
• In the summer of 2010, within months of winning a two-thirds majority in the 
parliament, the Hungarian government embarked on a series of legislative and 
constitutional changes that signalled a likely clash with the core values of the EU 
as  set  out  in  the  Copenhagen  Criteria  and  Article  2.  The  most  dramatic 
development  came  in  2012,  when  the  Commission  referred  Hungary  to  the 
Court of Justice for an infringement case concerning the retirement age of judges, 
prosecutors and public notaries. However, it  opted to confront Hungary on a 
matter of age discrimination rather than a matter of the rule of law. Moreover, 
judiciary  independence  was  only  one  of  several  issues  relating  to  the 
concentration  of  political  power.  In  December  2012,  Commission  President 
Barroso  summed  up  the  problem  succinctly:  "There  are  concerns  about  the 
quality of democracy in Hungary."  Although the matter of early retirement for 12
judges  was  settled,  the  broader  question  of  Hungarian  backsliding  would 
remain on the EU agenda.
• In 2012 Romanian politics  was rocked by the clash between president Traian 
Băsescu and prime minister  Victor  Ponta,  when the  centre-left  Social  Liberal 
Union (USL) government accused the president (from the centre-right  Justice 
and  Truth  Alliance,  DA)  of  abuse  of  power,  and  had  the  parliament  pass 
emergency  decrees  to  have  Băsescu  removed  from  power.  When  the 
 Michael Merlingen, Cas Mudde and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “The Right and the Righteous? European 11
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Constitutional Court objected, its powers were reduced. The EU’s reaction was 
swift  and severe:  Both  Commission President  Barroso  and Council  President 
Herman Van Rumpoy immediately criticized the Romanian government’s failure 
to  comply  with  judgments  of  the  constitutional  court,  summoned  Ponta  to 
Brussels, and announced the prolongation of the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism.  The  prime  minister  eventually  backed  down  from  his  effort  to 
impeach the president.
• After the Polish Law and Justice party’s (PiS) victory in the 2015 elections, the 
party swiftly launched a campaign to change the constitutional order. When it 
began to change the political  order in the winter of  2015-16,  the government 
drew  immediate  criticism  from  both  the  Commission  and  the  European 
Parliament.  On 23 December 2015 the Commission sent a letter to the Polish 
government asking to be informed about the constitutional situation in Poland; 
on 13 January 2016 it launched a dialogue under the Rule of Law procedure; on 1 
June it issued a Rule of Law Opinion; and the Rule of Law Recommendation 
followed on 27 July 2016. Meanwhile, on April 13, MEPs passed a non-binding 
resolution  calling  on  the  Polish  authorities  to  restore  the  ability  of  Poland’s 
Constitutional Tribunal to uphold its Constitution and guarantee respect for the 
rule of law.13
Although the measures the Commission took against Hungary were based on ordinary 
infringement procedures, the then EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding made it 
clear in 2013 that she saw these kind of issues as “rule of law crises” that indicated 
problems of  a  systemic  nature.  The only  West  European cases  to  which she drew 14
attention was the French government’s attempt in summer 2010 to secretly implement a 
collective deportation policy aimed at EU citizens of Romani ethnicity.  Commission 15
President José Manuel Barroso had expressed similar concerns in this 2012 state of the 
union speech, when he warned of “threats to the legal and democratic fabric in some of 
 European Parliament resolution of 13 April 2016 on the situation in Poland (2015/3031(RSP)).  Available 13
at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-
TA-2016-0123+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
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our European states”.  However, Fidesz was a member of the European People’s Party, 16
and both the EP and the member state  governments  divided along party lines.  For 
example, when the (liberal) foreign ministers of Denmark, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands  wrote  a  joint  letter  calling  for  new  measures  to  deal  with  states  that 
violated  fundamental  EU  democratic  values,  Sweden’s  (conservative,  EPP)  foreign 
minister  Carl  Bildt  declined  to  join  them.  Sweden’s  (liberal)  Europe  Minister 17
confirmed that this was because Bildt would not criticize a fellow EPP member.  In 18
contrast to the divisive votes on Hungary, the EP resolution passed by 513 votes to 142 
with 30 abstentions, this time with the help of the EPP. On a vote that was 91% along 
party lines, only the Eurosceptic groups on the right and left flank and the PiS’ own 
European  Conservatives  and  Reformists  (ECR)  opposed  the  motion.  All  British 
Conservative MEPS present loyalty stood by their Polish ally.  Viviane Reding, now an 19
EPP MEP, said: “Last January,  I warned  against the reforms of  the  Polish  government 
aimed  among  others  at  dismantling  the  independent  judiciary.  Three months later, I 
remain just  as  worried.   The attacks  against   the Constitutional   Tribunal,   media-
freedom  and  women's  rights,  are  steps  in  the  wrong direction."20
At the same time, the academic literature coming out of think tanks and universities 
began to analyse the challenge of backsliding. This debate indicates that there is broad 
consensus on three points that are central to the question of whether and to what extent 
rule-of-law backsliding represents a crisis for the EU, or of democratization in general.  21
First, there is a range of populist parties on the left and right flanks of the party system 
across  Europe that  have ideological  profiles  and political  agendas that  are  not  fully 
compatible with all the core elements of liberal democracy – particularly the notion that 
 José Manuel Barroso, State of the Union 2012 Address, 2012, Press Release Database, available at: 16
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 Sveriges Radio, P1, 13.03.201318
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majority  rule  (as  expressed in  elections  though representative  parliaments)  must  be 
constrained  by  the  rule  of  law  (as  determined  by  constitutions  and  interpreted  by 
constitutional courts) and that liberal democracy requires an independent civil society 
(free from excessive political appointments or interference).  Second, most academics 22
writing on the subject regard the danger of such potential crises as more acute in some 
the EU’s  formerly communist  member states,  by and large because they see it  as  a 
matter of reversal of democratization processes that began with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Moreover, many argue that backsliding is a threat that the EU must take seriously. 
 Third, the most important causes of backsliding and rule-of-law crises in the EU are 23
all linked to political ideology and populism. To be sure, the first controversial policy 
measures  in  Hungary,  such  the  extraordinary  taxes  that  hit  foreign  companies 
disproportionately,  were  presented  as  a  response  to  the  domestic  and  international 
financial crises. But subsequent developments in both Hungary and Poland have been 
presented more in terms defending national sovereignty and projecting the will of the 
people,  and  in  opposition  to  liberalism  and  an  international  elite’s  dysfunctional 
policies (including, but not limited to, austerity policies).24
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Two cases  stand out  in  both  policy  reports  and the  academic  literature  –  Hungary 
because of the long series of issues that have been raised time and again since 2010, and 
Poland  because  of  the  seriousness  of  both  the  government’s  actions  and  the 
Commission’s response in the winter of 2015-16. Indeed, in the year 2016, the Financial 
Times featured a full 100 articles critical of Orbán’s illiberalism (to a mere 5 on other 
topics related to Hungary) and 27 articles critical of Kaczynski’s illiberalism (and 8 on 
other Polish topics). Two graphs, based on data from Freedom House, present a clear 
picture of developments in the two states since they joined the EU in 2004. 
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$Part 2 - Backsliding in Poland and Hungary: Between Voice and Exit
Fidesz and PiS have long been critical of important aspects of European integration, and 
are usually classified as Eurosceptic in the party politics literature.  However, although 25
they  have  long  voiced  strong  opposition  to  core  EU  values,  neither  has  advocated 
taking their country out of the EU. In Hirschman’s terms – they have opted for voice 
rather than exit.  Both criticize the club, and want to reform it, but neither is prepared 26
to leave it. However, the EU system also leaves room for a third alternative to loyalty: 
creative compliance.  This involves a sufficient amount of compliance with EU rules to 27
ensure that the state complies in form, while the policy content continues to go against 
the principles of EU rules. In other words creative compliance can be a form of soft 
backsliding – practices that violate norms of part of the EU acquis, without falling foul of 
EU rules to the extent that it becomes grounds for a Rule of Law investigation or Article 
7 procedure. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the most controversial 
cases of Hungarian and Polish policies in the period since the Hungarian 2010 election 
FH Rule of Law
9.0
10.3
11.5
12.8
14.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
ECE 11 EU 28 Poland Hungary
 Paul Taggart and Alex Szczerbiak (eds), The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, 2 vols, Oxford: 25
Oxford University Press, 2008.
 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, 26
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
 Batory, “Defying the Commission: Creative Compliance and Respect for the Rule of Law in the EU”.27
and Polish 2015 election that have drawn criticism from EU institutions on the grounds 
that they might breach fundamental norms and rules – either as soft or hard backsliding 
with respect to the rule of law. 
1. Shortly after coming to power in 2010,  the Hungarian government adopted a 
number  of  new  taxes  that  disproportionately  hit  foreign  companies  in  the 
banking,  telecommunications,  energy  and  food  retail  business.  Although  the 
government argued that this was legal under EU rules,  it  immediately raised 
questions  about  its  commitment  to  the  EU’s  rules  and  norms  against 
discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  national  origin.  The  Commission  opened 28
infringement procedures against the extra tax levied on the telecommunications 
sector,  but  based  this  on  rules  that  require  that  specific  charges  on  telecoms 
operators be directly related to covering the cost of regulating the sector. Two 
years later the Commission withdrew the case, after losing a somewhat similar 
case  against  France  in  the  European  Court  of  Justice.  Although  the  tax  was 
criticized  in  the  financial  press  as  discriminatory,  the  Commission  opted  to 
pursue it as a violation of rules that ban the use of telecoms taxes to generate 
additional  revenue  for  the  central  budget.  In  the  end  the  tax  thus  did  not 29
qualify  as  backsliding,  but  the  Commission’s  decision  to  focus  on  the  least 
controversial aspect of the possible violation of EU rules foreshadowed its future 
preferences for treating policy problems a soft rather than hard backsliding.
2. The  first  major  controversy  related  to  the  rule  of  law  and  independent 
institutions  in  Hungary was the  media  law of  2010,  which drew widespread 
criticism in the international press.  The contentious points, some of which drew 30
sharp criticism from the EP,  included political  control  of  the media regulator, 
limited  protection  for  journalists’  sources,  ambiguous  rules  on  content  and 
sanctions  that  were  open  to  abuse  by  the  government,  as  well  as  political 
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allocation of radio frequencies.  The Hungarian opposition sought to take the 31
battle to international forums, including the EU.  The Commission dealt with 32
the problem as a matter of ordinary infringement related to the transposition of a 
media-related directive, not a rule-of-law matter, and a crisis was averted when 
the  Hungarian  government  backed  down.  However,  the  adjustments  to  the 
Hungarian media law did little to prevent increased centralized political control 
of the media, culminating in the closing down of the main opposition newspaper 
Nepszabadsag in October 2016 – ostensibly on financial grounds.33
3. The next big confrontation between Hungary and the EU concerned judiciary 
reform,  and  particularly  the  early  retirement  of  judges.  The  lowering  of  the 
retirement age from 70 to 62 effectively opened the way for a large number of 
new (political)  appointments,  and was duly criticized as a policy designed to 
weaken the rule of law.  The European Commission opted to deal with it as a 34
matter of illegal age discrimination, and in due course the European Court of 
Justice  did  indeed  find  that  the  Hungarian  law  constituted  unjustified  age 
 CEU Centre for Media and Communication Studies, Hungarian Media Laws in Europe: An Assessment 31
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discrimination.  By  that  stage,  however,  the  political  effects  were  in  place, 35
regardless of the compensation due to individual judges.
4. Two  other  efforts  to  limit  the  independence  of  bodies  for  which  EU  rules 
mandate  independence  also  drew censure  from the  Commission  in  2012:  the 
replacement  of  the  Data  Protection  Commissioner's  Office  and  planned 
legislation that would limit the independence of the Central Bank.  The Central 36
Bank  issues  was  resolved  (with  threats  of  infringement),  whereas  the  data 
ombudsman  decision  was  subject  to  the  infringement  procedure  and  the 
Commission’s decision was confirmed by the Court of Justice in 2014.
5. The new constitution of 2011, the subsequent constitutional amendments,  and 
the use of the new Cardinal Laws (that can only be changed by a 2/3 majority) 
quickly  received  heavy  criticism  by  NGOs,  academics,  journalists  and 
international  organizations  like  the  Venice  Commission  and  Helsinki 
Committees.  When  the  European  Commission  picked  up  on  a  number  of 37
related  cases,  using  ordinary  infringement  procedures,  the  Hungarian 
government backed down and modified the laws so as to ensure compliance 
with the letter  (but  not  the  spirit)  or  EU law:  In  2013,  protesting against  EU 
interference, the government changed its new rules on the relocation of court 
cases, political advertising, and special taxes to raise money in the event of EU 
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fines.  By that stage, the Commission President had taken the exceptional step of 38
sending  a  letter  to  the  Hungarian  prime  minister  underlining  that  “the 
Commission  has  serious  concerns  over  the  compatibility  of  the  Fourth 
Amendment to the Hungarian Fundamental Law with EU legislation and with 
the principle of the rule of law.”  39
6. In  2014,  the  Hungarian  government  was  censured  for  the  first  time  over 
violations of principles related to the rule of law, not by an EU institution but by 
European Economic Area state Norway. When Hungary changed the regime for 
overseeing the grants, Norway interpreted this as breach of the rules for the EEA 
and Norway Grants. The Hungarian police’s subsequent raid of the organization 
responsible for distributing the part of the EEA grants that goes to NGOs did not 
improve relations between the two states. In the diplomatic words of Norwegian 
Europe Minister Vidar Helgesen: ”I am deeply concerned about the Hungarian 
authorities’ measures against civil society and their efforts to limit freedom of 
speech.”  This is  the only case of unambiguously hard backsliding,  since the 40
Norwegian  government  responded  by  suspending  all  payments  to  the 
Hungarian  Government  (but  maintained  the  NGO  fund).  The  episode 41
prompted Helgesen to set out his criticism of the Hungarian government and the 
EU’s weak stance in a sharply worded letter to the Financial Times: “Hungary’s 
Government is turning its back on the West”, “launched a crackdown on civil 
society”,  and  “is  now  violating  the  terms  of  the  agreement  for  these  [EEA] 
funds”, adding that he was “puzzled and disappointed that a response from the 
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EU institutions has been largely lacking.”  When the Hungarian government 42
eventually backed down and “accepted all the conditions” set by the Norwegian 
government, Helgesen drew a clear conclusion from this episode: “It pays-off to 
stand up for fundamental values. […] We are under so much pressure externally 
that it’s  even more important to ensure internally that we hold each other to 
account in Europe. The EU should take learning from that.”  43
7. After the election victory on 25 October 2015, the new Polish PiS government lost 
no time in confronting the EU. On November 19, the Polish parliament used an 
accelerated  procedure  to  amend the  Law on  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  and 
introduce the possibility to annul the judicial nominations. It then proceeded to 
annul all  five appointments to the constitutional  court  made by the outgoing 
parliament. Two weeks later the court ruled that three of the five could take up 
their seats (three seats were vacated during the old parliament’s tenure; two only 
subsequently),  and obliged the president to take the oath of the three validly 
elected judges without delay. On 22 December, another a law amending the law 
on the Constitutional  Tribunal  followed,  which raised the threshold for  court 
rulings. The Commission responded the next day, with a letter that asked to be 
informed about the constitutional situation in Poland. In January, it followed up 
with  a  discussion  on  recent  developments  in  Poland  and  the  Rule  of  Law 
Framework.  Its  Rule of  Law Opinion duly followed on 1 June.  The Polish 44 45
government effectively ignored the Rule of Law Recommendation in July and its 
three-month deadline,  and took the view that  it  was,  in  prime minster  Beata 
Szydło‘s  words  “incompatible  with  the  interests  of  the  Polish  state”.  The 46
Commission’s  giving  Poland  a  new,  two-month,  deadline  in  December  did 
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nothing to change matters, other than provoking the Hungarian prime minister 
to emphasize that he would block any attempt to use article 7 against Poland.47
8. The Commission’s criticism of the Polish government’s actions in violation of EU 
norms and rules on the rule of law also extended to the government’s measures 
to limit the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal by refusing to have the 
court’s  judgments  published,  thereby  preventing  constitutional  court  rulings 
from taking effect. This pertained to the court’s judgment of 9 March 2016 to the 
effect  that  the  law  of  22  December  2015  was  unconstitutional,  as  well  as  to 
subsequent court rulings.  Meanwhile the Venice Commission had also issued 48
an opinion to the effect that it deemed the amendments of 22 December to be 
incompatible with the rule of law.49
9. In addition to its censure of Poland’s measures relating to the organization of the 
judiciary,  the  Commission  also  raised  concerns  about  the  effectiveness  of 
constitutional review of new legislation, with a view to the new controversial 
media law. It emphasized the necessity that  “the Constitutional Tribunal is able 
to  fully  ensure  an  effective  constitutional  review  of  legislative  acts.  Other 50
controversial proposals included a law \designed to limit demonstrations.”51
Over the last six years, backsliding has thus emerged as a third alternative to the binary 
choices  of  voice  and  exit:  disloyalty.  To  be  sure,  the  EU  has  long  struggled  with 
individual member states’ occasional lack of compliance, but this has mostly been a 
matter of limited capacity or poor implementation in practice on the part of the member 
states. Open defiance of EU rules has been in extreme exceptions – as the 1995 ‘beef 
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crisis’  when the  UK abstained from votes  in  the  Council  in  protest  over  veterinary 
restrictions on beef exports testifies.  Nevertheless, in Hungary since 2010 and Poland 52
since  2015,  national  populist  governments  have  adopted  a  strategy  of  defying 
“Brussels” more openly, calling for a “cultural revolution” in the EU and promising to 
defend each other against Commission efforts to use the Article 7 procedure.  In the 53
EU, whether a policy initiative amounts to backsliding in terms of the rule of law or the 
independence of institutions and civil society is very much in the eye of the beholder. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in light of its limited power, the European Parliament has been 
bolder than the Commission and the Council. However, even in the EP, many parties 
have been reluctant to – in the language of Article 7 – “determine that there is a clear 
risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2”. The 
Commission opted for a softer approach in the Hungarian case, but quickly began to 
test its new Rule of Law instrument against Poland. The member states have been more 
divided, and very reluctant to criticize one of their own number.  If backsliding is both a 
threat and a crisis in the eyes of the EP, the Commission’s reaction hardly includes the 
element of urgency that is need to classify backsliding as a crisis. Almost no member 
state – the exception is EEA member Norway – has reacted in a way that merits the term 
crisis management.
The Commission’s strategy with regard to the various cases that could qualify as hard 
of soft backsliding in Hungary has been to treat these cases formally as a matter or 
ordinary  infringement.  At  the  same  time,  both  Barroso  and  Reding  were  quite 54
outspoken about the threat these developments – and Orbán’s rhetoric – posed to liberal 
democracy  and  the  rule  of  law.  This  amounts  to  a  very  cautious  approach  to 
backsliding,  treating  it  a  soft  rather  than  hard  backsliding,  in  contrast  to  the 
Commission’s  much  stronger  reaction  to  developments  in  Poland  in  the  winter  of 
2015-16. In 2012, commenting on the Cardinal Laws, the Commission warned that: “As 
guardian of the Treaties, the Commission remains preoccupied that a number of the 
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new provisions may violate EU law.”  That same year, Barroso said of the Hungarian 55
prime minister that: “Those who compare the European Union with the USSR show a 
complete lack of understanding of what democracy is” and that they “fail to understand 
the important contribution of all those who have defended and fought for freedom and 
democracy.”  However, the most vocal criticism of the Hungarian government came 56
from came from the USA, Norway and the Council of Europe, including US Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton.  The Council of Europe’s Thorbjørn Jagland pointed out that the 57
CE has a much broader mandate than the EU to act against violations of the rule of law 
and human rights.  Viviane Reding later defended the Commission’s soft strategy in an 58
interview with  Reuters:  "I  prevented worse  […]  It  did  not  change  dramatically  the 
nationalistic  course  of  the  Hungarian  prime  minister,  but  at  least  it  stopped  him 
dismantling the independence of the courts and the independent data authority."  Jean-59
Claude Juncker’s greeting the Hungarian Prime Minister with a jovial “Hello, Dictator” 
at  the  2015  Riga  Summit  could be  taken as  an  indicator  that  the  new Commission 
continued  its  two-track  strategy  of  combining  political  pressure  with  ordinary 
infringement  procedures.  On  22  March  2017,  Commission  Vice-President  Frans 60
Timmermans (whose portfolio includes the rule of law) made it clear that the member 
states must make sure that “these values serve not only as ornament or a bouquet of 
flowers. The Commission cannot do this alone. The member states have a responsibility 
too”.61
The European Parliament adopted a much more critical  line,  and issued a series  of 
reports on developments in Hungary after the new 2011 constitution (the Basic Law) – 
which  at  that  point  had  already  been  criticized  in  strong  language  by  the  Venice 
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Commission.  The EP’s strategy was thus – even in the face of opposition by the EPP – 62
to  treat  many  of  the  developments  in  Hungary  as  a  form  of  hard  backsliding  –  a 
violation of both EU norms and EU rules pertaining to liberal democracy and the rule of 
law. The EP’s 16 February 2012 Resolution on the recent political developments in Hungary 
expressed serious concern in relation to the exercise of democracy, the rule of law, and 
the system of checks and balances,  referring to the new 2011 constitution (the Basic 
Law).  The Resolution of 3 July 2013 used much the same language.  Reding, who 63 64
went on to become an EPP MEP, was particularly critical of her own party’s rallying 
behind Fidesz, and confirmed that the EPP had considered expelling their Hungarian 
member: "It was always the political parties which helped the prime ministers I was 
acting against - the Socialists with Ponta, and the EPP when I acted against Hungary."  65
In 2015,  the EP again condemned the Hungarian government’s  policies  –  now with 
reference to  the prime minister’s  suggestion that  the country might  reintroduce the 
death penalty  –  and noted that  a  serious breach Article  2  values  would trigger  the 
Article 7 procedure. The EP then called for the Commission to activate the first stage of 
the Rule of Law framework and initiate “in-depth monitoring process concerning the 
situation  of  democracy,  the  rule  of  law  and  fundamental  rights  in  Hungary.”  Six 66
months later, the EP followed up with another call for the Commission to activate the 
Article 7 procedure.67
Finally, the member states themselves, both individually and collectively in the Council 
of Ministers and the European Council, have been remarkably cautious. This is in sharp 
contrast  to  the strongly worded reactions of  the US government (under Democratic 
president Barack Obama) and the Norwegian government (led by Conservative Erna 
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Solberg).  For example, in 2012 then Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt replied to 68
domestic critics of his reluctance to speak out against fellow EPP-member Orbán by 
arguing that this was a matter “between the Commission and Hungary” and anyone 
who called for governments to criticize other EU governments “”misunderstood what 
the European system looks like.  Around the same time, Der Spiegel reported critically 69
on German conservatives’ reluctance to openly criticize fellow ‘conservatives’.  In 2013 70
the spectre of Fidesz’ expulsion hung over an EPP meeting, but in the end no formal 
calls for expulsion were made. An EPP source who asked for anonymity told BBC that 
"there  were  many  supportive  statements"  for  Orbán  and  “the  outcome  was  quite 
positive for Mr Orbán and he received huge applause at the end".  As a member of the 71
ECR rather than the EPP,  Poland’s PiS enjoyed considerable less  protection in 2016. 
However,  it  could  count  on  the  support  of  the  Hungarian  prime  minister  in  the 
European Council, and – to the extent that the party’s vote in the European Parliament 
is a guide to party policy – the UK’s Conservative government. Even in the Polish case – 
where  Timmermans  accused  the  government  of  peddling  “alternative  facts”  – 
ideological,  pragmatic  or  party  political  division among member  state  governments 
looked set to prevent any recourse to Article 7 in 2017.72
Part 3 - Rule of Law Backsliding, Disloyalty and EU Crisis Management 
The definition of a crisis in the TransCrisis project holds that a crisis must have three core 
characteristics:  threat,  urgency  and  uncertainty.  By  this  definition,  backsliding  with 
respect to the rule of law in Poland and Hungary qualifies as a potential crisis for the EU. 
Since the threat  and urgency elements are very much contested,  even the notion of 
invoking EU crisis management in controversial. Indeed, the EU’s three main tools for 
managing backsliding with respect  to the rule of  law in a member state – ordinary 
infringement procedures,  the Rule of  Law procedure,  and the Article  7  procedure – 
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therefore  each  equip  the  organization  with  a  different  set  of  crisis  management 
capabilities.
The threat element of a crisis refers to fundamental values that may be undermined as a 
result of some form of adversity. Both the European Parliament and the Commission 
have  emphasized  the  threat  that  certain  laws  enacted  in  Hungary  pose  to  the 
fundamental values of the EU, including democracy and the rule of law. Likewise, both 
bodies emphasized the threat that country’s new constitution represented to the rule of 
law. However, there has been no consensus among the member states on this. Some – 
notably  Germany,  Denmark,  Finland  and  the  Netherlands  –  have  been  more 
forthcoming than the rest. It is also in the nature of this kind of issue that the charges 
levelled by the Commission will be hotly contested by the target states – and any other 
state  that  regards  itself  as  a  potential  target.  Moreover,  both  in  the  EP and among 
member  state  governments,  reluctance  to  criticize  the  Fidesz  government  has  been 
higher among MEPs and government ministers that represent parties that belong to the 
European People’s Party. The requirement that the remaining member states must agree 
unanimously on Article 7 measures against any given state therefore makes it unlikely 
that the European Council “determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach” 
in the event that two or more member states are under scrutiny for backsliding. When 
the Commission criticized Warsaw over its measures against the judiciary in January 
2016, Orbán made it clear that “The European Union should not think about applying 
any sort of sanctions against Poland because that would require full  unanimity and 
Hungary will never support any sort of sanctions against Poland.”73
The urgency element of a crisis refers to the perceived need for timely action to deal with 
the crisis. This is contentious in the matter of backsliding on the rule of law, not only 
because  different  actors  hold  different  views  about  the  degree  of  urgency,  but  also 
because the EU decision making procedures provide for a period of investigation and 
assessment before formal opinions are issued. Most of the Hungarian cases were treated 
by  the  Commission  as  ordinary  infringements  of  EU law,  even when they  entailed 
measures  that  could  be  seen  –  and  were  seen  by  the  Commission  President  –  as 
threatening the rule of law.  Nevertheless, in terms of placing an issue on the agenda, 
the Commission can take action remarkably swiftly. The Rule of law procedure followed 
within weeks of the Polish government’s action on judicial appointments.  When, on 
March 28th 2017, the Hungarian government tabled amendments to the Law on Higher 
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Education  targeted  at  the  Central  European  University,  Commission  Vice  President 
Timmermans raised the issue at the weekly meeting of the College of Commissioners 
the very next day.  In terms of detecting an emerging crisis and placing it on the policy 74
agenda, the Commission therefore seems to have attached increasing priority to rule of 
law issues since the Polish election result in 2015. 
The  third  element  of  a  crisis  –  that  it  entails  a  degree  of  uncertainty  –  is  less 
controversial in the case of backsliding and the rule of law. The notion that when a crisis 
occurs, there is there a lack of reliable information about its causes, its consequences and 
potential remedies certainly holds for issues related to threats to the rule of law. How to 
interpret the values set out in Article 2 is far from clear, and the Article 7 procedure 
remains untested. The Rule of Law framework was tested for the first time in 2016, and 
by the end of the year the consequences of this procedure remained as unclear as ever. 
Evidently the ‘dialogue’ between the Commission and the target state has little effect 
when that  state  in questions used a ‘disloyalty’  strategy.  By March 2017,  the Polish 
government had ignored successive deadlines set by the Commission in its Rule of Law 
Recommendation, but the road ahead was no clearer than it was a year earlier. 
The very existence of a crisis – particularly in terms of whether there is a threat and how 
urgent it  is  –  is  thus in practice a  matter  of  political  contestation when it  comes to 
democratic backsliding. All the EU’s policy tools were designed to deal with a situation 
in which a single state – like Slovakia under Mečiar or Austria after the 2000 election – 
might be deemed potentially problematic by all other member states, regardless of party 
affiliations. In a context in which the social democrat and conservative blocs in the EP 
divide along party lines to protect a member of their group, or in which two or more 
governments  openly  challenge  Article  2  values,  crisis  management  is  by  definition 
politicized.  This  means  that  the  EU  procedures  lose  much  of  their  traction.  The 
Commission’s  powers  and  competences  are  strongest  when  it  comes  to  ordinary 
infringement procedures, where it operates under guidelines that are tried and tested 
and subject to contestation in the Court of Justice after a decision has been made. The 
Commission’s capacity for swift reaction to backsliding is even stronger under the Rule 
of  Law  procedure,  but  here  the  EU’s  decision-making  powers  are  correspondingly 
weak. Likewise, other than pass resolutions, there is little the European Parliament can 
do.  Conversely,  the  EU has  considerable  powers  to  sanction  a  member  state  under 
Article  7,  but  here  the  organization’s  competence  in  terms  of  detection  and  sense-
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making are weakened by operating in the shadow of the need for unanimity among the 
member states. 
Table 1:  Seven crisis management steps under three EU procedures for dealing with 
backsliding
Detection – the timely recognition of an emerging threat – is relatively similar across the 
three procedures.  In the ordinary infringement procedure,  the Commission can take 
action on the basis of its own investigations or act on complaints from a range of actors, 
including members of the public,  businesses,  NGOs, etc.,  as well  as petitions of the 
European Parliament. Under the Rule of Law Framework, the Commission begins an 
investigation when it is concerned that a policy initiative might violate the rule of law – 
and ultimately Article 2. An Article 7 procedure can be put on the agenda by a reasoned 
proposal  by one third of  the member states,  by the European Parliament  or  by the 
Commission. In effect, detection in all three cases depends on the media and reports 
from a range of organisation such as NGOs. In most of the case of backsliding cited 
Infringement Rule of Law Article 7
Detection Commission 
monitoring and 
complaints to the 
Commission
Commission 
monitoring 
Commission, EP or 
member states 
monitoring
Sense-making The Commission 
launches formal 
infringement 
procedure
Commission Rule of 
Law Opinion
Commission, EP and 
member states
Decision-making Commission decision 
(and Court of Justice 
adjudication)
Commission Rule of 
Law Recommendation
The Council
Coordination Commission cooperation with the target 
member state, monitoring and following-
up
Meaning-making Commission advice to the target state Untested
Communication Commission dissemination of information 
Accountability Commission’s public 
accounts and case in 
the event of a Court 
case
European Council 
decision making under 
the Article 7 
procedure
above,  private  or  public  actors  complained  loudly  about  the  Polish  or  Hungarian 
government’s acts (or planned acts) before the Commission or EP took up the issue. 
Compared to the press, NGOs and academia, the Commission, EP and Council have 
relatively limited capacities for independent detection of crises. In terms of leadership, 
the Commission has proven cautious, and the EP and Council riven by party political or 
ideological  divisions.  Although  leading  Commissioners  (the  president  and  the 
Commissioners in charge of  the relevant portfolio)  have spoken out time and again 
against backsliding in the rule of law, this did not translate into more than ordinary 
infringement in all the Hungarian cases. In the EP party loyalties have not prevented 
‘detection’, as the left went after the national populist right-wing Hungarian and Polish 
governments  and  the  right  was  happy  to  criticise  the  left  in  Romania.  But  in  the 
Council, even detection of backsliding is impaired by consensus and/or party political 
ideologies. Only individual states have even raised the issue.
Sense-making – the collecting, analysing and sharing of critical information needed for 
a shared picture of the situation – is even more contentious than detection. In all three 
cases the main onus is on the Commission to investigate and assess the matter. The 
procedures  are  in  place,  but  the  Hungarian  cases  indicate  that  the  threshold  for 
invoking them is rather high. In the Polish case the Commission moved more swiftly, 
and collected, analysed and disseminated information about its findings concerning the 
PiS government’s rule of law violations. In this case the Commission demonstrated that 
it has the capacity to analyse a potential threat, as well as the political will to exercise 
leadership.  This  is  in  stark contrast  to  the Hungarian cases,  where the Commission 
seemed to avoid analysis of the potential consequences of the threat, and chose to focus 
on narrow potential breaches of directives on age discrimination, data protection and 
cross-border  media  operations.  Although  several  Commissioners  have  made  strong 
political  statements,  in  terms of  sense-making and leadership their  action compares 
rather unfavourably to the Norwegian response to the crisis over the EEA and Norway 
grants.  Indeed,  in  the  Hungarian cases,  much of  the  sense-making was  left  to  civil 
society, the media, NGOs and even other governments.
If member state backsliding in the rule of law is considered a potential crisis for the EU, 
decision-making – the selection, making and implementation of strategic decisions that 
relate to the immediate crisis response and its aftermath – has been the main stumbling 
block  for  EU crisis  management.  In  cases  where  the  Commission opts  for  ordinary 
infringement,  this is  simply a matter of the Commission making a decision and the 
European Court of Justice acting as the final court of appeal. The procedures are well 
established, and formally they worked well in most of the Hungarian cases. However, 
deploying  a  strategy  of  creative  or  disloyal  compliance  permitted  the  Hungarian 
government to adjust its rules so as to comply with the letter of the law but still achieve 
most of its goals – ‘European in form, but national in content’. Likewise, the Polish case 
demonstrated  the  Commission’s  capacity  and  leadership  ability  as  far  as  issuing 
opinions and reports is concerned. But in both sets of cases, the Commission held back 
from opening an Article 7 procedure on the grounds that it could not expect an Article 7 
vote to pass in the European Council. If the Commission had the capacity and will (i.e. 
leadership) to consider invoking Article 7, the same cannot be said of the EP and the 
Council. In the EP it is clear that party politics repeatedly prevented recourse to Article 
7, the EPP successfully protecting Fidesz and the ECR standing by PiS. In the Council 
other considerations contribute to limited leadership – publically stated reasons for not 
criticizing  fellow  governments  include  consensual  norms,  appropriateness,  party 
loyalty and ideological commitment to national populist defiance of the EU. 
Because the only action against backsliding that has gone beyond the decision-making 
state is ordinary infringement and the Rule of Law procedure, it is too early to say much 
about coordination, meaning-making, communication and accountability in the Article 
7 procedures. Suffice it to note that coordination, meaning-making, communication and 
accountability would require joint action between the member states, the Commission 
and the Council President. 
As  for  the  ordinary  infringement  and  Rule  of  Law  procedures,  the  Commission’s 
capacity  and  leadership  is  not  in  question.  The  problem  is  that  even  after  an 
infringement ruling (including confirmation by the Court of Justice), compliance in the 
EU system is based on the idea that the member state acts in good faith. The same is 
very much the  case  in  the  event  of  a  Rule  of  Law Opinion –  as  the  Commission’s 
difficulties with handling the Polish government’s dismissal of the whole thing in the 
autumn of 2016 showed. In both cases coordination – collaboration between partners – 
means  that  EU  and  the  target  state  must  work  together  loyally.  In  the  Hungarian 
infringement cases the opposite happened. Indeed, the Commission’s normative power 
has proven much less impressive that much of the academic literature on the subject has 
assumed  –  both  in  terms  of  Hungary’s  substantial  (as  opposed  to  merely  formal) 
compliance  with  infringement  rulings  and  of  Poland’s  response  to  Rule  of  Law 
Opinions and Recommendations. 
Meaning-making and communication – the Commission’s formulating a key message 
that offers a convincing explanation of the threat – is likewise unproblematic in terms of 
formal capacities under infringement and Rule of Law procedures. However, in practice 
the  Commission’s  ability  to  formulate  and  communicate  a  message  that  resonates 
beyond the expert policy community might well be questioned. In both the Hungarian 
and Polish cases, the messages that reach the public in the two states is shaped almost 
exclusively by the very governments the Commission is acting against (indeed, political 
control over the media was one of key concerns in both countries). In other words, the 
Commission can (and does) provide plenty of actionable advice,  both in the case of 
normal infringements and under the more exceptional Rule of Law procedure, but the 
problem is that the target states are – almost inevitably – not particularly disposed to 
follow it. In the Rule of Law case, the shadow that the unanimity requirement in the 
Council in the event of an Article 7 vote casts over any Commission action effectively 
waters  down  the  impact  of  the  Commission’s  decisions  as  long  as  it  can  expect 
protection from one or more member states. 
The Commission’s limited room for manoeuvre in terms of effective meaning-making 
and  communication,  in  turn  has  direct  consequences  for  accountability  in  crisis 
management.  Although  the  Commission  lacks  neither  the  opportunity,  capacity  or 
leadership required to render an explanation in a public forum of relevant decisions and 
strategies  that  were  initiated  before,  during  and after  the  crisis,  the  very  nature  of 
clashes  between  the  Commission  and  backsliding  member  states  means  that 
accountability  is  likely  very  quickly  to  turn  into  a  blame  game  where  the  target 
governments  blame liberal  elite.  Indeed,  when the Hungarian government  complies 
with infringements threats or rulings, the government’s line is normally that this is done 
under  duress,  in  the  face  of  oppressive  and  somewhat  illegitimate  force.  In  the 
Hungarian prime minister’s own words: “We bow to force, not arguments”.  In the 75
case  of  the Commission following up a  Rule  of  Law Recommendation by invoking 
Article 7, the accountability stage simply becomes the decision-making stage of the Article 
7 procedure. 
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Table 2: Summary of issues related to EU crisis management capacity and leadership 
across seven crisis management steps.
Conclusion: The Problems of Managing Disloyalty and the Spectre of Open Defiance 
The problem with member state backsliding with respect to the rule of law is that – 
almost by definition – this involves direct confrontation between the EU instructions 
and member states that challenge the very legitimacy of the EU’s fundamental rules and 
norms. Not all EU states comply with all EU rules all of the time. Sometimes this is 
because of  limited capacity  for  implementation,  and in  some cases  it  even involves 
disputes  about  what  the  EU  rule  in  question  actually  means.  The  EU’s  ordinary 
infringement procedures were designed with this in mind, and in a large number of 
cases this never goes beyond the initial stage. The system is based on an assumption 
that member states seek to comply with the spirit of the law, even if they occasionally 
fall foul of the letter of the law. The problem with backsliding is that the reverse is often 
the case – a government might be prepared to adjust the letter of the law and formal 
procedures, but circumvent the Commission’s rulings and maintain the breach of the 
spirit of the law. The causes of backsliding are therefore not so much related to financial 
crises, a backlash against austerity policies, or even an anti-EU or anti-liberal political 
wave, as simply a matter of populist, Eurosceptic governments winning power as part 
of the normal pattern of alternation in government in countries where the main political 
cleavage is not socio-economic left vs right but liberal vs national populist. To the extent 
that such governments espouse the ‘illiberal democracy’ model advocated by Viktor 
Step EU crisis management capacity EU leadership and crisis 
management
Detection Limited, but increased with the 
Rule of Law procedure
Politically divided and contentious
Sense-making High thresholds Reluctance to court controversy
Decision-
making
Veto points Too divided 
Coordination Weak procedures and enforcement Limited will 
Meaning-
making
Little capacity or mandate Does not resonate with recipients
Communicatio
n
No capacity for communication 
beyond elite
Resistance to actionable advice? 
Accountability Little effect beyond elite Blame game
Orbán, the stage is set for confrontation over rule of law issues. Part of the logic behind 
Article 50 was that states for whom loyalty was impossible and voice was not enough, 
there would be an explicit exit option. Fidesz’s political genius lay in the invention of a 
new strategy beyond voice  but  short  of  exit  –  disloyalty.  The  first  seven years  this 
strategy worked well for the Hungarian government, as it allowed the Commission to 
claim a degree of victory in Budapest by forcing formal compliance while Orbán could 
present himself at home as the defender of national interests against foreign agents as 
“we, the sovereign nations, stand in opposition to the federalists, and the voters stand 
in opposition to the Brussels bureaucrats”.  PiS’  victory in Poland changed all  this. 76
Although the Polish election provided the Fidesz government with an ideological ally, it 
also drew renewed attention to the problems of backsliding and the inadequacies of the 
Commission’s two-track political pressure-plus-infringement strategy. In contrast to the 
Hungarian  government’s  ability  formally  to  comply  with  EU  rules,  Beata  Szydło‘s 
government  and  Lech  Kaczyński’s  party  seems  determined  openly  to  defy  the 
European Commission. The question is whether the strategy of open defiance will, in 
the end, undermine the disloyalty strategy – or whether backsliding will persist, and 
perhaps develop further, until it presents the EU with something that the Commission, 
the EP and even the remaining member state can agree constitutes a crisis. 
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Backsliding in corruption and corruption control 
Agnes Batory
Abstract
This chapter discusses whether we have witnessed soft backsliding in (particular forms 
of) corruption and corruption control in EU member states, and to what extent 
backsliding may be attributed to EU wide crises, in particular the economic crisis. It 
finds no evidence of a direct link between backsliding in corruption and corruption 
control and the crisis, although the latter had an indirect impact. The European 
Commission emerged as the key EU institution to assume responsibility for the policy 
area, but efforts to create a new plank of EU activity have been halted, suggesting that 
corruption as a policy issue is not perceived as sufficiently pressing to prompt more 
decisive intervention. The paper concludes that this underestimates the magnitude and 
nature of the negative impact of corruption on the EU’s economic and political system. 
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References
1. Introduction
A recent study conducted by Rand Europe for the European Parliament estimates that 
‘corruption costs the EU between €179bn and €990bn in GDP terms on an annual 
basis’ (EPRS 2016). Even the considerably lower estimate of €120bn by the 2014 EU 
Anticorruption Report (EC 2014) is equal to roughly one third of all funding available 
for regional and cohesion policy in the 2014-20 period, for instance.  The European 77
Commission warned in 2014 that ‘up to a quarter of the value of public contracts in EU 
Member States may be lost to corrupt practices’ (Malmstrom 2014). While variation in 
levels of corruption across the EU is wide, several EU member states score below 
Botswana and some below Jordan on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception’s Index, the most widely used indicator available.  Almost 4 out of 10 78
business people in the Czech Republic report having lost business because a competitor 
paid a bribe – roughly on par with India.  In 2013, one quarter of EU citizens felt 79
corruption affected their daily life, and 56% felt the situation got worse over time as 
opposed to just 5% who said the level of corruption had decreased (European 
Commission 2013). Arguably, corruption has also acquired a more sinister form in recent 
years, at least in Central Eastern Europe. As Transparency International put it, ‘the new 
face of corruption in Europe … [is] not the lawless, ‘anything goes’ environment of the 
immediate post-Soviet period, but the deliberate shaping of the laws and institutions to 
favour a ruling party and its cronies – all under the guise of a nationalist, ‘illiberal’ 
agenda.’80
All this matters not only because huge sums of the taxpayers’ money are diverted from 
their intended productive use in the EU, but also because corruption imposes high costs 
on European societies in terms of undermining trust in political institutions, weakening 
political legitimacy, and acting as a break on investment and economic growth – all of 
which suggest that corruption control should be high on the EU policy agenda. 
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The questions this policy paper investigates are whether the level and/or form of 
corruption is or should be seen as a crisis for the EU; whether there is evidence of 
backsliding in corruption and corruption control in recent years; and how the EU has 
been dealing with corruption as a policy problem. Specifically, the intention below is to 
review trends in corruption and corruption control in selected member states; to discuss 
possible causes and effects of backsliding (to the extent it can be demonstrated), among 
them the financial crisis of 2008; and to map efforts at detection and sense-making on 
the European level. This paper directly relies on and follows up conceptual work and 
mapping of empirical developments in ‘TransCrisis Policy Brief D6.1: Policy paper 
mapping backsliding’ (Sitter et al 2016), and the TransCrisis codebook (Boin et al 2016). 
The next section (2) defines corruption and operationalizes backsliding in corruption 
and corruption control. Section 3 provides an overview of trends in corruption, focusing 
on the ‘new’ member states and distinguishing between administrative corruption on 
the one hand and high-level political corruption/state capture on the other. Section 4 
reviews developments indicating a relaxation of anti-corruption efforts as another sign 
of soft backsliding. The subsequent section (5) discusses possible causes for backsliding, 
including the role of the financial crisis. Section 6 is devoted to policy responses on the 
EU level, discussing whether corruption constitutes a crisis and who/how has assumed 
responsibility for dealing with it. The final section (7) offers some conclusions and 
draws out the policy implications for action on the EU level. 
2. Defining corruption and backsliding in corruption and corruption control 
2.1 Corruption
The literature on corruption goes a long way back, and considerable attention has been 
paid to definitional issues, from Plato to contemporary political theory and policy 
studies. Reviewing this literature is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. It should 
suffice to say that most scholarly definitions in Political Science focus on the notion of 
public office and on deviations from the norms binding on those holding public office 
and thus harming the public interest (e.g., Heidenheimer at al 1989), while public choice 
theory discusses corruption in the context of rent-seeking. A widely used analytical 
approach is to frame corruption as a principal-agent problem, namely as the inability of 
a principal (normally a political leader) to monitor agents (bureaucrats) who, using their 
discretion, decide over public resources not in line with the principal’s intended 
objective but rather for extracting private rents (eg. Klitgaard 1988). Although these 
conceptualizations have come under criticism lately - mainly from scholars approaching 
corruption as a collective action problem (e.g., Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2013) – they 
remain dominant in policy-making. Major international actors on the scene, from the 
World Bank to Transparency International, use a working definition of ‘abuse of public 
office for private gain’. This is also the definition adopted by the European Commission 
(2014: 2) in its first Anti-Corruption Report, in line with international legal instruments, 
notably the UN Convention Against Corruption or the Council of Europe covenants. 
This definition glosses over important distinctions in forms of corruption, such as petty 
vs ‘grand’ corruption; bureaucratic/administrative vs political corruption; and 
particularly sporadic or ‘ad hoc’ vs systemic corruption, ‘legal corruption’ and state 
capture. Some of these categories overlap. For instance, petty and administrative 
corruption both refer to ‘bribery to bend the rules’ (Karklins 2002), practices whereby 
bureaucrats ‘at the implementation end of politics’ enrich themselves, using their 
discretion in applying law and regulations for personal benefit (Andvig et al 2000: 18). 
In contrast, grand or political corruption ‘takes place at the highest levels of political 
authority’, involving political leaders who are in a position to tailor legislation to 
private interests, involving significant pay-offs for both politician and client (Ibid). 
Another distinction is about how corruption is (or is not) organized. Bureaucratic 
corruption is not (normally) centralized; it is individual rent-seeking behaviour by 
public officials in an environment that allows or enables this. In contrast, state capture is 
highly organized, normally by a relatively small number of individuals in key positions 
of political and economic power, but encompassing most or the whole of the political 
system. Indeed, in the case of state capture a parallel, informal set of institutions 
functions next to the formal state institutions, diverting public resources on a huge scale 
to selected groups and hollowing out the transparency and accountability of formal 
state structures. As Karlkins (2002: 27) puts it: ‘Systematic high-level political corruption 
may establish a hidden political regime at odds with the constitutional purpose of state 
institutions’; ‘state capture tends to subvert, or even replace, legitimate and transparent 
channels of political influence and interest intermediation’ (World Bank quoted ibid). As 
an influential study by the World Bank (2000: 13) put it, corruption comes to be ‘woven 
into the basic institutional framework, undermining governance and weakening the 
credibility of the state’ and enabling ‘powerful firms and individual “oligarchs” buying 
off politicians and bureaucrats to shape the legal, policy, and regulatory environments 
… [and] politicians abusing their authority to shift public resources to themselves and 
their allies through well-hidden stakes in a complex web of private and public 
companies’. State capture might entail legal (or legalized) corruption (Kaufmann and 
Vicente 2011). No law is violated, because the ‘extractive rulers … construct rules and 
durable practices of redistribution, budgeting and authority’ and through legislation 
build institutions that serve rent-extraction (Grzymala-Busse 2008: 639).
These distinctions are important for analytical purposes, since they allow for describing 
different ‘constellations’ of corruption in a political system. For instance, there are 
countries where corruption is rife both among high level political decision makers and 
on street level. In others political leaders may successfully repress low level petty 
corruption while they carry on enriching themselves, possibly at far greater cost to the 
citizen than what would be imposed by corrupt practices encountered in daily life. In 
some political systems bureaucratic corruption might be tolerated by political leaders 
who are themselves relatively clean, for instance to ensure low level bureaucrats’ 
support for the regime or simply to supplement low public sector wages (e.g., 
Huntington 1968; Maor 2004). And in the case of state capture, tight, small networks of 
individuals in business and politics essentially subvert the state in a highly organized 
and centralized manner to the extent that formal public institutions become little more 
than a façade. 
These distinctions also have very important implications for corruption control. Viewed 
from a principal-agent framework perspective, corruption involving principals – the 
very people who are in a position to affect change – becomes an almost intractable 
problem. This is in essence the problem often described as ‘lacking political will’: high 
level political leaders who have a vested interest in maintaining a corrupt status quo 
will obviously do everything they can to block reform. Indeed, in these situations much 
of the literature focuses on exogenous sources of influence – be that from international 
organisations, or from external shocks – to move the political system to a new, less 
corrupt equilibrium.  In contrast, with respect to cases where there exists an honest 
principal (for instance, a new political leader is elected who is not involved in rent-
seeking) a host of policy measures have been found to be available for curbing 
corruption. Many of these were rooted in Public Choice and the New Public 
Management -- Susan Rose-Achermann’s work  (1999) is perhaps the best known in this 
respect --and belief in their effectiveness rose and fell together with the credibility of 
neoliberal economics and the ‘Washington consensus’ (see e.g., Rothstein 2011, Persson 
2013; Batory 2012a). Be as it may, the point remains valid that on systemic level ‘top 
heavy’, organised corruption poses fundamentally different challenges for reform than 
‘bottom heavy’ corruption. 
2.2 Backsliding in corruption and corruption control
Defining backsliding has been the subject of our earlier TransCrisis paper (Sitter et al 
2016). The literature reviewed there essentially uses the term to refer to a reversal of 
democratization and the weakening or undermining of the norms underpinning liberal 
democracy, including the rule of law. As our previous policy paper put it: ’Much of the 
work on reversal of democratization also focuses on the consequent decline in the 
quality of democracy, including low transparency and state capture by elites. This is in 
effect a decline in good governance, or what Thomas Carothers (2007) calls “bad 
governance” and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2014) documents as “drops in democratic 
quality” (Sitter et al 2016: 4).  In short, for the purposes of the Transcisis project, 
‘Backsliding is defined as unilateral and systematic acts by a member state government 
that violate the laws and/or the norms of the EU’ (Sitter et al 2016: 8). 
Our previous paper also made a distinction between hard and soft backsliding. Hard 
backsliding occurs when acts or policies violate the fundamental norms and values of the 
EU linked to liberal democratic governance and also directly violate EU primary or 
secondary law (the acquis). For instance, a member state government removing an 
ombudsman for data protection undermines checks and balances in a constitutional 
system and also, as the ECJ ruled with respect to Hungary in 2014, EU law guaranteeing 
the independence of the authorities responsible for the protection of personal data 
(Directive 95/46). In contrast, in the case of soft backsliding, member states’ acts or 
policies involve violation of their major commitments to the EU without directly 
violating the acquis, or at least the relevant part of the acquis (Sitter et al 2016: 9). For 
instance, the obligatory early retirement of judges may violate the relevant directive on 
discrimination in the workplace, again as the ECJ decided with respect to Hungary, 
even if, at least according to the Commission, it does not run counter to EU law 
pertaining to the protection of judicial independence, which is on the other hand clearly 
a liberal democratic norm that is foundational to EU governance.
Operationalising backsliding in corruption in the EU context is a complex task, and 
requires answering two preliminary questions: can member states be said to be bound 
by an EU norm to combat corruption (soft backsliding)? And is corruption control part 
of the acquis (hard backsliding)? 
The quality of democracy is severely impaired by corruption in several ways. It 
undermines ‘distributive justice – namely the “impartiality principle”, whereby a state 
ought to treat equally those who deserve equally’ – as well as social expectations of a 
‘rule-based administration’ (Kurer 2005: 222). The perception of wide-spread corruption 
undermines trust in institutions more broadly and may lead to resignation and apathy 
among citizens who feel that the political system is not responsive to their needs and 
preferences (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Corruption may also empty electoral 
accountability of its meaning: if competing political parties are all seen, to some degree, 
corrupt then party choice and a change of government cannot be expected to bring 
significant improvement in public affairs. Unsurprisingly, a perception of wide-spread 
corruption therefore also suppresses electoral participation (e.g., Sundström and 
Stockemer 2013), and also goes hand in hand with lower levels of support for 
democracy (Rose et al 1998). To the extent that democracy and the rule of law need to be 
underpinned by a functioning market economy, corruption imposes further costs in 
terms of depressing economic growth and output (for a review of this literature see 
EPRS 2016). Given this link with the quality of democratic (and economic) governance, 
a rise in levels of corruption or the (deliberate) weakening of existing anti-corruption 
policies and instruments can clearly be conceptualized as backsliding.
In terms of soft backsliding, there is strong evidence that combating corruption is both a 
norm in the EU and a commitment by the (new) member states. This can be traced back 
to several roots. First, all member states have an obligation to uphold the foundational 
values of the EU embodied in Article 2 TEU, which refers to the rule of law, respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and human rights. Given the link 
particularly with the rule of law, corruption has an obvious relevance for member 
states’ ability to uphold Article 2. Second, corruption control was seen to form part of 
the Copenhagen criteria, setting out the conditions for prospective new member states 
for joining the EU in 1993, which was then applied to judge the preparedness of the 10 
‘new’ member states acceding in 2004/07, and since then Croatia. Although corruption 
was not explicitly mentioned, during the accession negotiations the Commission 
considered it being covered by conditionality (and indeed in the framework of the still 
active Cooperation and Verification Mechanism vis-à-vis Bulgaria and Romania). The 
justification was that wide-spread corruption can impact on each of the three areas 
evaluated by the Commission, undermining implementation of the acquis 
communautaire, the smooth functioning of the single market, and the quality of 
democratic institutions and core democratic values the Union seeks to represent, with 
most direct link with the latter, so-called political criteria. 
Importantly, corruption control as a democratic norm, or rather a pre-condition for 
other norms to function, was derived not so much from existing EU law but rather the 
member states’ international legal obligations.  The most important sources of these are 
the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Council of Europe civil and 
criminal law covenants on corruption, as well as the OECD anti-bribery convention. 
During the accession negotiations the would-be member states in CEE were expected to 
accede to these international legal instruments – at the time when not all existing 
member states had done so. It was also later, in 2008, that the EU itself adopted the UN 
Convention on Corruption. This is also to say that the EU, lacking a strong and coherent 
legal base in EU law (with the exceptions noted below), ‘borrowed’ the content of 
member state obligations in corruption control from intergovernmental bodies and 
international law – in much the same way as the Commission refers to Venice 
Commission rulings and Council of Europe standards with respect to the rule of law or 
judicial independence. 
This ambiguity of the legal status of anti-corruption is reflected in the academic 
literature. Writing in 2009, Vachudova (2009: 50, emphasis added) points out that, 
although ‘EU members are now in agreement that a spirited fight against corruption 
should be required of candidate states’,… ‘the fight against corruption as such is not part 
of the acquis’ since ‘[the member states] have never agreed to a set of EU-level anti-
corruption policies’ (see also Anagnostou and Psychogiopoulou 2014). In contrast, 
Kartal (2014: 944) takes it for granted that corruption control obligations are part of the 
acquis since accession negotiations treat them as conditions for entry. Indeed, the 
Commission’s enlargement website makes it clear that candidates need to adopt ‘all 
current EU rules (the "acquis")’, including obligations under the rule of law.  This 81
specifically entails, in addition to judicial independence, that aspirant countries’ 
‘government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law and that political 
leaders and decision-makers take a clear stance against corruption; [and] the process by 
which laws are prepared, approved and enforced is transparent, efficient, and 
fair’ [emphasis added].   The 2010 Stockholm Programme provided a mandate to the 82
Commission to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption policy for the EU, but this has 
not happened (see section 6 below). 
Putting aside the possible asymmetry between requirements for candidate countries 
and obligations binding on existing member states, some EU (secondary) law does exist 
in a few specific areas related to the anti-corruption field. These consist of, most notably, 
i) instruments for the protection of the EU’s financial interests (a convention 
from 1995). In 2012 the Commission proposed a Directive in the same area in 
criminal law, which has been blocked by the Council, and not adopted to this 
day. Both primarily aim to combat fraud damaging the EU budget (not the 
member states’); 
ii) a convention against corruption involving EU or member state officials 
obligating member states to punish active and passive corruption (bribery of 
officials, and acceptance of bribes) as a criminal offence;
iii) a Council Framework Decision (2003) on combating corruption in the private 
sector, which mainly aims at harmonizing definitions across the member 
states; 
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iv) anti-fraud provisions in the directives regulating public procurement;
v) legislation pertaining to the status and powers of OLAF (the European Anti-
Fraud Office, a specialized agency of the Commission), as well as relevant 
parts of sectoral legislation on matters relating to fraud, corruption and other 
offences affecting the EU financial interests in the Structural Funds, 
agricultural policy and rural development funds, direct expenditure and 
external aid that form the legal basis of OLAF investigations. 
Taken together, the patchwork of these legal instruments constitutes only a limited set 
of very specific obligations rather than a comprehensive EU anti-corruption framework. 
Even the existing legal instruments are not uniformly transposed across the member 
states and there are serious gaps in implementation and enforcement (EPRS 2016: 10). 
Moreover, much of the legislation constrains/compels member states only when EU 
funds are at stake; in other respects EU level legal rules aim mainly at the 
harmonization of certain minimum standards such as the criminalization of corruption 
offences. Consequently, backsliding in anti-corruption will mainly take the form of soft 
backsliding, and even in that respect the standard from which backsliding can be 
evaluated is clearer with respect to the member states that joined the Union under 
conditionality embodied in the Copenhagen criteria. These ‘new’ member states 
explicitly consented to making concerted efforts to combat corruption as a condition of 
entry, and were monitored in doing so before accession was allowed to take place. For 
these member states, a worsening corruption situation clearly involves going back on a 
commitment given to the EU and thus a reversal of pre-accession policy and practice. 
In terms of indicators of what might constitute a worsening corruption situation (as 
compared to the pre-membership status), there are two lines of inquiry. On the hand, 
analysis needs to evaluate trends in the level and/or form of corruption in the member 
states and on the other, the quality of effort made by member states to control 
corruption. The two are obviously related, but do not necessarily point in the same 
direction at any given point in time. This is partly because corruption is a multi-causal 
societal phenomenon: a lot of factors are at play some of which are and some of which 
are not responsive to policy interventions. And it is partly because of a time lag between 
policy intervention and effect. For instance, it is possible that determined efforts to 
combat corruption are underway in a highly corrupt country, but before policy 
interventions bear fruit levels of corruption may stagnate or even rise. A notable 
example of this is the Italian magistrates’ mani pulite campaign, which at least initially 
made Italy (seem) more, rather than less corrupt (Mungiu Pippidi 2016: 25). Conversely, 
governments may relax control measures without an immediate, visible eruption of 
corruption taking place. Also, given that corruption is a complex phenomenon it is 
possible that policy interventions are effective against particular forms of corruption or 
in specific sectors, without decisive improvement being in evidence overall. For 
instance, as one observer comments about Romania, ‘[it] is the country where 
generalized corruption and the toughest anticorruption in Europe have been co-existing 
for the past ten years. The result is not less corruption, but crowded jails’ (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2017: 5).
Observing trends in either field (corruption/anti-corruption) is made more complicated 
by the absence or weakness of quantitative benchmarks, as discussed in our previous 
policy paper (Sitter et al 2016). Indeed, as recent scholarly analysis concludes, ‘the study 
of changes in levels of corruption is still in its infancy’ (Escresa and Picci 2016). Bearing 
this in mind, the following section proceeds to provide an overview of levels and forms 
of corruption and control efforts in selected member states. As our earlier paper argued, 
this analysis focuses on the ‘new’ member states as it is among these countries, in 
addition to Italy and Greece, that existing quantitative indicators show corruption to be 
the most serious problem, albeit with considerable cross-country variation. 
3. The state of play: Levels and forms of corruption 
The first question to investigate is whether we see more corruption in the EU now than 
in the years prior to the financial crisis. Unfortunately the most commonly used 
indicators, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the 
World Bank governance indicator Control of Corruption both suffer from widely 
recognized methodological weaknesses, which severely limit the possibility of 
comparing countries to each other as well as observing trends over time (see eg Knack 
2007; Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadasov 2016). ‘Although the statistical methods vary 
somewhat, both
standardize corruption indicators from numerous sources to place them on a 
comparable scale, and compute an average (unweighted for TI, weighted for WBI) to 
obtain one value for each country’ (Knack 2006: 262). It is consequently unclear what 
exactly these indexes measure, whose perceptions they report and what kind of sample 
biases they show, how the different data sources are integrated, and how and to what 
extent new developments on the ground feed into changing the scores.  Taken with this 83
rather large pinch of salt, the appendices of our previous paper (Sitter et al 2016) show 
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that most new member states stagnated or showed only short term improvement or 
worsening in corruption over the last decade or so. It is only a handful of countries that 
seem to have made visible progress in reducing corruption in general (Estonia, in any 
case one of the cleanest countries in the EU, and Poland), while some others (Hungary, 
Slovenia, Italy and Greece) are perceived to be more corrupt than before. 
However, as pointed out before, generic corruption scores may mask important 
variation on country level in terms of the kinds of corruption societies may experience, 
with some forms possibly declining while others increase and vice versa. State capture 
and high level political corruption is particularly difficult to track. One data source that 
promises to provide some information in this respect is the World Bank enterprise 
surveys, which include questions on administrative corruption as well as state capture, 
with the limitation that the surveys are conducted with firms and therefore reflect a 
business perspective (Knack 2007). With respect to administrative corruption several 
questions pertain to the need for bribery in various sectors (e.g., taxation) and bribery 
depth (the percentage of transactions where bribery is expected) or bribery incidence 
(percentage where bribery is experienced).  In early versions the state capture questions 
asked respondents’ opinions on e.g. paying bribes to influence the content of new 
legislation. In more recent editions of the survey the relevant questions tap into 
exchanges to secure government contracts, i.e. corruption in public procurement 
(assuming that it is here that the centralized corruption that is likely to affect for 
instance large infrastructure projects would be most visible). 
Using this kind of World Bank enterprise survey data, an earlier study observed that the 
post-communist countries made notable progress between 2002 and 2005 (roughly the 
years before the 2004 enlargement) in administrative corruption, but not in state capture 
(Knack 2007). More recent survey data are shown in Annex 1, and also confirm that 
countries that make progress in combating administrative corruption – the aspect that is 
most likely encountered by ordinary citizens in their daily life - are by no means certain 
to also roll back state capture. For instance, in Croatia the incidence of administrative 
corruption appears to have decreased while corruption in government contracting 
increased. In Hungary and Slovenia the administrative corruption situation stagnated, 
but in both countries state capture as indicated by government contracting increased by 
a very large volume. In contrast the data indicates that Poland curbed administrative 
corruption but shows no significant change in state capture. In Lithuania the former 
increased while the latter similarly stagnated. Finally, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia and Romania improved with respect to both forms of corruption. The surveys 
also confirm that corruption generally remains a major constraint for businesses, as 
indicated by 26% of respondents in Lithuania, 27% in Bulgaria, and 46% in Romania – 
in contrast with just 3% in Estonia and 7% in Latvia (2013). 
Additional information on state capture or institutionalized grand corruption is 
available for particular countries or groups of countries in some existing studies. 
Unfortunately systematic cross-country comparison is not possible but some of the 
findings are nonetheless worth reporting here: 
- A 2014 European Commission report, edited by Balazs (2014: 35) finds that ‘Unlike 
in most Western European countries, the danger of state capture (when external 
private interests take over public policy formation) seems to be a recurrent 
phenomenon in some Eastern European countries as shown by countries like 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia’. 
- A study of public procurement spending financed from EU funds in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia finds that ‘there is considerable market access 
restriction, hence likely institutionalised grand corruption, going on in all three 
countries during the 2009-2012 period, by and large following the same techniques 
and ‘tricks’ ... These results on their own demonstrate that corruption is systemic in 
public procurement in these countries’ (Fazekas et al 2013). The methodology of the 
study draws on publicly available public procurement data, and analyses these data 
sets for the incidence of techniques used for limiting competition and favouring 
companies belonging to corrupt networks. As Fazekas et al (2013: 19) find, ‘EU 
funding considerably increase[s] corruption risks in Central and Eastern Europe in 
at least two principal ways. First, by making a large amount of additional public 
resources available for rent extraction in public procurement; second, by failing to 
implement sufficient controls counter-balancing additional resources for corruption’. 
- Another study by Fazekas and Toth (2014: 26) using public procurement data and 
network analysis for Hungary alone finds that ‘state capture is [an] established, 
daily practice in approximately 60% of Hungarian public sector organisations 
conducting public procurement between 2009-2012’ and that ‘The networked nature 
of political corruption in Hungary makes any administrative fixes to corruption 
likely to fail’.   
- An in-depth qualitative study of Hungary by Magyar (2016) describes the country’s 
ruling party Fidesz as ‘political apex predator’, and the political system as a whole 
as ‘post-communist mafia state’, in which power and wealth are concentrated in the 
hands of a small group of insiders (a political ‘family’), and where the insiders 
extract rents not through overt violence but through selectively targeted 
parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, and taxation.
- Vachudova’s (2009) study finds that ‘What we observe today in Bulgaria and 
Romania are the ongoing consequences of an extended period of state capture’. 
- A 2012 National Integrity System study on the Visegrad countries by Transparency 
International finds that 
‘In Hungary we can find several grand corruption cases where powerful interest 
groups and national “minigarchs” are able to manipulate state laws and policies 
for their own benefits. Rent-generating cartels are typical in mega-projects such 
as large-scale motorway and bridge projects. As Hungarian examples suggest, 
corrupt economic cliques extract huge amounts of public money from the system 
through intentionally designed and professionally managed corrupt networks. In 
Poland the state-business relationship in corruption often works in the opposite 
direction. Here we can find several “state captures the business” cases when 
public officials extort bribes from business people or even seize private assets 
using illegal means such as blackmail. … In Hungary beyond the “normal” 
10−15% kickbacks for small public projects at local levels we can find 
intentionally designed and professionally managed corrupt network systems 
siphoning off huge amount of public money from large scale public 
projects’ (Transparency International 2012b: 15; 21).
4. Quality of anti-corruption efforts 
As argued above, soft backsliding in corruption is most likely manifested in relaxing 
efforts to combat corruption and/or deliberately undermining existing anti-corruption 
and transparency instruments. Benchmarking and comparisons across countries and 
time are equally difficult as capturing changes in levels or forms of corruption – despite 
the fact that a number of quantitative indicators purport to do precisely this. Measures 
such as the World Bank ‘control of corruption’ are also indexes drawing on surveys 
mapping perceptions, not an assessment of actual policy interventions in the anti-
corruption area. The Freedom House Nations in Transit (NIT) ‘corruption’ measure 
(referred to below) is a composite of evaluations of legal frameworks against corruption 
but also of public perceptions and as such it is a relatively imprecise measure. 
Bearing this in mind, there is nonetheless some existing work mapping possible trends 
in corruption control. For instance, Transparency International’s flagship (largely) 
qualitative comparative National Integrity System study points out that ‘Apart from 
Bulgaria and Romania, which continue to have serious integrity deficits, the majority of 
the newly acceded countries’ can be classified as exhibiting mixed progress in the fight 
against corruption’, but also that ‘The evidence suggests that since accession to the EU 
in 2004, there has been a rolling back on progress made in the fight against corruption in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia’ (TI 2012a: 16 and 17). 
Kartal (2014: 945) uses NIT data to investigate whether backsliding has taken place in 
the new member states since they joined the EU, and finds that indeed, ‘the average 
level of corruption control increases prior to membership bit it decreases noticeably 
afterwards’. He argues that the principal reason for backsliding is the weakening of the 
EU’s political leverage once membership is achieved. However, this does not explain 
why, according to the NIT data below, the Baltic states continued to strengthen anti-
corruption efforts post accession while the Visegrad 4 did not, or why the latter group 
of countries seems to have experienced a temporary boost to corruption control in 
2009-10. (This discussion feeds into the broader academic debate on whether domestic 
factors can counterbalance the absence of conditionality post-accession; see Batory 2010 
and Sitter et al 2016 for a review of this literature). 
Control of corruption in EU-member CEE countries before and after accession 
(Kartal 2014)
$
Source: Kartal 2014: 945. 
Note: the data used is the Freedom House Nations in Transit ‘corruption’ indicator, 
which reflects expert assessment of ‘public perceptions of corruption, the business 
interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and 
the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives’ (Freedomhouse.org). 
Going beyond quantitative data, one way to capture whether corruption control efforts 
increase, stagnate or fall back is to consider the fate of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), 
which, where they exist, are at the pinnacle of control efforts. Indeed, ACAs are often 
portrayed as the sine qua non of effective anti-corruption, and the creation of these 
agencies – often due to policy transfer by global transfer agents such as the UN, the 
World Bank and the EU – is used by governments to signal their commitment to 
cleaning up public life (Batory 2012b).  However, as an earlier study of the ACAs in 84
Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia shows, governments either create agencies that are very 
weak in terms of formal powers (‘paper tigers’), or create strong agencies with the 
expectation that the agency will only damage opposition parties (‘attack dogs’) and 
whenever an ACA actually performs its job well governments make concerted efforts to 
undermine it or diminish its independence (Batory 2012b). 
These observations are largely born out by the European Commission’s 2014 Anti-
corruption Reports, which mapped each member states’ measures in place and 
evaluated the effectiveness of policies on the national level. The Report does not score 
member states’ performance, but pinpoints areas that were deemed to be particularly 
problematic. As the excepts below suggest (Box 1), most of the ACAs – in the member 
states that created specialized anti-corruption agencies – faced repeated attacks against 
their independence, which clearly indicates governmental intention to undermine the 
fight against corruption and thus constitutes backsliding from commitments made as 
part of the EU accession process.  
 
Box 1: European Commission Anti-corruption reports (2014)
Excepts (italics added)
Fighting corruption has long been a priority for Bulgaria, and legal reforms have 
resulted in the establishment of new structures. However, corruption remains 
widespread. The European Commission suggests that Bulgaria should shield anti-
corruption institutions from political influence and appoint their management in a 
transparent, merit-based procedure.
Hungary has in place a number of tools to increase integrity and transparency in public 
administration. Some ambitious anti-corruption policies have been developed. 
However, concerns remain, such as those related to informal relations between 
businesses and political actors at local level.
 This is despite the fact that countries with ACAs do not necessarily perform better than those that do 84
not have specialized agencies (Mungiu-Pippidi 2016). 
Latvia has made progress in preventing and addressing corruption, with a searchable 
online database of political donations. It is developing and refining its anti-corruption 
laws. This ongoing work is positive, but there are concerns remaining about the 
implementation of the legal framework. The European Commission suggests build on 
the achievements of the Bureau for combating and preventing corruption (KNAB) by 
strengthening its independence and protecting it from potential political interference. 
Poland has been implementing measures and fine-tuning policies against corruption, 
however a more strategic approach is necessary to ensure comprehensive solutions. 
Thus, in this report, the European Commission suggests implementing a long-term 
strategy against corruption, listing specific actions, the timeframe and resources for 
their implementation, and those responsible.  … The Commission also suggests that 
Poland should strengthen safeguards against potential politicisation of the Central Anti-
Corruption Bureau (CBA).
In Romania, both petty and political corruption remains a significant problem. 
Although some positive results have been observed when it comes to prosecution of 
high level corruption cases, political will to address corruption and promote high 
standards of integrity has been inconsistent. In this report, the European Commission 
suggests that Romania ensures that all necessary guarantees remain in place to safeguard the 
independence and continuation of non-partisan investigations into high-level corruption 
cases, including with regard to elected and appointed officials.
Slovakia has made considerable efforts to improve the legal anti-corruption framework 
for criminal law and public procurement. However, several factors limit the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption work; problems with legislation, the perceived lack of 
independence of parts of the judiciary, and close ties between the political and business 
elite. In this report, the European Commission suggests that Slovakia should strengthen 
the independence of the judiciary.
Slovenia has been among the most active of the Central and Eastern European states in 
the fight against corruption, with a well-developed legal and institutional anti-
corruption framework. However, recent years appear to have seen a decline in the 
political drive against corruption, amidst allegations and doubts about the integrity of 
high-level officials. ... The Commission is also suggesting that Slovenia should safeguard 
the operational independence and resources of anti-corruption bodies and prosecution services 
specialized in combating financial crime
(accessed at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-67_en.htm on 22 March 2017)
A country case that merits closer attention here is Romania, where the National Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DNA), a specialized prosecution service, has achieved 
spectacular success in going after high level political corruption. Among the over 1250 
indictments over corruption in a single year (2015), DNA has sent to trial a sitting prime 
minister, five ministers, 16 MPs and 5 members of the senate as well as several mayors, 
and seized over half a billion euro worth of assets, clearly signaling that high position or 
political connections alone are no longer sufficient to avoid prosecution.   There is also 85
evidence that DNA prosecutes politicians from within the ranks of both the opposition 
and government parties of the day,  thereby diverging from the ‘attack dog’ pattern 86
described that characterizes other powerful agencies in the new member states. It seems 
that what allowed this unusual combination (extensive powers and independence in 
operations) was a window of opportunity created by intense pressure from the EU, in 
the form of pre-accession conditionality directly before Romania’s accession in 2007, the 
presence of a reform-minded minister of justice in office in Romania as well as the 
appointment of a particularly committed corruption fighter as head of the agency. The 
pattern observed elsewhere, of the agency being subject to intense political attacks to 
undermine its independence, does however hold. For Instance, the Commission’s 2014 
Anti-Corruption Report for Romania notes that in 2013 the then ruling government 
tried to use appointments to the agency as a way to put pressure on the DNA leadership 
in relation to on-going cases relating to high level politicians. So far the agency has 
however managed to push back against these attacks and maintain its level of 
activism.  87
Another clear sign of efforts to weaken existing measures against corruption, and thus 
of backsliding, is efforts to restrict freedom of information, thereby making it more difficult 
for citizens and journalists to uncover evidence of malpractices. Hungary, which has no 
ACA, is a case in point. On the fringes of the sweeping changes undermining checks 
and balances and the rule of law in the country (Sitter et al 2016), Viktor Orban’s 
government has also introduced legislative changes to restrict channels of public 
accountability. These consisted of, among others, 
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(i) replacing the independent data protection and freedom of information 
ombudsman with a data protection authority in 2011, cutting short the 
ombudsman’s term and, according to the Commission (2012) at the time, 
‘creat[ing] the possibility that the prime minister and president could dismiss the 
new supervisor on arbitrary grounds’.
(ii) In the wake of several data requests probing into a corruption scandal, in 2013 
the government introduced changes into the FOI act making it easier for public 
bodies to reject information requests; subsequent amendments increased fees and 
waiting times for information requests; and an 2016 amendment exempted the 
state-owned postal service and foundations established by the National Bank of 
Hungary from FOI (both alleged by the opposition to be used for syphoning 
away public money) (see eg. Bertelsman Sustainable Government Indicators ); 88
(iii) Adopting legislation to make donations to sports clubs that can be written off 
from the corporate tax a tax secret (according to Transparency International the 
scheme was used to channel funds to politicians in exchange for the donor being 
awarded lucrative public procurement contracts);89
(iv) Intimidating NGOs; eg. raiding the offices of three non-government 
organizations that distributed EEA/Norway grants, received by NGOs seen as 
‘problematic for "leftist political ties", such as Transparency International, the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union or the investigative journalism portal 
atlatszo.hu’ ;  targeting specific NGOs with planned new legislation on ‘foreign 90
funded NGOs’ – with the law explicitly aimed against organizations that conduct 
high-profile freedom of information/anti-corruption litigation, such as the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union and Transparency International Hungary.  91
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Following criticism from the group, in 2017 Hungary also withdrew from the Open 
Government Partnership, ‘a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete 
commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, [and] 
fight corruption’ – the only country to ever do so apart from Russia.  92
5. Causes and effects
In the previous sections a nuanced picture emerged, suggesting that while the 
corruption situation improved or at least did not get worse in the past years in a 
number of countries (notably Estonia, Latvia), there is evidence pointing at backsliding 
in some areas: even in member states that made progress against administrative 
corruption, high level political corruption/state capture seems to be entrenched (as seen 
in corruption affecting public procurement) and/or efforts to undermine anti-
corruption and transparency mechanisms can be detected (e.g. Romania, Hungary). The 
question here is what might be driving these processes, and in particular, whether the 
2008 financial and economic crisis (or other EU-wide crises) might play a role. 
With respect to the latter question, the answer is probably “no” – at least there is no 
evidence of a direct link between the crisis and backsliding in corruption, other than the 
impact in terms of affecting the level of public resources devoted to corruption control. 
In Lithuania, for instance, the Special Investigation Service (STT) had its budget cut in 
2009 to the extent that the STT management told the relevant parliamentary committee 
that ‘the level of funding compromised its ability to attract and retain experienced 
officers, to combat large-scale bribery, and to monitor political corruption’ (EC Anti-
Corruption Report Lithuania 2014: 7). However, the cuts took place in the context of an 
austerity package that cut public sector agency budgets across the board, which does 
not suggest a deliberate effort to defang the agency (although the decrease in STT 
salaries to parity with other law enforcement agencies did have the effect that many 
experienced investigators left, thereby weakening the service; Kuris 2012a: 18). The 
story is similar in Latvia where the agency’s budget shrank by 30%, but also in the 
context of cuts affecting the whole of the public sector, and with the agency managing to 
realize savings without cutting operational staff (Kuris 2012b: 14). The fact that the 
Baltic republics remain among the cleanest of the new member states despite being 
among the hardest hit by the crisis also cautions against assuming a direct link. 
As to what caused backsliding in corruption, where we do see evidence pointing to 
backsliding, there is no simple answer. As we pointed out in our previous report (Sitter 
 Accessed at https://www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/ogp-support-unit/2016/12/07/media-92
briefing-government-hungary-withdraws-open-government on 31 March 2017.
et al 2016), given the absence of an EU-wide trend, or at least a uniform trend 
characterizing a group of member states, the drivers will be found in a combination of 
country-specific factors and political dynamics. Here the 2008 economic crisis may have 
played an indirect role, in weakening electoral support for mainstream parties and 
giving a boost to populist and/or fringe parties and thereby making the wide consensus 
necessary for effective corruption control efforts (such as the establishment of genuinely 
independent control institutions) even more difficult to achieve. However, to date no 
systematic analysis has proven this link. On the other hand, econometric analysis 
provides support for the claim that (in transition economies in general) the volume of 
(administrative) corruption has grown because the crisis increased people’s economic 
vulnerability which was in turn exploited by public officials extorting bribes (Ivlevs and 
Hinks 2015). Econometric analysis has also shown that the crisis has had an impact on 
perceptions of corruption: ‘individuals in countries that experienced the worst of the 
economic crisis report more perceived corruption on the part of their 
governments’ (Gugiu and Gugiu forthcoming). 
6. Policy response on the EU level: does corruption constitute a crisis?  
According to the TransCrisis codebook, ‘we speak of a crisis when a considerable 
number of people (including politico-administrative elites) agree that a certain situation 
constitutes a disruption of normalcy, a threat that requires an urgent response’, where 
the potential disruption may concern ‘fundamental values (e.g. security, health or 
integrity)’ (Boin et al 2016: 5). The three key conceptual elements of crisis are threat, 
uncertainty, and urgency, all of which are subjectively constructed (ibid). A 
transboundary crisis is in turn a crisis that crosses boundaries either in a geographical 
or sectoral sense (ibid). 
Regarding the first of the conceptual elements, the presence of a threat, corruption can 
clearly qualify as a crisis given its clear detrimental implications for the economy and 
the core values of the Union, particularly the rule of law, as discussed above. As the 
European Commission (2011: 3) put it in its Communication ‘Fighting corruption in the 
EU’: 
‘[corruption] harms all EU Member States and the EU as a whole. It inflicts 
financial damage by lowering investment levels, hampering the fair operation of 
the internal market and reducing public finances. It causes social harm as 
organised crime groups use corruption to commit other serious crimes, such as 
trafficking in drugs and human beings. Moreover, if not addressed, corruption 
can undermine trust in democratic institutions and weaken the accountability of 
political leadership.’  
Uncertainty, the second element, is a given with respect to corruption, considering how 
difficult the phenomenon is to define, empirically capture and measure, and the fact 
that there is no consensus either in academic or policy analysis on what constitutes 
effective remedies against corruption. And there was at least one critical juncture when 
discussions about corruption as a policy and normative problem acquired an element of 
urgency – the final key defining feature of a crisis as per the Codebook. This critical 
juncture is the 1999 resignation of the Santer Commission in the wake of a huge 
corruption scandal. An independent expert committee appointed by the European 
Parliament uncovered evidence of wide-spread corrupt practices in the Commission. 
This led to a crisis of legitimacy and eventually to a raft of reform measures, embodied 
in the 2000 ‘White Paper on Reforming the Commission’ and introduced by the Prodi 
Commission under the direction of Neil Kinnock (Nastase 2013). Further changes were 
introduced as part of Sim Kallas’ European Transparency Initiative, which, among 
others, also aimed to overhaul the professional ethics infrastructure of the Commission 
(Nastase 2013). 
Whether these reforms have gone far enough is hotly debated (see e.g. Transparency 
International EU 2014). Apart from the Commission, where revolving door problems 
and lack of transparency in lobbying seem to persist, the European Parliament too was 
rocked by the cash for amendments scandal in 2011, and reports of dubious if not 
outright corrupt expenses claims by MEPs commonly feature in the press. These kinds 
of doubts about the probity of the EU institutions overshadow the arguably equally, if 
not more, important agenda of controlling corruption in the member states, and provide 
ammunition to Eurosceptic politicians,  and to member state governments resisting 93
any push from ‘Brussels’ to clean up public life in national capitals. 
This may explain, at least in part, why progress on creating EU competences in the area 
of anti-corruption has been so limited. As summarised above (section 2.2), EU law 
pertaining to corruption is patchy, and key EU competences are missing for 
implementing and enforcing even the limited scope of legislation that is in force. 
Notably, the European Court of Justice does not have the power to rule on EU-level 
corruption cases; there is no EU level prosecution of transnational cases; and OLAF (the 
European Anti-Fraud Office) can only make recommendations to member states (TI EU 
2013).  This means that even when individual cases of corruption are uncovered, it is up 
to member states to decide what they do with the information – and apparently only 
 In the words of the head of the Leave campaign prior to Brexit, ‘Brussels is a very corrupt place full of 93
bureaucrats’, accessed at http://www.politico.eu/article/leave-campaign-head-brussels-very-corrupt-
place/ on 31 March 2017.
46% of OLAF notifications are followed up by national authorities.  Another part of the 94
explanation for limited progress on the EU level on anti-corruption is that while the 
problem is recognised as serious (‘It is not acceptable that an estimated 120 billion Euros 
per year, or one percent of the EU GDP, is lost to corruption’; European Commission 
2011: 3), it is not seen as urgent, or as urgent enough, given that corruption is (correctly) 
perceived to be as something that is, at least to some extent, always present in political 
life (‘[t]his is certainly not a new problem to the EU, and we will not be able to totally 
eradicate corruption from our societies’; ibid).
Having said this, a number of ‘crisis management’ tasks can be identified as being 
undertaken on the EU level.  Detection obviously applies: corruption as a problem 95
appeared on the policy agenda first with the scandal around the Santer Commission, 
and stayed on the agenda throughout the protracted process of Eastern enlargement, 
with the then member states and EU institutions highly concerned that the CEE 
countries joining would mean importing high levels of corruption into the Union – 
hence anti-corruption as a highly salient part of pre-accession conditionality. The EU 
institutions have also accumulated vast amounts of data on corruption (‘sense-making’), 
to mention just a couple of examples, dedicated Eurobarometer polls (e.g., European 
Commission 2014) or qualitative studies (e.g. the Rand study commissioned by the 
European Parliament; EPRS 2016). 
There are also clear signs that the European Commission would have liked to assume – 
and to some extent assumed - responsibility for dealing with corruption on member 
state level (coordination, meaning-making and communication as per the Codebook). 
This was based on a mandate the Commission received in the Stockholm Programme 
(2010), where the Council called on the Commission to ‘develop indicators, on the basis 
of existing systems and common criteria, to measure efforts in the fight against 
corruption, in particular in the areas of the acquis (public procurement, financial 
control, etc) and to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption policy, in close cooperation 
with the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)’ (European 
Council 2010). This essentially treated corruption as a form of serious cross-border 
crime – which, in the terminology of the Codebook, constitutes a transboundary threat. 
 Accessed at http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2015-03-24-TI-94
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 According to the TransCrisis Codebook (Boin et al 2016), crisis management tasks consist of the 95
detection of the problem; ‘sense-making’ (collecting and analysing information about the problem); 
decision-making and implementation of a response; coordination among key actors; ‘meaning making’ 
and communication (communicating to citizens); and accountability (explaining and justifying the action 
taken.
Some of the key steps in what may have constituted a new plank of EU activity 
addressing this transboundary threat consisted of the following. 
i) The Commission’s mainstreamed anti-corruption into membership 
conditionality at the time of the 2004/07 enlargement. 
ii) Using the mandate under the Stockholm Programme, in 2011 the Commission 
published a Communication announcing plans to step up efforts to monitor, 
implement and enforce existing anti-corruption standards; to mainstream a 
‘stronger focus on corruption in all relevant EU policies’, and put ‘a stonger 
focus on anti-corruption issues within the EU enlargement 
process’ (European Commission 2011). 
iii) Following up the Communication, the Commission launched a framework 
for ‘a reporting mechanism for periodic assessment’ in 2011  and published 96
what was intended to be the first round of Anti-corruption Reports in 2014. 
The reports, one on each member state, assessed the given country’s strengths 
and weaknesses in the area and provided recommendations. While the 
exercise was relatively tame, the then Home Affairs Commissioner expressed 
hope that ‘this will start a political process and will spur the political will and 
the necessary commitment at all levels to address corruption more effectively 
across Europe. The price of not acting is simply too high’ (Malmstrom 2014). 
(Other relevant EU monitoring mechanisms such as the Justice Scoreboard are 
covered in a parallel TransCrisis report). 
iv) The Commission and the European Parliament pushed for the creation of a 
European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), as a LIBE committee report in 
Parliament put it, ‘as soon as possible, with the participation of as many 
Member States as possible, of an EPPO that is efficient and independent from 
national governments and the EU institutions, and protected from political 
influence and pressure’ (EP LIBE 2016). The EPPO was seen as crucial for 
making EU action possible, given the unreliability of follow-up from national 
authorities in individual cases. A number of member states – including, 
unsurprisingly, Hungary and Poland – sought to block the initiative in the 
 Accessed at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/pdf/96
com_decision_2011_3673_final_en.pdf on 31 March 2017.
Council but in early 2017 a larger group has decided to push on with the 
creation of the EPPO under enhanced cooperation.97
v) Corruption features as part of the country-specific recommendations 
presented by the Commission to the Council in the framework of the 
European Semester of Economic Governance. On the basis of these the 
Council also adopts recommendations; the process is repeated cyclically. 
However, corruption is only a small segment of the reports which mainly aim 
to monitor public finances, and there are no hard sanctions against 
governments not implementing the recommendations (e.g. EPRS 2016: 84).
However, whatever momentum might have been present early in the decade it has been 
all but lost. The Commission’s ambitions (or lack thereof) since then are clearly 
signalled by the GD Migration and Home Affairs website bearing the title ‘Fighting 
corruption: a stronger commitment for greater results’ – last updated in 2011.  An even 98
stronger indication that anti-corruption is no longer a priority comes from the 
Commission’s failure to publish the 2016 edition of the Anti-Corruption Reports. When 
the Reports were first published in 2014, the exercise was very explicitly meant to be 
periodic: as the press release accompanying the first Reports promised, ‘The next EU 
Anti-Corruption Report will be issued two years from now’.  In a letter to the chairman 99
of Parliament’s LIBE committee, Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans 
explained giving up the Commission’s flagship anti-corruption initiative as follows: 
‘Given the complexity and evolving nature of corruption and its prevention, a 
more efficient and versatile approach would therefore be to complement the 
continued focus given to corruption issues in the European semester with 
operational activities to share experience and best practices among Member 
States' authorities and actively working in a wider context alongside 
international organisations such as the UN, Council of Europe, the OECD, G7 
and others’.  100
 Accessed at http://www.politico.eu/article/malta-wont-back-new-eu-corruption-prosecutor/ on 29 97
March 2017.
 Accessed at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2011/20110606_en on 29 98
March 2017.
 Accessed at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-68_en.htm on 29 March 2017.99
 Letter from Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans to the chairman of the EP LIBE Committee, 100
25 January 2017, accessed at http://transparency.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/20170130-Letter-
FVP-LIBE-Chair.pdf. Accessed on 31 March 2017.
In short, the Commission appears to push responsibility for anti-corruption to other 
(not corruption focused) mechanisms and to intergovernmental organisations active in 
the field. 
7. Conclusion and implications
Corruption remains a serious problem for the European Union. It is clear that the 
weakness (or absence) of common action at the European level imposes very significant 
financial costs on the EU (EPRS 2016). Over three quarters of EU citizens believe that 
corruption is widespread in their country (European Commission 2014). There is no 
doubt that this perception – and the reality of corruption, particularly high level 
political corruption – also has serious negative implications for legitimacy and the 
quality of democracy. 
Whether the situation has worsened in the past few years cannot be answered with a 
simple yes or no. In a number of member states particular forms of corruption appear to 
have been curbed, but stagnation characterizes most political systems, and in others 
corruption has merely changed form. There are clear signs that it is common for 
governments especially in the new member states to have gone back on their pre-
accession commitment to roll back corruption, as seen in efforts to undermine anti-
corruption mechanisms or weaken channels of public accountability, particularly 
freedom of information. This paper argued that these processes constitute soft 
backsliding. There is no evidence that the financial crisis or other transboundary crises 
are directly responsible, but they may have played an indirect role by contributing to 
electoral swings empowering or strengthening populist parties. 
The EU is relatively ill equipped to deal with corruption in the member states. EU 
legislation is patchy and weakly implemented in the area, despite the fact that already 
in 2010 there was clear recognition of the added value that would be represented by 
common European action. For some years, it seemed that a new plank of EU activity 
may emerge but in recent years the European Commission, the institution that assumed 
primary responsibility on the EU level, seems to have shied away from further attempts 
to forge a genuine European policy against corruption. The reason for this is that 
corruption as a policy problem is perceived to lack the urgency that is a critical 
ingredient for turning a problem into a crisis. EU leaders and EU institutions have been 
busy putting out more brightly burning fires. However, neglecting action against high 
level corruption and state capture now will impose high costs on European societies in 
the future. 
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Annex	1:	World	Bank	Enterprise	Surveys*	
  
Economy	 Year	 Average/SE/N	
Bribery	
incidence	(%	
of	firms	exp.		
at	least	one	
bribe	
payment	
request)	
Bribery	depth	
(%	of	public	
transactions	
where	a	gift	
or	informal	
payment	was	
requested)	
Percent	of	
firms	
expected	to	
give	gifts	in	
meetings	
with	tax	
officials	
Percent	of	
firms	
expected	to	
give	gifts	to	
secure	
government	
contract	
Value	of	gift	
expected	to	
secure	a	
government	
contract	(%	of	
contract	
value)	
Percent	of	
firms	
identifying	
corruption	as	
a	major	
constraint	 		 		
All	Countries	
	
Average	 17.7	 13.8	 13.0	 29.0	 1.7	 32.6	 		 		
Europe	&	Central	Asia	
	
Average	 18.0	 14.0	 13.7	 25.1	 1.5	 23.5	 		 		
High	income:	nonOECD	
	
Average	 7.3	 5.5	 4.6	 8.7	 0.3	 23.2	 		 		
High	income:	OECD	
	
Average	 1.9	 1.3	 0.7	 14.3	 1.8	 10.5	 		 		
Bulgaria	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 55.6	 33.8	 2.5	 27.2	 		 		
Bulgaria	 2004	 Average	 ...	 ...	 ...	 ...	 ...	 ...	 		 		
Bulgaria	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 42.6	 41.2	 3.2	 20.1	 		 		
Bulgaria	 2007	 Average	 6.7	 4.7	 6.1	 19.9	 0.9	 45.9	 		 		
Bulgaria	 2009	 Average	 10.9	 7.0	 6.6	 23.1	 0.0	 33.5	 		 		
Bulgaria	 2013	 Average	 8.9	 6.4	 6.0	 28.2	 0.0	 27.5	 		 		
Czech	Republic	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 37.1	 28.5	 1.3	 14.9	 		 		
Czech	Republic	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 36.0	 40.4	 2.1	 25.9	 		 		
Czech	Republic	 2009	 Average	 7.1	 4.3	 0.2	 30.3	 1.5	 25.1	 		 		
Czech	Republic	 2013	 Average	 3.5	 1.5	 0.4	 11.2	 1.3	 15.9	 		 		
Estonia	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 19.8	 23.5	 1.0	 3.7	 		 		
Estonia	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 13.7	 8.5	 0.2	 4.3	 		 		
Estonia	 2009	 Average	 5.7	 2.8	 0.0	 1.6	 0.0	 5.4	 		 		
Estonia	 2013	 Average	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 3.2	 		 		
Croatia	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 43.1	 10.8	 0.6	 27.4	 		 		
Croatia	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 20.1	 7.6	 0.2	 17.4	 		 		
Croatia	 2007	 Average	 4.9	 2.9	 6.0	 6.4	 0.1	 18.9	 		 		
Croatia	 2013	 Average	 3.9	 2.5	 0.0	 14.0	 1.1	 19.1	 		 		
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or	informal	
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expected	to	
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Percent	of	
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Value	of	gift	
expected	to	
secure	a	
government	
contract	(%	of	
contract	
value)	
Percent	of	
firms	
identifying	
corruption	as	
a	major	
constraint	 		 		
Hungary	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 29.1	 27.8	 1.7	 8.2	 		 		
Hungary	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 24.2	 28.8	 1.5	 8.6	 		 		
Hungary	 2009	 Average	 1.0	 0.7	 0.7	 30.5	 0.0	 20.4	 		 		
Hungary	 2013	 Average	 2.1	 1.1	 0.0	 51.8	 14.1	 11.0	 		 		
Lithuania	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 29.1	 26.7	 1.4	 18.7	 		 		
Lithuania	 2004	 Average	 ...	 ...	 3.8	 ...	 0.3	 27.6	 		 		
Lithuania	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 35.4	 31.6	 2.1	 16.5	 		 		
Lithuania	 2009	 Average	 7.2	 4.4	 3.4	 14.5	 0.4	 38.6	 		 		
Lithuania	 2013	 Average	 10.4	 9.8	 10.9	 12.9	 0.3	 26.5	 		 		
Latvia	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 37.1	 22.0	 1.6	 15.3	 		 		
Latvia	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 30.0	 24.1	 1.6	 12.8	 		 		
Latvia	 2009	 Average	 8.9	 5.0	 4.4	 48.4	 4.2	 33.9	 		 		
Latvia	 2013	 Average	 3.5	 2.3	 0.9	 5.8	 0.0	 7.7	 		 		
Poland	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 28.3	 23.6	 1.7	 26.4	 		 		
Poland	 2003	 Average	 ...	 ...	 0.0	 12.9	 0.4	 38.4	 		 		
Poland	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 30.4	 12.3	 0.3	 20.6	 		 		
Poland	 2009	 Average	 8.2	 7.1	 4.8	 18.0	 0.8	 24.1	 		 		
Poland	 2013	 Average	 1.9	 1.8	 2.1	 18.7	 0.9	 13.0	 		 		
Romania	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 36.1	 23.3	 1.5	 36.1	 		 		
Romania	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 27.4	 14.7	 0.3	 30.7	 		 		
Romania	 2009	 Average	 19.7	 14.1	 12.1	 38.7	 1.1	 52.3	 		 		
Romania	 2013	 Average	 9.8	 6.1	 6.8	 7.1	 0.5	 46.1	 		 		
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or	informal	
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value)	
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firms	
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corruption	as	
a	major	
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Slovak	Republic	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 43.4	 54.2	 3.2	 30.6	 		 		
Slovak	Republic	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 31.3	 37.1	 1.9	 13.3	 		 		
Slovak	Republic	 2009	 Average	 5.7	 4.3	 3.1	 40.9	 5.3	 31.1	 		 		
Slovak	Republic	 2013	 Average	 4.4	 4.0	 2.5	 22.1	 0.0	 19.0	 		 		
Slovenia	 2002	 Average	 ...	 ...	 15.8	 11.3	 0.4	 4.9	 		 		
Slovenia	 2005	 Average	 ...	 ...	 14.0	 13.3	 0.2	 4.8	 		 		
Slovenia	 2009	 Average	 2.3	 1.7	 0.0	 2.4	 0.0	 9.8	 		 		
Slovenia	 2013	 Average	 0.2	 0.1	 0.3	 31.5	 1.6	 12.2	 		 		
*	data	generated	from	http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Custom-Query;	corruption	and	informality	indicators.	An	Enterprise	Survey	is	a	firm-level	survey	of	a	
representative	sample	of	an	economy's	private	sector.	The	surveys	cover	a	broad	range	of	business	environment	topics	including	access	to	finance,	corruption,	
infrastructure,	crime,	competition,	and	performance	measures.		
**	as	indicated	by	corruption	in	public	procurement.	
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Policy paper summarizing findings on backsliding in equality policies and inclusion 
measures addressing gender, disability and ethnicity based inequalities 
by Andrea Krizsan and Violetta Zentai 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic crises and their management is deeply gendered, racialized and impacting 
disproportionately on vulnerable groups such as disabled people, ethnic or racial minorities 
(Walby 2015). Backsliding of policies and commitments concerning gender equality, equality for 
persons with disability and equality for ethnic and racial minorities in the European Union and 
its member states in the context of the recent economic and financial crisis is seen by many as 
particularly distressing (Bettio et. al 2012, Karamessini and Rubery 2014, Lombardo and 
Kantola 2017, EDF 2014). Research in this field focused mostly on the social impact of the crisis 
on these vulnerable groups, but we know far less about its policy impact1. The question is 
whether in the context of the crisis governments went back on specific EU policy commitments 
in the field of equality policies, or whether the disproportionate social impact is only indirect 
impact of more general austerity measures. Our focus in this paper is to understand European 
retrenchment in equality policy regimes and particularly commitments to EU norms and their 
relation to the economic crisis.  
This report analyzes backsliding in the equality policy regimes of five EU member states 
and looks at the nature and the causes of backsliding. Our approach leaves open the possibility of 
finding alternative explanations for backsliding rather than an exclusive causal link to the 
economic and financial crisis. We look at the extent to which backsliding uses crisis as pretext 
for change, or is a response to or part of crises management. 
In Work Package 6 we define backsliding to mean governments going back on major 
commitments to the EU in a specific policy area. This can take the form of gradual slide away or 
major set-back; can mean various policy choices (including deliberate action or inaction) or 
lowering existing standards. We differentiate between hard backsliding where retrenchment 
involves direct violation of the EU acquis and violates the fundamental norms and values of the 
EU and soft backsliding when retrenchment involves violation of a member states’ major 
commitments to the EU norms but without directly violating the acquis. 
Equality and non-discrimination is a fundamental principle of the European Union. 
Equality between women and men is stipulated in article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.  The Treaty also affirms the principle of non-discrimination on various 
inequality grounds in its Articles 10 and 19. The EU adopted legislation against discrimination 
on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.  
This legislation covered all areas of life for ethnicity and also has extensive coverage for gender 
but it is limited to employment for the other four areas of discrimination. Historically, until 2000, 
the body of EU law only covered gender equality in the field of employment. In 2000 with the 
adoption of two new directives (the Employment Equality Directive for discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, religious belief, age and disability in employment and the Racial 
																																								 																				
1 One exception for gender equality is the volume Gender equality and the Economic Crisis edited by Lombardo and 
Kantola (2017). But even this attempt looks at gender equality separately without a comparison with other equality 
policies.  
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Equality Directive for discrimination on basis of race and ethnicity) protection was extended to 
the other five grounds of discrimination.2 In 2004, the Gender Goods and Services Directive 
expanded the scope of sex discrimination to the area of goods and services.3 These Directives 
stipulate the prohibition of discrimination and prescribe action to promote equality including the 
establishment of independent equality bodies for gender and racial equality. In addition to this 
hard law a series of soft policy instruments set norms and define the framework for national 
commitments for all protected inequality categories.4 This report focuses on three of the six 
inequality categories covered by EU law, the ones that are most widely regulated and also most 
extensively analyzed since the start of the economic crisis: gender, disability and race and 
ethnicity.  
EU Member States have an obligation to implement EU law in their national legislation, 
and thus there is considerable scope for hard backsliding in terms of violation of the acquis.  
However, given the extensive body of soft law and the discretion left to member states in 
adoption of hard law, the field also allows substantial scope for soft backsliding: national 
measures that step back on commitments to EU norms but without a direct breach of EU law. In 
the three examined equality fields the reality is a mixture of hard and soft backsliding. 
Two research puzzles emerge from our approach. First, why some countries face particularly 
strong backsliding in their equality policy regimes and others not, and how is this connected to 
the economic crisis and its management? In order to answer this puzzle we analyze 
comparatively the patterns of backsliding in our five countries looking at the three equality 
policy fields as constitutive of a wider equality policy field, in search for national level 
explanations.  
The second puzzle is connected to differences between the three analyzed equality policy 
fields. These three fields while they have a lot of similarities and overlaps, they are marked by 
different patterns of development over time and complexity in policy measures, and different 
vulnerabilities to backsliding both at the national and the EU level. At the EU level the context of 
the crisis brings backsliding in commitment to gender equality and further questions about the 
centrality of gender mainstreaming as a European policy strategy (Jacquot 2017, Weiner 2017). 
The crisis is seen by many as a lost opportunity to reaffirming respect for gender equality and 
eventually creating a more gender equal European Union (Wiener 2017). At the same time both 
ethnicity and disability policy are marked by important progress around the time of the economic 
crisis. Rather than backsliding the field of ethnicity in the immediate post crisis period was 
marked by the launch of a common Roma5 policy framework for the EU: the Framework for 
National Roma Integration Strategies by 2020, adopted in 2011. European disability policy also 
made important progress during this period: in 2009 the EU has become party to the UN 
																																								 																				
2 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation.  
Official Journal of the European Union, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0054; Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal of the European 
Communities 19.7.2000, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0043 
3 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men 
and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. Official Journal of the European Union, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32004L0113  
4 For a list of standard setting instruments on gender equality see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/law/index_en.htm For anti-discrimination see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/law/index_en.htm  
5 Currently the largest ethnic minority of the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm  
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Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	 (UN CRPD),6 the first international 
legally-binding instrument setting minimum standards for rights for people with disabilities. UN 
CRPD sets the highest standards of commitments on Member States concerning the rights of 
disabled persons and most importantly makes explicit the EU level endorsement for a rights 
based approach to disability rather than charity and medical approach.  
Based on these paths of European development one could expect backsliding on gender equality 
policies but progress on disability policies and policies dealing with ethnic and national 
minorities. 
In addition to variation in the direction of change at the EU level, there is diversity in the 
various equality policy regimes that mediate the transfer of European norms, with different path 
dependencies, national actor constellations and priorities for various aspects of equality policy. 
Literature also argues that there is no one size fits all policy blueprint to these different equality 
policy fields (Verloo 2006). There may be differences between them on a variety of factors: the 
range of positions in each category; the common understanding of the origin of the social 
category; the possible location of the inequalities connected to it; the possible mechanisms 
producing and reproducing them; the norm against which they are compared, as well as in the 
strategies used to address them. The importance of redistributive strategies versus rights and 
recognition based strategies may vary for each of them (Fraser 1995). As such they might be 
differently vulnerable or resilient to the impact of the crisis. Understanding different patterns of 
backsliding across the three issues and explaining those will add to the potential of this analysis.  
Finally, another important aspect to be considered when investigating different equality 
policy fields together is dynamics of competition or oppression Olympics (Martinez 1993) 
between the different equality policy fields, which may be particularly prominent in the context 
of scarce resources to be distributed between various inequality groups, and which may be 
reflected in policy outputs.  
 
2. Research framework and methods 
 
Equality and non-discrimination is a relatively recent area for the EU and thus 
comparative methodology for measuring policy progress overtime continues to be limited.  The 
majority of existent indicators measure social inequalities and progress or backlash along those 
lines, but very few capture policy outputs. In addition, while equality on different grounds can be 
perceived as an integrated policy field, its different subfields continue to be addressed in 
isolation. Gender equality, race and ethnicity, and disability are viewed as the major separate 
fields. The few, fragmented, and mostly one-off indicators that exist are in ‘silos’. This makes it 
difficult to capture trends and patterns of progress or development with standardized sets of 
indicators. Therefore the qualitative analysis of backsliding across these fields is imperative.   
To capture backsliding we rely on conceptualization of policy progress used in the field 
of equality policies (Ferree and Gamson 2003, McBride and Mazur 2010). We use a dual set of 
indicators: we focus both on substantive content of policies and the extent to which they promote 
autonomy and rights of protected groups and on procedural elements, that is the extent to which 
actors advocating for the rights of these groups are included in policy-making. We rely on 
previous analysis done by academics, experts and NGOs for choosing critical elements to be 
examined for backsliding in the equality policy realm. First we look for legal changes in the 
																																								 																				
6 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted on 13 December 
2006, came into force on 3 May 2008.  Available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml  
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realm of anti-discrimination law.  Institutional structures for equality policy and strategic 
planning were marked as particularly hard hit for all three equality fields. Gender equality policy 
agencies were closed, budgets of equality bodies cut, equality policy strategies stalled in several 
European countries. For all three fields we look at backsliding in this realm. Another hard hit 
field that is problematized by different protest movements and also mentioned in the literature 
concerns different distributive social policy measures that ensure equal opportunity or equality 
including care related schemes, pension schemes and protected employment (Bettio et. al 2012, 
Karamessini and Rubery 2014, Lombardo and Kantola 2017, EDF 2014). Finally the absence of 
ex-ante evaluations using a lens of gender, race or disability on austerity packages directed at 
cutting public sector employment, other public benefits, or amendment of tax schemes is also 
seen as problematic. In the absence of such ex-ante examinations the disproportionate impact of 
austerity and restructuring policy packages will inevitably impact more strongly vulnerable 
groups. 
Literature on the crisis emphasizes the importance of participation of interest groups and 
representatives of vulnerable groups in crisis management and policy responses to the crisis 
(Walby 2015). The absence of inclusion and state closure to consultation processes reproduces 
the negative impact of the crisis on vulnerable groups, and as such is a critical indicator for 
backsliding.  
Along these lines we used a series of more specific indicators for each of the three fields, 
which capture the above mentioned elements of backsliding. For gender we looked at the 
retrenchment of equality bodies and gender equality strategies, reduction in family benefits, 
reduction in maternity/paternity allowance, gender insensitive reductions in the public sector 
(wages/personnel) and gender insensitive pension reform. For disability we include 
reorganization and downscaling institutional structures and policy strategies, retrenchment in the 
de-institutionalization process, cuts in supported employment, cuts in support and care services, 
cuts in disability allowances, and the curtailing of needs assessment towards more limited 
definitions for disability. For race we cover retrenchment of legislation to combat racism and 
racial discrimination, retrenchment of specialized bodies, retrenchment of integration policies 
and as a background indicator also changes in the socio-political context in order to capture a 
potential surge in right-wing extremist groups and political parties, an intensification of hate-
speech in public discourse, and an increase in violent acts taken against immigrants and racial 
minorities. We looked for backsliding in processes of inclusive policy making for all three fields. 
Responses to the crisis may be framed in different ways. The literature on the gender 
politics of the economic crisis identifies three different patterns to frame responses to the crisis: 
the neo-liberal, the social democratic and the nationalist (Walby 2015, Karamessini and Rubery 
2014). The neoliberal approach favours market deregulation, reduction of state intervention in 
the economy, and cuts in state funding for benefits and public services. The social-democratic 
framing favours state regulation of finance and the active intervention of the state to reduce 
inequalities through legislation and government spending, particularly for the people that are 
worst affected by the crisis (Walby 2015). A third, nationalist framing subordinates state 
intervention and subsidies to the nationalist project that favours ethnically pure demographic 
sustainability and a subordination of individual rights to collective national wellbeing. The three 
different frames project different configurations of retrenchment both with respect to 
redistributive and to recognition aspects of backsliding.  
Not all countries witnessed retrenchment of equality policy regimes in the close 
proximity of the economic crisis and where retrenchment took place it was manifested in 
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different ways, and framed the crisis and the adequate response to it differently. In our analysis 
we look for such differences in whether there was any backsliding or not and if there was how 
was it framed and what were its implications for equality policy regimes.  
We selected five European Union member states for our analysis: Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, UK and Spain. We identified these countries based on our previous summary mapping 
exercise in which we analyzed backsliding comparatively across all EU member states (Sitter et. 
al. 2016). In the mapping exercise, we found that these countries exhibited a variety of patterns 
of backsliding and their selection also served the regional diversity of our sample. In the 
mapping we found Poland to be a resilient country with no backsliding in the period following 
the breakout of the economic crisis (not until 2015). Hungary and Romania are both hard hit by 
the crisis, though in different ways: with Hungary exhibiting backsliding in all three policy 
fields, Romania remaining resilient for disability. Along the three CEE countries we also 
included two older member states of the EU, two countries that have a prominent record on 
equality policies and they are also considered to have been hit hardest by the economic crisis in 
the equality policy field: UK and Spain. We used the mapping data as preliminary indicators, 
open to being challenged by our in-depth qualitative analysis. In conclusions we come back to 
the table and suggest revisions. 
 
Table 1: Backsliding in equality policy regimes (source: Sitter et. al. 2016) 
Member states Gender Race  Disability 
Hungary ↓ ↓ ↓ 
Poland ↔ ↔ ↔ 
Romania ↓ ↓ MIX 
Spain ↓ ↔ ↓ 
United Kingdom ↓ ↔ ↓ 
↓ - decrease in performance; MIX – mixed pattern; ↔– no change in performance  
 
Based on the analysis of these five cases we expect to understand more about why and 
how the economic crises is connected to backsliding of equality policy regimes, and why not. 
What are the patterns of crisis management? How backsliding may affect the three different 
policy realms differently and what are the similarities?   
On the assumption that not all backsliding is directly caused to the economic crisis and 
the crisis is not necessarily leading to backsliding, in our analysis we consider a series of 
alternative explanatory factors for backsliding. Our case selection covers these factors and will 
allow us to look for their salience. These factors are: 
- economic performance of the country when the crisis started,  
- color and ideology of governments and impact of government changes and particularly 
the emergence of right wing populism,  
- salience of pro-European Union discourses, and 
- strength of mobilization against the negative impact of crisis management packages on 
vulnerable groups and forms of resilience.  
The report will first present short summaries of the five cases. In a comparative chapter 
we investigate the cases along a series of factors. Conclusions will come back to the questions 
formulated for the report. The Annex 2 of the paper contains full length versions of the five case 
studies.  
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3. Five cases compared: Hungary  
 
Context 
Throughout the post-communist period, the Hungarian equality policy regime has placed 
most emphasis on addressing the cause of disabled persons and ethnic minorities, primarily the 
Roma. Gender equality has remained the least salient issue in Hungary, either marginalized or 
explicitly opposed. Meanwhile, Hungary has always been a good performer in following 
international norms, particularly EU norms, in the equality fields.  
 
Crisis management 
Hungary faced the economic crisis with high level public debt and weak growth 
capacities. A socialist-liberal government was restructured towards the end of its political cycle 
in April 2009. A technocratic government took over and functioned until the next parliamentary 
election in 2010 and introduced the first austerity measures. Retrenchment in equality policy 
regimes came about in two waves. Following the first wave of austerity measures in 2009, a 
second wave emerged under the right wing populist government starting in 2010. The two sets of 
responses differ significantly in their framing: the first set of austerity measures were framed 
with some sensitivity to inequality and gender issues despite the extensive budget cuts (2009-10). 
The second wave of retrenchment was framed in nationalist, familialist terms with particularly 
negative effects on gender and race issues. The austerity package introduced in 2009 kicked off a 
crisis management with economic growth stimulation, including labour market activation of 
women, disabled people and minorities. The conservative coalition from 2010 continued the 
austerity provisions in certain social policy fields but also engaged in a drastic revision of the 
whole political and welfare system. It used the crisis as a justification to carry out major reforms 
in an emergency manner. The new regime became increasingly hostile to gender equality and 
ethnic diversity, and increasingly favourable to the Hungarian middle class both economically 
and culturally. It has also marginalized democratic processes and blocked existent consultation 
processes with civil society groups representing the vulnerable. Hungary’s Equal Treatment 
Authority (ETA), the agency enforcing the anti-discrimination acquis, suffered retrenchment 
under both governments. First, the pre-2010 government introduced financial cuts, and then the 
conservative government interfered with its scope of activities and expertise. The agency’s 
leadership and personnel were replaced and its expert board dismantled. These changes resulted 
in shifting the focus towards discrimination based on disability and motherhood, rather than 
more sensitive issues such as gender equality, sexual orientation or ethnicity. 
 
Gender domain 
Gender equality policies were impacted by both waves of retrenchment, although framed 
in two distinctive ways. In 2008-2010, the gender equality institutional framework was stable. 
The government’s tri-partite consultation body, the Council for Gender Equality continued its 
activity in several thematic groups, including consultations about austerity measures. The 
department for Gender Equality, though small and at low level of the hierarchy, was also 
operating within the Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs. In early 2010, the government 
adopted the first gender equality strategy since 1997, the National Strategy for the Promotion of 
Gender Equality 2010-2021. The conservative shift in 2010 resulted in dismantling most of these 
structures. The consultative Council was not convened after 2010. Any formalized consultation 
between the government and women’s rights groups stopped, and starting from 2015 the most 
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prominent groups are persecuted as foreign agents. The governmental agency was dismantled 
and re-established under the deputy state secretary for Family and Population Policy. Gender 
equality policy framing was replaced by family policy one. All actions under the National 
Strategy were stalled. In 2011, a new constitution (The Fundamental Law) was adopted spelling 
out the right to life from the moment of conception opening the door to limiting the right to 
abortion; redefining family as heterosexual marriage, and ignoring the principle of equal pay 
between men and women. Differences were visible also in the realm of parental leaves. The first 
crisis management government followed a logic of labour market activation and reduced the 
length of paid parental leave from 3 years to 2 years. Family allowance was also frozen for two 
years. The conservative government brought a series of measures to assert the primary role of 
women as carers, such as reduced labour protection for mothers during pregnancy and early 
childhood, reinstatement of the 3 years long parental leave with limited possibilities to work in 
parallel, family taxation, pension reform to give exceptionally high credit for caring. Incentives 
were introduced for employers to assist employees in reconciling work and family life. Overall, 
the pre-2010 government focused on child poverty through increasing universal child allowance, 
family-related social assistance and decreasing tax credits, while the conservatives detached 
family policies from social policies and targeted them at increasing fertility rates among 
‘appropriate’ working families.  
 
Disability domain 
This policy domain also witnessed retrenchment despite Hungary’s pioneering 
ratification of the UN Convention (CRPD) in 2007. Retrenchment was followed by some 
progress after 2013. The Hungarian policy and institutional framework follows a medical and 
charity approach contrary to the rights approach of the UN CRPD and the European anti-
discrimination standards. Strategic programing in disability remained continuous during the 
crisis: the National Disability Program 2007-2013 was followed after a short interruption by a 
new program for 2015-2022. At the same time the main consultative body, the National 
Disability Council ceased operating in early 2011. After years of blocked communication 
between the government and disability groups, the Council was reinstated in 2013, though 
consultations included only groups sponsored by the government. Its activity was also 
complemented in 2015 with the Inter-ministerial Disability Committee tasked with coordinating 
disability policy across departments. Unlike in the domain of gender and ethnicity, state grants 
support six national disability interest groups. The main principle of intervention under both 
crisis managing governments was reduction of cash transfers to disabled persons and their 
activation on the labour market. Disability reforms started in 2008 introducing obligatory 
periodic re-examinations for disabled persons, which later was extended to all beneficiaries. 
Around 30% of the disability pension beneficiaries lost their pension and only the half of them 
could receive temporary rehabilitation benefit. In 2012 disability pension was transformed into 
sickness allowance. The average amounts of allowance have also dropped. Services previously 
sponsored by the state became contracted out and the number of social workers decreased. Under 
the conservative government, two progressive processes can be noted: deinstitutionalization of 
disabled people and supported decision making was introduced in the Civil Code in 2010. 
Implementation in both processes generates criticism.   
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Race/ethnicity domain 
When the crisis started, Hungary had acted along a national strategy for Roma inclusion 
within the spirit of the transnational Decade of Roma Inclusion soft policy coordination 
mechanisms. The socialist-liberal government started to use the EU Structural Funds for 
territorially targeted development program for localities of sizeable Roma communities. By the 
same token, the government introduced a larger public work program by which it tied various 
social assistance benefits to low quality and low paid work separated from the open labor market. 
Under the conservative-populist government, a New Fundamental Law replacing the 
Constitution in 2011 stipulated that citizens are entitled to social rights through their ‘work 
responsibilities’. As an EU obligation, Hungary prepared a new complex and long-term strategy 
for Roma inclusion (2011–2020). The governmental change preserved and only moved the State 
Secretariat for Social Inclusion from Ministry of Labor to Ministry of Public Administration and 
Justice. In 2011, a Roma Coordination Council was established to provide a forum for dialogue 
and cooperation for all the stakeholders on the area of Roma issues. The Roma participants were 
selected by highly clientelistic and by-partisan methods. In 2012 the former independent 
institution of Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities was 
abolished and became a Deputy Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. The personnel and 
budget of the main anti-discrimination complaint body, the Equal Treatment Authority was also 
cut. From 2013 on, social benefits for long-term and short term unemployed became tightened 
and reintegration into the regular labor market was further weakened. As the economic recovery 
moved ahead and the country received massive development support through the EU Structural 
Funds, the government started to provide the better-off families remarkable financial resources 
through tax credits despite the general cutback in social spending, meanwhile it terminated the 
earlier compensation for low-income earners. Until 2014-2015, the country received low number 
of migrants and refugees which did not create major policy challenges. Basic legal and policy 
infrastructure for migration and refugee affairs was measured as lower average in European 
terms according to the MIPEX index.   
 
Conclusions 
In Hungary backsliding first took the form of a neo-liberal austerity package with some 
openness and sensitivity to equality concerns. From 2010 a conservative-nationalist approach 
took over, which subordinated cuts and restructuring to a nationalist agenda in which gender 
equality ethnic diversity were seen to undermine national sustainability. Cuts in the first wave 
left equality institutions and programming untouched or even improved across all three grounds 
though with more limited budgets. The second wave established a hierarchy in which disability 
remained a politically acceptable inequality ground, though framed in medical terms, but gender 
and ethnicity were hit hard, by blocked consultation, dismantled institutions and also 
ideologically driven reframing of social policies reaching to these groups.  
 
 
Five cases compared: Poland  
 
Context 
Between 2007 and 2015, Poland had two consecutive pro-EU governments. In 2007 the 
center-right party the Civic Platform (PO) formed a government coalition with the agrarian 
Polish People's Party (PSL) to pursue strong commitment to ‘Europeanization’ of national 
policies. The next elections in 2011 marked a clear victory for the PO and ensured the 
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continuation of European-friendly policies. The PO’s social opinions remained conservative, 
particularly on same-sex marriages, church separation from state, or abortion. Yet, in 2007-2014, 
Poland made impressive progress in all three main equality domains: gender, race and disability. 
It promoted anti-discrimination legislation, introduced electoral gender quota, ratified the CoE 
Istanbul Convention, and amended the Labor and Penal Codes to favor the position of vulnerable 
groups on the labor-market. As numerous member states progressed to dismantle their equality 
infrastructure, Poland demonstrated a high degree of ‘resilience’ which ended in November 2015 
with the election of the Law and Justice Party to power. 
 
Crisis management 
Although the spill-over of the crisis was reflected in unemployment and absolute poverty 
statistics in years 2008-2011, Poland experienced economic growth during this period. While the 
budget-related provisions of the laws of 2009-2010 indicated ongoing ‘budget slimming’, no cuts 
were made to social support and care services, and in fact certain areas (i.e. childcare services) 
saw increase in spending. Poland was one of only few member states that did not curb public 
sector employment. Cuts in the field of welfare provisions and integration measures (targeted at 
minorities and disabled persons) were avoided and efforts were made to strengthen reconciliation 
of family and working life and activation of disabled persons on the labor market. Finally, this 
period opened up a dialogue with civil society and allowed for creation of platform(s) where 
issues related to gender equality, non-discrimination, and treatment of minorities and disabled 
persons could be openly discussed.   
 
Gender Domain  
After 2004, Poland had been delaying full implementation of the EU anti-discrimination 
regulations, which resulted in several infringement procedures by the European Commission. 
During the crisis years, Poland emerged as one of the countries in the EU where gender equality 
policy showed progress. New anti-discrimination provisions were passed, equality institutions 
established, and previous problematic policies amended. Passed in 2010 the new ‘anti-
discrimination’ law generated amendments to the Labor Code and set up equality bodies (the 
Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment and the Human Rights Defender). In 2012, 
Poland’s first strategic National Program for the Promotion of Equal Treatment 2013-2016 was 
accepted. In 2015 Poland ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women, and Domestic Violence. Most of the consultation 
mechanisms have been put in place. Further, women’s groups established The Congress of 
Women (2009) with government funding. The Congress has become a regular consultation 
partner of the government on gender equality issues. In 2009 and 2011, Poland extended parental 
leave provisions and introduced reforms to support development of early childhood education 
and care. The public sector also escaped cuts. Following the European trend since 2010, Poland’s 
total budget for public administration was frozen yet the share of employment in public 
administration in total employment remained stable.  
 
Race/Ethnicity Domain  
Poland is a nationally and religiously uniform state without a long tradition and 
experience of combating racial discrimination and running integration programs. Despite small 
numbers of ethnic minorities, Poland has seen extreme nationalistic movements and right-wing 
organizations and parties gain influence over the last decade. The voices of the targeted groups 
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remain weak. This ‘silence’ is exaggerated by ethnic and religious biases strongly embedded 
within the majority of the population. Despite the hostile context, the 2010 anti-discrimination 
act not only regulated racial discrimination but also opened the door for legal amendments to 
strengthen the fight against hate crimes. The 2014 amendment of the 2005 Law protecting the 
rights of national and ethnic minorities introduced the social integration of minorities as a duty 
for public authorities (previously, civic integration existed). The Polish state also showed 
commitment to the integration of Roma: developed National Roma Inclusion Strategies and with 
the decision of the Ministry of Education abolished all forms of segregated education.  In 2014 
the Ministry of Education funded 53 local initiatives facilitating the integration of Roma children 
into the education system. Poland also adopted its first comprehensive migration strategy in 
2011. An action plan was developed to the strategy in 2014 which specifies details of 
implementation including budgets and responsibilities. The policy was dismantled following the 
coming to power of the right-wing Law and Justice Party in 2015.  
 
Disability  
Policies directed at persons with disabilities also escaped serious retrenchment in Poland 
and even showed some progress. Poland ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of People 
with Disabilities in 2012. Transposition of the Directive 2000/78/EC which prohibits inter alia 
discrimination due to the disability at the workplace and in other occupational activities resulted 
in new provisions in the Labor Code. The Government Plenipotentiary for Disabled People and 
the implementation of the Act on Vocational and Social Rehabilitation and Employment of 
Disabled Persons received ‘stable’ financial assistance throughout the period of the crisis. It is 
noteworthy that a shift in the approach towards activation of disabled persons on the labor 
market resulted in decreases in spending for disability benefits. As a result, the number of 
employees with disabilities employed on the open labor market in the system of subsidized 
employment has been steadily growing while the number of those employed in sheltered 
enterprises has dropped. This redirection of funds was backed by the support of the Government 
Plenipotentiary Office for Disabled People. In 2013 amendments to the Act of Family Benefits 
increased the amount of nursing benefit for carers but also reduced the circle of entitled people to 
approximately half of the previous group. Protests and the Constitutional Tribunal (K27/13, 
K38/13) blocked the limiting aspects of the amendment.  
  
Conclusion 
In Poland welfare reduction measures have been systematically applied to social policy 
areas related to care, education and welfare payments from the 1990s. While the recent global 
economic crisis often served as justification for the ongoing Polish neoliberal drive, there was 
little evidence during this period of "backsliding” on commitments to equality measures. The 
equality infrastructure in the executive powers got major boost during the crisis years. The critics 
of Polish reforms propose that reforms of the anti-discrimination fields resulted from the 
obligations of the European Union membership rather than from political convictions and 
grassroots demands. Moreover, the social welfare provisions, while more sensitive to 
reconciliation between work and family, continued to promote traditional family values and 
entrenched medical models of protecting the disabled. The new right-wing, Euro-skeptic 
government elected in 2015 began to swiftly dismantle the equality infrastructure particularly in 
the gender domain, where Poland saw a return to pro-family policy in traditional, catholic 
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understanding and full abandonment of anti-discrimination measures and institutional framework 
(across all three domains). 
 
 
 
Five cases compared: Romania 
 
Context 
In Romania, European integration is viewed as an important framework and benchmark 
for both legislative and institutional changes in the field of equality policy. Key equality bodies 
specialized by grounds were established before the crisis. The National Council for Combating 
Discrimination (NCCD), the equality body established under EU acquis for the enforcement of 
anti-discrimination law in Romania experienced no major disruption during the crisis. Yet, 
austerity measures did target policy and institutional achievements that were young and feeble 
constructions, unable to stand against sever retrenchment.  
 
Crisis management 
During the years of the crisis, Romania had several governments each using somewhat 
different crisis frame. The beginning was marked by a political framing that denied the existence 
and impact of crisis for Romania. In 2009 a new coalition government led by the Democratic 
Liberal Party changed the discourse and introduced a series of crisis management interventions 
mainly austerity measures. Upon signing an agreement with the IMF, reductions in public 
expenditure were implemented including freezes of public sector wages in education, health, and 
social care, cuts in social benefits, and VAT increase. Measures were mainly adopted without 
prior public consultation or any impact studies, through governmental emergency ordinances. 
The neoliberal government and the president of the country assumed a leading role, while the 
parliament was left behind. The Social Dialogue Act in 2011 abolished any cross-sector 
bargaining. Yet, outspoken protest became a key feature of the Romanian response to the 
economic crisis. Demonstrations occurred in 2010 against cuts of public sector spending, and in 
2011 in response to cuts in gender based violence policies. In 2012 massive protests erupted in 
some major cities against a strategy to privatize the health care system. Feminist resistance was 
successful in achieving the inclusion of women’s groups into policy discussions. In 2012, the 
neoliberal government enacting the austerity measures resigned. After several intermediary 
governments, elections in 2012 brought a series of Social Democratic Party led governments 
which reinstated some of the previously cut elements of the equality policy regime.   
 
Gender domain 
Romania had a relatively progressive gender policy framework when austerity measures 
hit in. Law no. 202/2002 on Equal Opportunities between Women and Men set key priority areas 
for gender equality policy and established The National Agency on Equal Opportunities for 
Women and Men (ANES). Strategic planning for gender equality was continuous starting from 
the adoption of the 2002 law, and remained uninterrupted during the crisis. The National 
Strategy on equal opportunities between women and men was adopted in 2009 for the years 
2010-2012. In addition to ANES the National Agency for Family Protection was established in 
2003 for the enforcement of Law 217/2003 on the Prevention and Sanctioning Domestic 
Violence. In 2010, restructuring of the public administration dismantled ANES and also the 
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National Agency for Family Protection consequently halting adequate enforcement of policy 
measures in place. Gender equality was also inhibited by social policy retrenchment measures 
which included 25% cut in salaries in the public sector and 15% in pensions parallel to 5% 
increase of VAT. Progressive logic was not considered, irrespective of the horizontal and vertical 
segregation of the labor market. In 2010 social transfers were decreased for a range of social 
categories, from single parent families to families whose children have a poor school attendance 
record. Parental leave and childcare services were particularly hard hit. Families increasingly 
relied on informal care provided by grandparents, other relatives. The 2010-2011 budgetary cuts 
affected the length of parental leave and the terms of financial compensation during the leave. 
The retirement age for women was raised to 63 years and the contribution years to 35. Gender 
based violence policy was one of the gender equality fields most severely hit by the crisis in 
Romania. Yet, in response to sustained struggles of civil society actors, combating gender based 
violence witnessed important progress during the years of the social democratic governments. In 
2012, the 2003 domestic violence law was amended to include the order of protection, and 
improved funding for organizations running shelters. In 2015, ANES was reinstated, this time 
with extended competences including the field of combating and preventing violence against 
women. In 2016, the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence was ratified by the Romanian Parliament. Overall by 2015 
the gender equality domain recovered from the impact of the initial backsliding.  
 
Ethnicity/Race domain  
Policies on race and ethnicity in Romania address both the sizable Roma minority as well 
as several other ethnic minorities living in the country. Equality policy commitments towards the 
EU concern mainly Roma inclusion. The National Agency for Roma (NAR) was established in 
2004 for central policy coordination. Unlike the main gender or disability bodies which were 
downgraded in 2010, during the same period NAR remained in place but became the site of 
political battles. The National Council for Combating Discrimination (NCCD), which is the 
equality body in charge for enforcing the anti-discrimination acquis also escaped dismantling, 
but faced budget cuts in the immediate proximity of the crisis and increase again following that, 
mirroring the generally high funding fluctuation of the institution between 2002 to 2011. In line 
with the EUs Framework Roma Strategy, the Romanian government prepared in 2011 a Strategy 
of the Government of Romania for the Inclusion of Romanian Citizens Belonging to the Roma 
Minority for 2012-2020. Funding, however, became thin from state budget both in 2012 and 
2013. In addition to the disproportionate impact of wider austerity measures on marginalized 
Roma people, a retrenchment of integration policies can also be noted. Drawbacks occurred by 
cuts in support for school mediators, Romani language teachers, and health mediators. The 
decentralization of services generated backlash in local authorities’ capacity to deliver policies. 
At the same time, progress of educational policies can also be observed. The crisis did not affect 
the Romanian government’s affirmative action measure in education aimed at Roma students. 
Overall, however, due to the accumulated precarity of the majority of the Roma, their social 
exclusion worsened during the crisis. Scandalous eviction cases initiated by municipal 
governments also emerged during this period. Racism and hate speech endorsed by high level 
public figures marked the period.  
 
Disability  
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The implementation and monitoring of the National Strategy on equal opportunities for 
disabled people was under the supervision of The National Authority for the Disabled People 
(NADP). Similarly to the gender equality body, this agency was also disintegrated and placed as 
a smaller office within the Ministry of Labor in 2010. People with disabilities were entitled for 
different social transfers, specific services, and for a personal assistant. Romania introduced the 
requirement of re-examination of disability status resulting in loss of status for one third of those 
concerned and, as a consequence, in reduced funding support. Not only social transfers were cut, 
but also the salaries of the professional caregivers were diminished by 25%. Payments were 
delayed by public authorities. Cuts in health care spending also had disproportionate impacts on 
the lives of people with disabilities, including the lack of compensated drugs. At the same time, 
there was little change in the employment status of people with disabilities or in approaches to 
promoting social inclusion. The austerity measures deepened poverty for disabled people and for 
their households. In 2013, the number of institutionalized persons increased. In the same period, 
Romania ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2011. In 2015, 
the NADP was reinstated as the main coordinating body for policies on disabled people 
(replacing the term ‘handicap’ by ‘disability’).   
Conclusions 
In terms of governmental infrastructure, disability and gender equality bodies were 
dismantled opening wide doors to the retrenchment of gender equality and disability strategies. 
Their dismantling conveyed a negative message that these domains were seen as second class 
matters. The ethnicity/race dedicated institutions suffered due to reduced budgetary allocations 
that impeded the implementation of relevant strategies but also due to political battles. Still, 
ethnicity/race dedicated institutions were not dismantled by the austerity packages. It seems that 
the antidiscrimination coalition and Roma NGOs were more powerful than disability and gender 
equality NGOs. Women’s NGOs proved more active and effective in altering gender-based 
violence policies. Nevertheless, they were less influential in regards to preserving the status quo 
of gender equality or gender-based violence bodies. The measures enacted in Romania reflected 
the economic and social preferences of the international financial institutions and particularly the 
IMF towards austerity and public cuts. The color of the government also had a role: most cuts 
were done under a neoliberal government, whereas the following social democratic regimes 
reinstated some of the previous cuts including the gender and disability bodies. The lack of social 
dialogue fed into powerful protest reactions by society throughout the crisis years and may have 
also contributed to the reversal of the cuts. 
 
 
Five cases compared: Spain  
 
Context 
The development of the Spanish economy from the second half of the 1990s until 2007 
resulted in increasingly higher levels of employment, wealth and welfare state development, 
which translated into higher standard of living for the vast majority of Spanish citizens.  Under 
the socialist government (2004-2010) gender equality, social inclusion and integration policies 
gained political leverage, leading to a significant expansion of equality infrastructure (in all 
equality fields) and transposition of European anti-discrimination legislation. Up to 2008, Spain's 
equality measures supported women's entry into paid work while funding for care workers 
created new employment opportunities. This meant that in a relatively short time span Spain had 
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become a good model in policies for gender equality in the EU context. Moreover, since at least 
2003, the government pursued active social integration and inclusion of immigrants and 
minorities. 
 
Crisis management 
Starting from 2008 Spain experienced economic, financial and fiscal crises with two 
peaks that triggered policy changes across different sectors.  In 2009, the socialist government 
adopted an economic stimulus plan, however, these measures proved unsuccessful in curbing 
escalating unemployment and mounting public deficit. In May 2010, the government announced 
a package of austerity measures worth around 1.5% of GDP, including wage cuts for civil 
servants, cancellation of some welfare provisions and public pension freeze. Amidst protests and 
general strikes, the government also introduced a 2% rise in VAT and increased the retirement 
age to 67 from a previous 65. In 2011, the center-right People's Party won an absolute majority 
in parliamentary elections as voters punished the outgoing socialist government for the worst 
economic crisis in generations and the EU's highest unemployment rate. The conservative 
government launched tougher policy measures to regain the confidence of the markets and the 
EU. In 2011, the government approved major public spending cuts and increased VAT to 23%. 
In the same year, Spain's anti-austerity Indignados movement emerged spreading across the 
country and shaking the very core of politics. The movement managed to block some of the most 
drastic reforms in health care. It also filtered into city halls in major cities like Madrid and 
Barcelona through recent municipal elections. With the rise of Podemos and Ciudadanos, Spain's 
long-standing two-party system came to an end.  
 
Gender domain 
In the context of the crisis, Spain witnessed a dramatic retrenchment of gender equality 
schemes (backsliding on five out of our six indicators). Various EU documents and reports show 
that gender was not mainstreamed in the design of policy responses to the crisis in Spain. Once 
the recession began to affect the service sector, women's unemployment rose rapidly and by 
2010, surpassed men's. The Labor Reform increased unilateral opportunities for employers to 
introduce more flexible employment conditions and fire employees, especially those who take on 
most of the burden of care, i.e. women.  Direct transfers, such as the “Baby Check”, were 
stopped. The extension of paternity leave was delayed and eventually abandoned. Spending on 
health was reduced by more than 15% in real terms in only two years with various gendered 
consequences. The long-term care benefits governed by the 2006 Dependency Law were also 
suspended. Public pensions were frozen in 2011 when average pensions in Spain stand at only 
63% of the EU-15 average. All these entailed the reorganization of care work largely with the 
increase of traditional unpaid services provided by women in the family. In 2010, equality 
infrastructure also began to be dismantled as part of public saving strategy. The central 
government budget dedicated to gender equality policies decreased at all governmental levels. In 
a spirit of ‘rationalization and sustainability of local administration’, the power of local 
government to pursue gender equality measures was restricted. Reproductive rights of women 
also came under attack during the conservative government. It is important to note that the 
participation of women in politics and decision making did not decrease during the crisis 
management.   
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Race/ethnicity domain 
Traditionally, the Spanish state respects territorial and cultural diversity and enacts a 
multicultural policy regime. The social integration model concerning ethnic minorities and 
migrants is seen as responsive to the different dimensions of integration. However ethnicity and 
race related policies are less salient on Spanish policy agendas and less developed compared to 
gender (Alonso et. al. 2012). Recession had an ambivalent impact on this domain. At the start of 
the recession, in 2011, Spain finally adopted legislation to comply with the requirements of EU 
Directive 2000/43/EC (Racial Equality) and Directive 2000/78/EC (Employment Equality) and 
established the Non-Discrimination Council/Racial and Ethnic Origin. In was the second wave of 
recession that resulted in backsliding on all previous integration commitments. While the formal 
anti-discrimination framework remained stable, budget earmarked for integration of ethnic 
minorities (i.e. Gitano [Roma]) and immigrants has been substantially reduced in 2012 (by 17%). 
The cut was a huge blow to Roma inclusion programs long recognized as ‘a model’ for 
integration across Europe. The reduction in co-financing of EU Structural Funds programs 
together with a general reduction in welfare provisions generated major setbacks in employment, 
education, health and housing objectives. The Spanish Integration Fund which forms the bulk of 
immigration inclusion spending, mostly disbursed through municipalities and regions, was first 
cut in 2011 to one third, and ultimately eliminated in 2012. With the Royal Decree Law 16/2012, 
almost a million undocumented migrants got excluded from accessing healthcare services except 
for exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, according to the penal code reform approved in 
December 2012, to host and protect an undocumented immigrant is a felony, rendering 
humanitarian aid and acts of solidarity punishable by the law. 
 
Disability  
The Spanish state transposed all major EU and international conventions and directives 
concerning disability rights and policy norms and developed its own legislative infrastructure. In 
2012 Spain implemented national budget cuts of 13.65% and regional budget cuts of up to 10% 
to health and social care services. As an immediate consequence, Spanish commitment to 
independent living was put at risk, local authorities postponed (or paused) the construction of 
residential care facilities and  government funding for independent living projects in the 
autonomous regions was reduced by 22-29% in 2012 compared to the previous year. 
Employment services including supported employment faced overall 25% cut in funding. 
Finally, earlier investment plans aimed at improving the accessibility of public buildings, 
services and transport have been virtually paralyzed, further hindering independent living. Since 
2011, entitlements to benefits for mildly dependent people with disabilities (including those 
affected by mental distress) have been tightened. Moreover, there has been a shift from 
personalized services towards more standardized minimum services, which hits the fundamental 
cornerstone of independent living. Currently, the law on the promotion of personal autonomy 
and care for dependent persons is under review which is likely to result in higher co-payment 
requirements and increased number of persons of co-payment duties. The austerity measures 
have caused significant delays in payments from the public sector to non-profit social service 
providers. In Spain, the public administration’s debt towards these organizations has put them in 
jeopardy, and as a result social services to people with disabilities are endangered (in fact 
termination or collapse of providers and services have been reported in Valencia and Andalusia).  
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Conclusions  
The austerity measures have unleashed dramatic backsliding in the equality policy regime 
which had seen major positive developments in the 2000s. Our research has found severe 
retrenchment in both gender and disability domains. While race/ethnicity protection policies 
showed progress right after 2008, by 2011 the new conservative government began to reduce 
integration programs and initiatives. Overall, crisis management measures introduced by central 
and regional governments were introduced without previous assessment of their negative impacts 
on women, ethnic minorities or disabled people. Budget deficits were regulated without the voice 
of those who are the most affected by the crisis. Backsliding reached for gender and disability 
policies both in the realm of recognition and in the realm of redistribution. For ethnicity we see 
an initial progress in the realm of recognition, but backsliding in the second stage in 
redistribution aspects. 
 
 
Five cases compared: United Kingdom  
 
Context 
In spite of its always critical stance towards European policy coordination and 
convergence, the country observed all important human rights conventions and relevant norms of 
the EU equality acquis. More than that, the UK served as a vanguard of anti-discrimination and 
equality policies in Europe since the 1980s. Court activism, civil society advocacy and public 
service tradition positively influenced equality thinking and policies leading to progressive 
solutions such as positive equality duties in public administration and services. In 1997-2007, the 
government under Labor leadership significantly increased public spending including on 
vulnerable groups and equality. The explosion of the economic crisis in 2007 prompted the 
government to implement a stimuli package, following a mild Keynesian model.  
 
Crisis management 
The international economic crisis in 2008 ushered the longest period of economic 
downturn in the UK in modern history. By denouncing the increase in public spending during ten 
years of the Labor government, the "age of austerity" was popularized by the British 
Conservatives as early as 2009. Following parliamentary elections in 2010, the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government announced the biggest cuts to state spending since the 
Second World War, including significant reduction in social security and the planned cuts of 
900,000 public sector jobs between 2011 and 2018. Moreover, in 2012 the institution of public 
consultation was undermined: the statutory 12 week minimum consultation period, which is part 
of a Compact agreement between government and the voluntary sector, was removed. The 
country moved to a new social policy regime which was not reversed with the start of economic 
recovery. 
 
Gender Domain  
In the mapping exercise of our research, UK demonstrated backsliding on all indicators 
against solid former performance. Since 2010 the Government Equalities Office, previously a 
dedicated government unit, has been downgraded to a unit of the Home Office and more recently 
moved to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. The main consultative body of the 
government, the Women’s National Commission, was closed in 2010. In social policy reforms, 
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restrictions were introduced to strengthen work incentives and self-reliance by paying little 
attention to gender inequality consequences related to segregated employment, part-time work, 
and care responsibilities. Embedded in the 2010 Spending Review, the retrenchment in family 
and childcare provisions particularly affected women. As part of the Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
measures, in 2011 the government reduced the proportion of childcare costs (from 80% to 70%) 
and increased the threshold eligibility conditions for parents.  It also abolished the Child Trust 
Fund stripping parents from access to investment vouchers. The government also closed the 
Health in Pregnancy Grant, and restricted the Sure Start Maternity Grant for low-income parents 
to first babies or multiple births. These changes reinforced traditional gender roles and decreased 
the assistance to childcare costs. The women’s NGOs spearheading progressive changes in 
gender equality agendas faced the worst funding crisis in recent history of the UK. Their 
sustainability was seriously undermined while demand for services has increased. Parallel to 
these retrenchments, women’s political representation has increased in the crisis years. Political 
parties can use women-only shortlists until 2030 alongside other voluntary action and 
encouragement.  
 
Race/Ethnicity Domain  
The UK has a long tradition and experience of respecting social diversity, fighting 
discrimination and running social integration programs. In the crisis management process, anti-
discrimination legislation and institutions remained intact, while integration funding has been 
chipped away. The cuts in integration programs reflect broader fiscal tightening and changes in 
political philosophy and priorities in the integration of migrants. The department of Communities 
and Local Government was ordered to cut its budget roughly to half by 2014-2015 (including 
transfers to local governments). This has resulted in the termination of several community 
cohesion programs. The Migration Impacts Fund, raised through a levy on immigrant visa fees, 
has been scrapped. The English for Speakers of Other Languages program faced both budget 
cuts and limitations on eligibility. Similarly, the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant serving the 
integration of new arrivals has been mainstreamed into general education allocations. Like in the 
gender domain, NGOs working with migrant communities were hard hit by cuts in funding, 
some affecting core support, others directed at service provision. Refugee integration support 
services faced particularly severe pressure, with the Refugee Council’s state funding reduced by 
62% in 2011. In addition, the Refugee Integration and Employment Service ceased to exist after 
September 2011.  
 
Disability  
While disabled people have entered the recession on a profoundly unequal footing to 
non-disabled people, their interests have been largely absent from national debate arising from 
the downturn. The welfare reforms reduced the numbers of people eligible for incapacity 
benefits, cut spending on care support services and independent living programs, and launched 
aggressive work activation programs. £2bn was taken out of the care budgets of local authorities 
even though demand for care services continued to grow. This was coupled with vast hikes in 
charges for essential services, including a 13% increase in meals and wheels charges, and a 33% 
increase in transport fees. The 2010 Emergency Budget launched an aggressive campaign to 
curtail eligibility criteria and force labor activation. The introduction of the Universal Credit 
removed financial benefits for disabled people who do not reach the required level of functional 
impairment in the work capability assessment (WCA). Those deemed fit-for-work were to 
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benefit from work related activities. It is estimated that 450,000 disabled people lost their status 
under the Universal Credit. Furthermore, the shift of resources to better targeting disabled people 
with the greatest need, resulted in cuts for families with disabled child (around £1,500 per year). 
Finally, in 2013 the government replaced Disability Living Allowance (DLA) with Personal 
Independence Payment (PIP). Other reforms in welfare support which intensify disability 
poverty risk include introduction of the Bedroom Tax, closure of the Independent Living Fund 
(which directly leads to re-institutionalization), the removal of automatic entitlement to Housing 
Benefit for young people, reductions in Disabled Student Allowance. 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, the endorsement of austerity policies in the UK has negatively impacted all three 
domains. In the last 6 years, government support to equality and diversity issues was cut back at 
a time where tougher labor market conditions raised the salience of such issues. The Emergency 
Budget not only generated extensive cuts in safety nets but also shrunk public sector employment 
and integration programs (targeted at both ethnic/racial minorities and persons with disabilities). 
It has been widely documented that these measures disproportionately affected women, racial 
minorities, and persons with disability having weaker positions in the labor market, political 
representation, media voice, etc. Furthermore, the use of a voluntary rather than compulsory 
approach to equality policies has allowed for dismantling of progressive equality and diversity 
policies (most acutely felt in the gender domain).  The case study endorsed the findings of the 
mapping exercise on considerable backsliding in both gender and disability domains. 
Ethnicity/race equality policies appeared relatively ‘protected’. An in-depth scrutiny unveiled, 
however, that while the legal anti-discrimination framework was not undermined, integration 
programs faced tremendous challenges due to decrease of state funding. The UK also faced 
unprecedented rise in hate speech and violent acts against racial and ethnic minorities, and rising 
xenophobic attitudes exploited by advocates of Brexit.    
 
 
4. Comparison 
 
Trajectories of backsliding  
 
We see a variety of trajectories of backsliding in the five countries that we examined. 
Their analysis helps understand the nature of backsliding in equality policy regimes and its 
determinants. While the financial and economic crisis hit everywhere our mapping indicated 
(Sitter et. al. 2016) that backsliding did not occur in all European Union member states, and its 
length, scope and effect was diverse where it occurred.  Backsliding did not only avoid the usual 
suspect countries such as the economically well off, and equality prone Nordic countries but had 
some surprising cases. Confirming the mapping data Poland emerged from our research as the 
only country among the Central and Eastern European new EU member states that witnessed 
progress in equality policy terms rather than backsliding during the period immediately 
following the economic crisis. Abrupt backsliding in Poland, particularly in gender and ethnicity 
policy issues, only started after the political shift to populist right following the 2105 elections. 
Backsliding was devastating to equality policies and vulnerable groups protected by them 
in all the other four analyzed countries. In fact all four countries witnessed political or 
democratic crises along the line. However two of the countries that we analyzed could engage 
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with the opportunities that emerged from these crises in ways that ultimately resulted in stopping 
or even reversing backsliding, just a few years after its start. Romania surfaced from its 
continued political crisis with a reversal of some of the most important equality policy cuts, 
empowered civil society organizations and improved patterns of cooperation between these 
organizations and the state. New forms of resistance and political organizing in Spain could also 
stall some of the important attempts of equality backsliding and allowed Spain to maintain a 
progressive equality regime ultimately (Lombardo 2016). A complex set of circumstances 
including civil society resilience, electoral politics as well as economic factors contributed to 
these patterns of reversal. In both countries these are still ongoing struggles. No such reversal 
emerges in the UK where backsliding in equality policy regimes along with other consequences 
of austerity measures are followed by the Brexit political crisis and the ensuing de-legitimization 
of previous commitments on European equality norms. 
Finally in Hungary backsliding is coupled with a political and democratic backsliding 
connected to the ruling of the Eurosceptic right wing populist government. Equality policy 
commitments along with more general European human rights commitments are increasingly 
questioned here with no prospect for reversal in the near future. 
Starting from the indicator based findings of the mapping exercise (Sitter et al 2016) we 
analyzed in more detail changes in the equality policy regimes of the five countries. We looked 
in particular at how equality policy related measures were justified, what was their framing and 
impact on women, ethnic and racial minorities and disabled persons, and what was their 
assessment by concerned civil society groups or international actors.  
 
Comparing backsliding in equality domains 
 
Gender. Gender equality has been the core equality value for European Union policy from the 
late 1970s onward. An extensive set of hard and soft EU norms emerged on gender equality by 
the late 2000s including complex transformative strategies such as the commitment to 
mainstream gender in all policy processes. Yet, gender equality policies were hard hit in the 
context of the crisis, both at the EU level and in several national contexts, and a mainstreaming 
of gender equality norms into crisis management has not occurred (Kantola and Lombardo 
2017). Our analysis of five EU member states largely confirms this, with the notable exception 
of Poland. We witness backsliding in gender equality policies and institutions in all the countries 
we examined, except Poland. Poland enters the crisis period with a minimal level of compliance 
with EU norms on gender equality. During the crisis Poland witnesses one of its most 
progressive periods in terms of gender equality, with remarkable legal, institutional and policy 
progress as well as good relations between various government actors and women’s movement 
groups. Poland’s progressive period ends abruptly only in 2015, when the populist right wing 
Kaczynski government takes over and dismantles most of what has been achieved in the previous 
7 years.  
 In the other four countries we see mainly soft backsliding. Gender equality institutions 
are targeted unequivocally. Governmental agencies responsible for gender equality and 
consultative councils and committees bringing civil society together with governments are 
dismantled (UK, Romania) or massively downgraded (Hungary, Spain). Importantly though 
gender equality bodies that are mandated under EU law to enforce anti-discrimination laws and 
policies remain in place and quite stable except for some curtailing of their independence and 
budget cuts. Implementation of existent gender equality strategies is stalled or slowed down due 
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to budget constraints and due to dismantling or downgrading of agencies responsible for their 
enforcement. Another important sign of giving up on commitments is the absence of 
mainstreaming gender equality considerations into crisis management.  
Two main frames on gender can be captured in these backsliding processes: the 
neoliberal frame and the familialist/nationalist frame. The neoliberal frame focuses on activation 
on the labor market and cutting benefits that serve any inactive status including maternity leaves, 
or early retirement. At the same time throughout the examined countries this activation takes 
place without improving support institutions and particularly care infrastructure. We see the 
neoliberal frame used in the UK, in Hungary in the first period (until 2010) and in Romania. The 
familialist frame attempts to push women back to the private sphere encouraging their care roles 
as primary or limiting their reproductive rights. In the Hungarian context a nationalist undertone 
is added in that women are held responsible for national demographic sustainability and for 
increasing the birthrate. The familialist frame dominates in Hungary after 2010 and in Spain 
(Lombardo 2016). In Spain we see attempts not only to cut costs but also to curtail women’s 
rights by re-familialization of care and challenging women’s reproductive rights. Resistance in 
Spain manages to block several attempts in this direction. In Hungary after 2010 cost efficiency 
is overwritten by the ideological priority of demographic sustainability, and reinstatement of 
conservative gender roles.  
A realm of gender equality falling under hard backsliding is retirement age. Equalizing of 
retirement age is discussed in both Hungary and Romania, but progress towards compliance with 
EU norms is limited even if no backsliding takes place. 
 
Race and ethnicity. Protecting the rights and providing social inclusion for ethnic and racial 
minorities in Europe is a politically salient agenda Europe since WWII, yet it only became part 
of EU hard law with the EU Race Directive of 2000. There are good reasons for European 
societies to ensure high protection to this agenda. Overall, our in-depth analyses show that the 
domestic crisis management practices starting in 2008 was ambivalent in this field with progress 
in development of anti-discrimination policies and institutions, new social inclusion strategies for 
the Roma but backsliding in terms of enforcement and social integration programs for migrants. 
As a result of the transposition of the Race Directive, anti-discrimination laws in the member 
states have established a consistent set of rights and obligations across all EU countries. Further, 
all Member States have established specialized bodies to provide assistance to victims of racial 
discrimination and scrutinize the implementation of the main anti-discrimination norms in public 
affairs. We have not found any major retrenchment of legislation and specialized bodies assigned 
to protect ethnic and racial equality in any of the five countries observed. In fact, anti-
discrimination legislation moved ahead in the observed period in Poland, Spain, and remained 
strong by repackaging previous anti-discrimination acts in the in UK, including the exemplary 
Race Relations Act. The independent equality bodies assigned to deal with the protection of 
victims of discrimination, as mentioned already above, have faced budget cuts and professional 
weakening in Hungary and Romania, and to some extent in the UK, but they developed during 
this period in Spain and Poland.  
Ethnic and race equality policies are seen fundamentally important for two particularly 
important social categories/groups in the EU member states, the Roma and migrants/refugees. In 
addition to the protection mechanisms that the Race Directive set for the member states, the 
social inclusion measures regarding these two major social groups are considered as policy 
domains of potential soft backsliding in our inquiry. All EU member states were obliged to 
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elaborate their National Roma Integration Strategies in 2011 and to include Roma inclusion 
priorities in the planning of the European structural funds for 2014-2020.  This development 
went against or occurred in spite of the economic crisis that Europe faced from 2008 on. Our 
case studies revealed that this massive European political and policy mechanism helped 
establishing some governmental coordination tools in Hungary, Poland, and Romania even if 
policy implementation has yielded mixed or low results in the years 2011-2015. A more subtle 
examination unveils that governmental coordination mechanisms remained weak or superficial in 
all countries in our sample and in Hungary participation mechanisms for Roma in policy 
processes moved to a scheme closely controlled by the government.   
In the field of migration and refugee protection, the regular host countries in our study, 
Spain and UK have tightened their citizenship regimes and moved from multiculturalism to civic 
integration approaches. The idea of civic integration implies that immigrants understand and 
internalize wider societal norms and laws as autonomous individuals and they practice religious 
and cultural freedom in the private lives. Social inclusion is a reward for compliance with norms 
and performance of civic obligations (Scholten et al. 2015). Civic integration policy models have 
become more popular since the start of the economic crisis both in UK and in Spain. It is debated 
if the civic integration frame implies backsliding in the field of ethnic and racial equality as 
recourse to assimilationist integration. In addition, both Spain and UK have introduced heavy 
cut-backs in integration programs in language teaching, migrant education, and awareness 
raising for the mainstream population in particular in the regional and municipal budget 
allocations, and Spain has even criminalized civic support for undocumented migrants.  
It is imperative to mention that socio-political contexts in all observed member states 
demonstrate tangible surge in right-wing extremist groups and political parties, an intensification 
of hate-speech in public discourse, and an increase in violent acts taken against immigrants and 
racial minorities. Some worsening of the wider political conditions across the board in European 
countries is evident, which could hardly be addressed by anti-discrimination laws.  
 
Disability. Disability stands out from the three fields by the remarkable progress this field has 
achieved at the EU level during the period of the crisis by the ratification of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Disabled Persons (CRPD). Yet, despite the window of opportunity to step up 
EU policies on the field from a largely medical and protectionist model to a human right model, 
we witness backsliding in this field as well. Backsliding in the field of disability also exhibited a 
series of typical patterns. Once again in this field we observe soft backsliding rather than hard. 
The EU sets no requirement for governments to create equality bodies for disability, and the 
acquis only extends to formal anti-discrimination measures and only in the field of employment. 
Mirroring the EU progress in formal policy terms all of the analyzed countries witnessed major 
progress in the field of disability policy: in parallel with EUs endorsement they all ratified the 
UN CRPD. Meanwhile in terms of implementation and de facto rights equality they all went 
back in terms of commitments.  
Backsliding followed different patterns. Redrawing the boundaries of the protected group 
so that much fewer people qualified for benefits and support was a practice used in Hungary, 
Romania, Spain and the UK alike. Reform packages were largely framed in labor market 
activation terms: levels of benefits and number of people qualifying were reduced with reference 
to the need for active participation on the labor market to the maximum possible level. 
Governmental institutions in charge for disability policies were also downgraded or dismantled. 
Strategic policy processes including de-institutionalization processes were slowed down or 
halted in Romania, Spain and the UK, but to a certain extent also in Poland. Another general 
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trend was cutting the budget of service providing NGOs and budgets available for care personal. 
Somewhat similarly to the gender equality policy field, under the pretext of labor market 
activation and in the absence of adequate support infrastructure (for care, housing, and labor 
market integration) backsliding stalled or even reversed the positive tendencies initiated by the 
UN Convention. So rather than a move away from a medicalized policy approach towards a 
human rights and autonomy based policy model, four of the analyzed countries witnessed loss of 
autonomy and independence of disabled persons, mainly due to cut services and infrastructure 
and stalled de-institutionalization. It is noteworthy though that much of the disability 
infrastructure and policy processes were reinstated following the peak of the crisis both in 
Hungary and in Romania, and Hungary speeded up it de-institutionalization process after 2013. 
 Overall in the disability field backsliding stalled or slowed down transformative policy 
processes towards a rights rather than charity and welfare based understanding initiated by UN 
CRPD. 
 
Inclusive policymaking 
 
Partnership with civil society is a fundamental norm in the EU7. Inclusive policy 
processes are even more important in the case of vulnerable groups, women, ethnic minorities or 
disabled, whose interests are underrepresented in the normal policy process (Fredman 2002). Yet 
we find critical backsliding in the realm of inclusion, consultation and partnership compared to 
previous practice in all three fields and in all countries except Poland. Backsliding takes a variety 
of forms. Most direct challenge is dismantling or blocking formal consultation structures such as 
councils or committees established for sustainable communication between civil society groups 
representing the various groups and governments. Formal consultation mechanisms are 
particularly hit in the field of gender equality where we see dismantling of institutional 
frameworks in UK, Hungary and Romania. In UK the time available for consultation is also 
trimmed for all policy processes. In Romania even Parliament is sidelined by decision making 
through executive orders.  
Formal consultation processes can also be curtailed by selective access to consultation 
based on government preferences. Selective inclusion of civil society actors leads to the 
exclusion of rights based groups in Hungary from consultation in all three policy fields. Another 
way of blocking the input of concerned civil society groups is their disempowerment by cutting 
their funding or replacing regular funding patterns with tendering in which rights groups can 
easily loose to organizations working for lower prices, but often without expertise in the field. 
Cuts of funding emerge both in the disability and in the gender equality field in one way or 
another in Hungary, Romania, UK and Spain as well. This limits capacity of these organizations 
to provide services but also curtails their availability for consultation processes. Finally in 
Hungary important gender equality, Roma and disability rights groups are not only excluded 
from consultation but persecuted by the government through tax and financial audits and 
negative media campaigns launched by the government.  
																																								 																				
7 Stated also specifically for purposes of crisis management Article 8, Regulation (EU) No.472/2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. 
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These different patterns of action limiting cooperation between governments and civil 
society and their use in all four countries points to a tendency of applied crisis management 
approaches towards state closure in these difficult times. It also highlights the vulnerability and 
weakness of hard achieved pre-crisis inclusion arrangements.   
Following the peak of the crisis in some of the examined countries, consultation patterns 
improved, mainly upon pressure coming from protests. Widespread and repeated protests in 
Romania achieved improved standing for civil society groups in all three policy fields which was 
further enhanced by the incoming social democratic government. In Hungary we also witness a 
reopening of consultation platforms for disability issues, importantly though consultation only 
includes groups selected and sponsored by the government and continues to exclude rights 
groups. In the UK new forms of consultation are introduced that rely on new media and are seen 
by the government as more efficient, yet are heavily criticized by women’s groups (Women’s 
Resource Center 2013). Finally, Poland shows impressive improvement in consultation processes 
in all three realms during this period including financial support for some of these platforms 
(Krizsan and Roggeband 2017). The Polish state closes to consultation only after the 2015 
elections. 
 State closure to democratic consultation emerges as an important crosscutting element of 
backsliding, which is not only problematic in itself but also has serious consequences for the 
substantive content of crisis management packages and post-crisis processes. The use of 
opportunities for protest and subsequent improvement of inclusion deserves special mention and 
further research to understand its nature.    
 
Comparing three equality policy fields 
 
Cross-sectoral analysis of gender equality, race/ethnicity and disability policies showed a 
series of similarities. Backsliding on previous policy commitments took place in all three fields 
in four out of the five analyzed countries. However, backsliding in all three policy areas was 
limited in matters that are regulated by hard law at the EU level. In all three fields commitments 
that were not respected belonged to the level of soft strategic objectives, which were until 
recently nevertheless unquestionable standards for the EU and most EU member states.  
We also found relatively cautious backsliding in formal policies, little in terms of cutting 
previous achievements on paper. It rather took the form of neglecting the implementation of 
existent policies or not funding them. As such the bulk of backsliding had a redistributive 
character rather than backsliding in policy salience of these issues. Backsliding took place 
primarily through the reframing of the various equality policy issues in ways that may challenge 
rights based and equality of outcomes approaches.  
Reframing of policy agendas is quite evident for both gender and disability but to a 
certain extent also race and ethnicity. In gender equality we saw the trend towards re-
familialization of care under the constraints of austerity and the language of activation, and 
upsurge of defense for traditional gender roles. The nationalist framing of gender roles, as it 
emerged in Hungary, is yet another step further away from rights based commitments in the 
field. In disability we witness backsliding from a rights and autonomy based framing towards a 
medicalized, charity based approach where once again autonomy and independence are 
downgraded (largely due to costs and cutting of support services).   
For race and ethnicity, in the field of Roma inclusion, the EU framework encouraged 
member states to use a progressive social inclusion framing in the middle of the crisis when 
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crafting their own domestic strategies in 2011. Yet, countries in our sample often experienced 
and even endorsed racialization and securitization of ethnic inequalities in their political and 
wider public discourses. Regarding the inclusion of migrants and refugees, the dominant policy 
framing often moved, although not in a linear way, towards the concept of civic integration with 
some permeable discursive borders to securitization anxieties. Backsliding and the ensuing 
reframing of policy agendas come as warning about the need to reexamine the progress bias in 
equality policy thinking. Backsliding that we found has shown the vulnerability of governmental 
institutions and equality policy strategies as well as government consultation mechanisms long 
seen as the direction for progress. We found vulnerability to cuts in funding across the three 
issues. Limited funding for institutions and for strategic targets undermines most equality policy 
objectives in all three fields. As a result of budget cuts, either in budgets allocated to policies, or 
in budgets allocated to enforcement agencies, policies may become symbolic instruments of 
window dressing but without substantive reach.   
Questioning the need for partnership between states and civil society organization 
representing these vulnerable groups is yet another common feature of backsliding in these 
countries and across all these issues, and another challenge to long accepted principles of 
equality policy making.  
Differences and divergence between the paths of the three issues were contextual. In the 
different contexts, different hierarchies of inequalities may emerge. In Hungary disability was 
the inequality field least hit by backsliding if we look at formal policy and institutional 
retrenchment, whereas gender was to most hit. Disability field could recover from institutional 
retrenchment, and also launch progressive action as long as that was framed in resonance with 
government terms. Gender remained a difficult field for the conservative government, where 
resonance between government frames and civil society frames was difficult or impossible to 
achieve. Disability especially if framed in medicalized and charity terms proved to be the 
comfortable equality policy field. In Romania it was ethnicity that was least hit, while gender 
and disability were massively affected. Yet, protest action strongly politicized gender, allowing it 
a recovery after 2012. In Spain gender was most politicized and resilient which migration was 
hard hit and exhibiting little resistance to backsliding, particularly in the context of the upcoming 
refugee crisis.  
 
 
5. Causal aspects 
Is the backsliding in equality policy regimes that we identified in four out of the five 
examined countries caused by the economic and financial crisis? In the following, we look at 
possible alternative causes for backsliding and examine what circumstances have supported its 
avoidance or its reversal after the initial retrenchment. We look at factors that emerge as critical 
from our five country review and that are also supported by various strands of literature. We 
analyze the following factors:       
- the severity of the economic hardship in the context of the crisis and the pace of recovery 
following the crisis;  
- the political ideology of governments that manage the crisis; 
- European norm compliance; and 
- social resistance and protest. 
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Table 2 at the end of Section 5 demonstrates the country variations of backsliding in equality 
policy domains and the identified causal factors behind. 
 
Economic hardship 
 
The policy change literature suggests that the severity of the economic crisis largely 
influences what policy responses governments opt for. Yet, from among the major types of 
policy responses, it is not evident if governments turn to the harshest austerity measures as 
opposed to social protectionism or muddling through (Bauer and Knill 2014). A recent 
comparative study on crisis consolidation measures in 14 European countries confirmed the 
earlier findings of the OECD (2012) that the size of the general fiscal consolidation measures 
was primarily related to the size of the fiscal crisis measured by budget deficit and debt. The 
worse the economic situation and the worse the budgetary situation, the more drastic and far-
reaching were the consolidation measures that had to be taken by the governments (Kickert, 
Randma-Liiv, Savi 2015). 
Hungary, Romania, Spain and the UK faced the very first waves of an economic crisis in 
2008-2009. In 2009, the year with the strongest impact of the crisis, real GDP per capita fell by 
close to 7% in Hungary and Romania and by 5% in the UK. Spain’s economic hardship largely 
copied the European average at that time generating 4.4% GDP decline. The governmental gross 
debt was the highest in Hungary, above the EU average (77% vs. 72%). At the same time 
Poland, was the only European country boasting GDP growth that year. All countries in our 
sample started to recover with positive per capita GDP growth in 2010 except for Spain which 
became subject of a European sovereign debt crisis starting the same year. Debtors in the 
Eurozone faced excessive national debt levels coupled with lenders’ increasing interest rates on 
state bonds. In return for the bailout by the ECB for its banking sector, the Spanish government 
was forced to introduce serious fiscal austerity. A second, less drastic wave of recession came in 
2012 hitting Spain the most among the five countries concerned. In 2013-2015, a slow recovery 
took place everywhere, putting Romania and Poland to the top, whereas letting the UK climb up 
slower than the EU average with steep rise of governmental debts. By 2015 Spain also achieved 
relatively high GDP growth but with high indebtedness. (Charts 1 and 2 below present the 
figures used in this section and see Annex 1 for more details.)   
Our case studies reveal that absence of economic hardship clearly sets apart Poland from 
the other four countries and as such may at least partly justify absence of backsliding there until 
2015. Meanwhile the case studies also reveal that economic hardship and the speed (and price 
for) of recovery only partly explain the scope of backsliding on equality policy measures. In the 
hardest year, the governments in office in Hungary, Romania and Spain tried to avoid the hardest 
responses and experiment with modest interventions. Pressing economic troubles pushed 
incoming new governments to act more forcefully in the second and third year of the crisis. 
Temporarily resisting polities, like Spain, surrendered in the second crisis year, in 2012.  
Correlation between economic hardship and equality policy backsliding is also supported 
by the evidence that quick recovery of growth in Romania seems to back the reversal of 
backsliding from 2013. An economic pressure based explanation to backsliding, however, does 
not hold in the case of Hungary and for the post 2015 regime observed in Poland. Here we have 
to assume the influence of other factors. Finally, the 2010 UK coalition government started a 
fundamental restructuring of its welfare regime first with relatively large, later diminishing 
public support. The cut-back in state provisions dragged UK spending below the 40 per cent 
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GDP trend-line of the postwar period which makes the country an outlier among the main 
European countries and falling below that in the USA (Taylor-Gooby 2012). This demonstrates a 
major regime change in societal vision on inequalities and social policy regime in the UK which 
has not been reversed in spite of the slow yet steady economic recovery. 
 
 
 
 
  
27	
	
 
Chart 1: General Government Gross Debt in EU 28 and five Member States 2001-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdde410 
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Chart 2: Real GDP Per Capita Growth in EU28 and Five Member States 2001-2016 
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Political ideology 
 
According to the literature, governments dominated by leftist ideological tenets are less 
likely to downscale social and equality policy as opposed to those allied with rightist ideologies. 
This is demonstrated with aggregate evidence in the welfare reform literature (Korpi and Palme 
2003; Finseraas and Vernby 2011). Some authors argue that experiences of welfare state 
retrenchment in different countries (Starke et al. 2013) show that policy dismantling are sensitive 
to organized interests. Others argue that the influence of political parties is limited because 
welfare state retrenchment initiatives are rarely popular among electorates. Thus, radical change 
especially resulting in restriction is highly unattractive regardless of the party affiliation (Jæger 
2012).  
Larger comparative research on explaining varieties of retrenchment policies during crisis 
only partly confirms that right-wing governments are more inclined and capable than left-wing 
governments to take drastic cutback decisions. It shows that the influence of the Troika in 
imposing cutbacks overrode the ideologically driven choices of these governments (Kickert, 
Randma-Liiv, Savi 2015:17). In three countries of our sample (Poland, Spain, UK) from 2010 
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conservative or conservative-liberal regimes ruled and implemented various step-backs in 
equalities policies. This experience upholds the usual ideology and social policy associations.  
The first, left-wing crisis government in Hungary introduced welfare benefit cuts in 2009 
yet it did not touch or even actively promoted equality policy progress through institutional and 
legal provisions on all three grounds. The conservative-populist government from 2010 enacted a 
new social and political regime which cared little about the most vulnerable in general but 
without ideologically addressing the disabled, introducing counter-framing to gender equality, 
being ambiguous about ethnic and race discrimination. The Romanian neo-liberal governmental 
regime introduced harsh austerity measures impacting all three major equality domains observed 
without specific ideological backing. The social democratic government coming to power in 
2013 reversed some of the previous cuts in equality policy.  
Challenging common ideas about relationship between ideology and equality policy 
progress, in Poland, the liberal-conservative regime up to 2015 achieved remarkable progress in 
equality policies during the crisis years. It is also noteworthy that some authors argue that 
Spanish conservative governmental politicians’ strategies were pragmatic and short-term-
oriented rather than inspired by large retrenchment based ideological convictions (Jordana 2014). 
Some initiatives showed, however, quintessential conservative rationale yet not always with 
successful implementation (e.g. abortion restriction proposal). Taylor-Gooby’s (2012) analysis of 
the UK coalition’s government program suggests that restructuring of welfare benefits and public 
services was more than a quick response to economic hardship, rather an ideologically embedded 
state reform package.  
 
European norm allegiance   
 
Three of the five countries analyzed in this report are new EU member states, entering the 
crisis with a recent accession track record. As equality policy developments in these countries 
were strongly related to EU accession, and conformity with EU norms backsliding during the 
crises period might have to do with the relative importance of EU and conformity with its norms 
for these countries. Pro-EU stances of governments are strongly correlated with party ideologies. 
The three countries take relatively different paths in these terms. Romania was an exceptionally 
diligent complier with EU equality norms particularly during the 2001-2004 period where the 
bulk of its equality law harmonization took place. This approach was maintained during the 
years. The neoliberal crisis governments followed the EU instructions in terms of economic 
restructuring as instructed by the Troika. But as soon as the economic pressure put on the 
country decreased Romania new pro-EU social democratic government reversed some of the 
previous measures that went against previous commitments towards EU norms (for example by 
reinstating the gender equality and the disability rights agency).  
In Poland position of governments diverged on how pro-EU they were. The conservative 
government following the accession was extremely slow on harmonizing norms with the EU 
acquis particularly in the field of equality policy. The pro-EU Tusk government coming to power 
just before the crises was tasked to do many of the harmonization tasks, to catch up with the 
other new member states of the region on equality policies. Progress during the crisis period in 
Poland is a somewhat delayed version of the accession progress many of the other new member 
witnessed right before their accession moment.  
The post 2010 FIDESZ Hungarian government went furthest in distancing itself from EU 
norms in democracy performance and developing a skeptic and later hostile attitude to Brussels. 
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The political costs of this behavior were offset by the EU’s continued avoidance of material 
sanctions. The Hungarian government’s gender equality framing and drawbacks resonated well 
with the weakening EU attention to gender, whereas its Roma inclusion compliance was ensured 
with active role in establishing the European frame strategy.  
In the case of Spain and UK, post-accession EU appeal was not relevant. For UK policy 
formations in equality matters the growing EU skepticism had some imprints on equality policy 
debates but the high achievements before the start of the economic crisis made the country more 
protected against possible hard backsliding.     
 
Social resistance 
 
Social pressure can be effective in countering democratic backsliding (Della Porta 2013). 
The recent economic and financial crisis has sparked a range of new social movements, most 
importantly in the worst affected countries by experimenting with new forms politics (Hyman 
2015). These movements embrace a variety of social groups, including young people, migrants, 
and the unemployed experiencing ‘precarious conditions by being affected by the crisis. In a 
global inquiry, Ortiz et al. (2013) observe intensive social protests in high-income countries’, 
among those the largest taking place in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In the majority of 
European countries, the first austerity plans faced with protest and resistance from the trade 
unions and other interest groups affected. This made governments postpone planned policy cut-
backs or reverse them in some of the countries, such as Spain and Romania in our sample 
(Kickert, Randma-Liiv, Savi 2015). 
As we argued above, our case studies show that the cutback measures circumvented, 
neglected and in some cases deconstructed the public consultation processes. Because of depth 
and breadth of the policy changes, often enforced by external economic policy actors, it is 
questionable if those consultation could have altered the courses of action. The trade unions and 
traditional interest groups had some power at the start of the crisis in the old member states, such 
as UK and Spain with some but limited interest and capacities to speak for gender and ethnicity 
based inclusion as well. Further, those worst affected by the crisis, in particular young people, 
those with precarious contracts, women, immigrants, are least likely to be unionized. Therefore, 
the three particular equality groups had to rely mostly on their own civil society based advocacy 
groups and wider social movement acts. 
Continued protest became a key feature of the Romanian response to the economic crisis. 
Opposition emerged as early as 2010 against cuts in income and then in 2011 in response to 
release of data showing the disproportionate impact of austerity measures on women. The peak 
was reached in January 2012, when massive protests erupted in some major cities, with 
Bucharest as the core. Protests could challenge some of the problematic human rights aspects of 
the austerity package and also political corruption. The presence of gender equality and Roma 
rights and other human rights groups was particularly strong in these protests. Although these 
protests could not stop the march of a neoliberal reconstruction up to 2013, they demonstrate that 
under certain conditions social pressure can lead the government to redress breaches of liberal 
democratic principles. Protests lead to policy progress in gender equality field, an improved 
standing for civil society organization in consultations with the government and the 
reinstatement of some equality policy instruments cut by austerity measures after 2013, when the 
new social democratic government came to power. 
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The most transformative social movement mobilization took place in Spain. The 
Indignados or Movimiento 15-M developed from demonstrations on 15 May 2011 and initially 
mobilized activists with critique against globalization combined with voice against the Iraq war, 
which was supported by the right-wing Spanish government in power. Mobilizations around 
larger urban centers in 2011-2013 stopped the privatization of health care services. Women’s 
groups and other rights groups participated in protest waves. Gender equality was mainstreamed 
into protest actions and claims8. Protests managed to block some of the measures that run against 
gender equality including the ban on abortion (Lombardo 2016). Resistance was institutionalized 
and channeled into city governments in major cities like Barcelona and Madrid with the 2015 
elections.   
 In UK major anti-austerity protests took place in 2011. However they could achieve no 
reversal on important equality policy related aspects. In Hungary, critical public voices did not 
come together in spontaneous or organized mass protests or civil society coalitions. Human 
rights groups appealed to the international public time by time to contest non-action or 
retrenchment in some of the main equality domains. These movements could not stop any major 
equality retrenchment measures after 2010. In Poland the period between 2009 and 2015 was one 
of the most fruitful since 1989 in terms of cooperation between rights groups and the 
government.   
 
  
																																								 																				
8 Oral presentation by Laura Sales Gutiérrez (SURT, Barcelona) at the conference Gender and the Economic Crisis, 
Central European University, 15-16 September, 2016.	
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Table 2:  Backsliding trends in equality policies and causes in five EU member states  
 
 
Hungary Poland Romania Spain UK 
Period 2008-
2009 2010- 
2008-
2015 2015- 
2008-
2013 2013- 2008-2009 2010-2015 2008-2015 
Crisis 
management 
in equality 
policies  
Mixed back-sliding resist 
back-
sliding 
back-
sliding 
reverse 
back-
sliding 
back-
sliding 
back-
sliding backsliding 
Economic 
hardships 
 
Severe 
severe 
/improv
ing 
mild mild severe improving severe severe severe improving 
Political 
regime 
 
left-
liberal 
conserv
ative 
liberal-
conserv
ative 
conserv
ative 
neo-
liberal 
social 
democratic socialist  
conservati
ve 
liberal 
conservative 
EU norm 
appeal 
 
Positive adverserial positive 
adverse
rial positive positive NA NA NA 
Movement 
and resistance 
 
Weak weak NA increasing 
significa
nt significant significant significant weak 
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6. EU crisis management 
 
Major European civil society actors unequivocally attribute recent backsliding in equality 
policies to the crisis and they envision a role for the EU in equality sensitive crisis management. 
Already in September 2009 the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), the largest coalition of 
women’s organizations in the European Union (EU), called policy makers “to recognize 
women’s role in shaping the post crisis framework which, one year after the collapse of the 
financial markets, continues to ignore the gender impact of the crisis on the real lives of women 
and men”.9 They note how the recovery plans failed to integrate the gender perspective and argue 
that equality “must be an inherent part of European […] recovery plans as well as the transition 
towards a longer term holistic vision of the post-crisis era”. Also the European Commission, in 
its 2009 Report on equality between men and women, asserted that ‘the economic slowdown is 
likely to affect women more than men’. The Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee of 
the European Parliament argued in 2013 that the impact of the crisis on gender equality needs to 
be addressed specifically and voted on a non-legislative resolution on the impact of the crisis on 
women in which they are calling Member States and the Commission to “implement a set of 
measures to address the “double punishment” women suffer since the beginning of the crisis.”10 
European Disability organizations have also come together and created in 2011 the EU 
Alliance Against Disability Cuts, which is meant to work “to expose this Europe-wide social and 
human rights crisis, by raising awareness about it and putting it higher on the European political 
agenda”. They argued that “EU policy instruments such as the European Semester should be 
used to enhance Member States policies towards the realization of inclusive societies where 
citizens with support needs are empowered to become active contributors and are not left 
behind.”11 Their work towards a Resolution of the European Parliament addressing the effect of 
cuts in public spending on disabled persons in the EU remained unsuccessful. 
While evidently the Member States bear the main responsibility for violations of rights 
due to crisis management measures some analysts argue that “when these measures have been 
imposed upon them by the Memoranda of Understanding and loan agreements, creditors also 
bear some responsibility for these violations.” (Ghailani 2016: 177) Analysis shows however that 
in recent years “the importance attached to human rights has declined together with state 
budgets, but that, unlike national budgets, these rights have not benefited from bail-out plans.” 
(Ghailani 2016). Gender and other equality priorities were integrated in EU crisis management 
processes only to a very limited extent and selectively. The European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights have both been reluctant to examine austerity measures from 
the perspective of fundamental rights and brought decisions that subordinated rights priorities to 
the exceptionalism of the crisis and primacy of economic recovery (Ghailani 2016: 175-176). 
Europe 2020 and the European Semester, the European Commission strategy on employment, 
productivity and social cohesion, set the framework for monitoring member states’ economic 
policies. Here “targets are translated into country-specific objectives through national reform and 
stability programs, where each member state sets the policies that it intends to implement to 
achieve the 2020 targets, and sets out the country’s budget for the coming three or four years. 
																																								 																				
9 European Women’s Lobby Women, the Financial and Economic Crisis - the Urgency of a Gender Perspective 
(September 2009). http://www.womenlobby.org/Women-the-Financial-and-Economic-Crisis-the-Urgency-of-a-
Gender-Perspective  
10 http://www.womenlobby.org/The-impact-of-the-crisis-on-gender-equality-needs-to-be-addressed-say-Women-s 
11 http://enil.eu/news/enil-press-release-eu-alliance-against-disability-cuts-news/  
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The European Commission sends country-specific annual recommendations to member 
states and monitors implementation, imposing financial sanctions to non-compliant states. After 
this European Commission monitoring, the European Council issues an individual 
recommendation to each member state to guide further reform. The changes required touch upon 
issues such as public finances, employment, education or pension reforms.” (Lombardo 2016:5). 
Systematic monitoring of rights could have been included under this framework, but this was not 
the case (Lombardo 2016).   
A light review of country specific annual recommendations delivered by the European 
Council to the governments of the five countries between the years 2011 and 2014 confirms the 
limited importance of equality issues in this EU crisis management exercise. Our analysis shows 
that monitoring paid only marginal and selective attention to special equality priorities along the 
detailed recommendations concerning economic recovery. Terms gender equality, disability, 
race/ethnicity, migrants are not mentioned one single time in the examined 20 sets of 
recommendations. There is a remarkable difference between recommendations delivered to old 
and new Member States. Spanish and UK recommendations are silent on inequality concerning 
any of our target groups. As an exception UK reports (2011, 2012, 2013) mention the problem of 
limited and expensive childcare in the context of labor market activation policies. This can be 
seen as indirect reference to women’s inequality though recommendations mainly speak about 
this in relation to poor and single income families, not women. Spanish recommendations lack 
any such references.  
Hungarian recommendations are the most extensive on these topics: they repeatedly refer 
to the outstanding level of inactivity of women on the labor market and scarcity of childcare. 
Discrimination against Roma is another recurring issue: poverty, access to education, structural 
problems on the labor market (including public works) are repeatedly brought up in relation to 
Roma. At a more structural level the need to mainstream Roma National Inclusion Strategy 
priorities (2012) and social inclusion (2013), as well as the need to improve consultation 
processes (2013, 2014) are also mentioned. Romanian recommendations are initially also very 
poor on these aspects but become more complex over the years. Initially the focus is only on low 
Roma employment (2011). By 2014 recommendations issued to Romania discuss equalizing 
pension age for women, low labor market participation and limited access to childcare for 
women, the slowdown of the de-institutionalization processes for disabled persons, slow 
implementation of the National Roma Inclusion strategy including lack of funding and 
coordination, as well as poor consultation processes. Finally Poland’s reports repeatedly focus on 
women’s labor market participation and insufficient childcare facilities to serve that but also 
include praises on improvements.  
To sum up: European crisis management paid limited attention to rights and particularly 
equality issues, despite the EU’s advanced normative framework. The emergency and severity of 
the crisis have overwritten rights issues. Even in the countries where monitoring covered certain 
equality matters (in Hungary and Romania), these were selectively picked and had limited scope.      
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This report analyzed backsliding in the equality policy regimes of five EU member states 
and investigated the nature and the causes of backsliding. Our approach stemmed from the 
assumption that the economic and financial crisis is one but not the only cause of backsliding in 
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equality policy domains. We also explored country variations by zooming on five cases that we 
have selected through an EU 28 mapping of backsliding trends in 2008-2015 completed at a 
former stage of the research (Sitter et.al.2016). We also compared convergence and divergence 
across three particular equality policy domains (gender, ethnicity/race, disability) that are 
constituted at different intersections of economic, political and social practices in societies and 
have partially different paths of development in the wider European Union’s political and policy 
arenas.      
Our comparative research has confirmed that there is a considerable scope for hard 
backsliding in equality fields in terms of violation of the acquis. There has been even more space 
for soft backsliding due to the extensive body of soft law and the discretion left to member states 
in adoption of hard law, that is to step back on commitments to EU norms without a direct 
breach of EU law. In the three examined equality fields, the crisis management generated a 
mixture of hard and soft backsliding. Cross-sectoral analysis of gender equality, race/ethnicity 
and disability policies showed a series of similarities. Overall backsliding on previous policy 
commitments took place in all three fields in four out of the five analyzed countries. It is 
noteworthy that backsliding in all three policy areas largely avoided policy matters that are 
regulated by hard law at the EU level. In all three fields, we have found step-backs from 
commitments within soft strategic objectives which, however, were until recently unquestionable 
standards for the EU and most EU member states.  
We have observed relatively mild backsliding in formal policy commitments, it has rather 
taken the form of neglecting the implementation of existent policies or significantly cutting their 
funding. A major bulk of backsliding measures have had a redistributive character rather than 
backsliding in policy salience of these issues. Tangible backsliding took place through reframing 
various equality policy issues in ways that may challenge rights based and equality of outcomes 
based approaches which achieved wide, although not undisputed, recognition in the last two 
decades. Backsliding and reframing of policy agendas warrants to reconsidering the progress 
bias in equality policy thinking. Backsliding that we found has shown the vulnerability of 
governmental institutions and equality policy strategies as well as government consultation 
mechanisms long seen as the direction for progress. Limited funding for institutions and for 
strategic targets undermines most equality policy objectives in all three fields. Further research 
may venture to explore whether serious institutional reductions for equality policy coordination 
and monitoring within governmental mechanisms is a consequence of across the board 
administrative spending cuts or more deliberate efforts to reduce possible executive resistance to 
austerity interventions.  
The different patterns of action limiting cooperation between governments and civil society 
and their use in all four countries points to a tendency of applied crisis management approaches 
towards state closure in these difficult times. It also highlights the vulnerability and weakness of 
hard achieved pre-crisis inclusion arrangements.  State closure to democratic consultation 
emerges as an important crosscutting element of backsliding, which is not only problematic in 
itself but also has serious consequences for the substantive content of crisis management 
packages and post-crisis processes. The use of opportunities for protest and subsequent 
improvement of inclusion deserves special mention and further research to understand its nature.    
Regarding the causes of differential crisis managements, we have found that the severity of 
economic and financial crisis has major impact indeed on the intensity of backsliding in equality 
policy domains. The significance of ideological backing of governmental regimes, however, 
remains important for choosing a mix of hard and soft backsliding initiatives, especially if public 
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debt burdens are manageable for a government and the major task is to manage economic 
downturn and lack of growth.  Ideological tenets influence the balance and hierarchy of crisis 
interventions among the three major equality fields. Further, the economic crisis might give a 
legitimating environment for major regime change in wider social policy and equality affairs 
rather than a single causal factor behind it. 
Civil society resistance and voice may also play a role in slowing down or putting some 
limits to backsliding or claiming its reversal, although not being able to halt it.  In our sample 
this could be traced –interestingly– in two quite different contexts. In Spain, it is major 
transformation of politics due to societal movements, mobilized by the crisis, within a frame of a 
strong yet relatively new democracy in Europe. In Romania, it is the formation of politics in a 
new democracy of Europe, fragile both in crisis and growth.  
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Annex 1: 
Chart 1: Real GDP per capita growth rate in EU 28, Euro area, and 5 member states (Eurostat) 
Chart 2: General government gross debt in EU 28, Euro area, and 5 member states (Eurostat)
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General government gross debt
% of GDP and million EUR
Percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
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A. Hungary Case Study  
By Andrea Sebestyen, with contributions from Andrea Krizsan and Violetta Zentai 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the post-communist period, the Hungarian equality policy regime has placed 
most emphasis on addressing the cause of disabled persons and ethnic minorities, primarily the 
Roma. Gender equality remained the least salient issue, either marginalized or explicitly 
opposed. Meanwhile, Hungary has always been a good performer in following international 
norms, particularly EU norms, in the equality fields. Hungary faced the economic crisis with 
high level public debt and weak growth capacities. A socialist-liberal government was 
restructured towards the end of its political cycle in April 20091. A technocratic government 
(Prime Minister Bajnai) took over and functioned until the next parliamentary election in 2010 
and introduced the first austerity measures. Retrenchment in equality policy regimes came about 
in two waves. Austerity package during the first wave earmarked a cut of about 600-900 milliard 
HUF from state expenditure. The primary goal was to stop overspending due mainly to the 
extensive social benefit system, the luxurious operation of the state, and the leverage of debt 
repayment. Short-term goals included taking protective measures to maintain working places and 
to make use of the available EU funds in a more targeted manner. Following the first wave of 
austerity measures in 2009, a second wave emerged under the right wing populist FIDESZ 
Hungarian Civic Alliance led government starting in 2010.  
The austerity package introduced in 2009 kicked off a crisis management with economic 
growth stimulation, including labour market activation of women, disabled people and 
minorities. The conservative coalition from 2010 continued the austerity provisions in certain 
social policy fields but also engaged in a drastic revision of the whole political and welfare 
system. It used the crisis as a justification to carry out major reforms in an emergency manner 
(Inglot, 2008 in Szikra). The new regime became increasingly hostile to gender equality and 
ethnic diversity, and increasingly favourable to the Hungarian middle class both economically 
and culturally. It has also marginalized democratic processes and blocked existent consultation 
processes with civil society groups representing the vulnerable. In January 2012, a new 
Constitution, the Fundamental Law (Alaptörvény) came into force, leading to important human 
rights and social policy changes many of which drew strong criticism both at home and abroad.2  
 
 
 
																																								 																				
1	The Socialist Party group submitted a ’constructive no-confidence motion’ against the Prime Minister and at the 
same time appointed Gordon Bajnai (at that time the head of the Ministry of Development and Economics) as a new 
prime minister 
2 “These criticisms concerned issues both of and beyond EU legislative competence, including transparency and 
legitimacy concerning the adoption of the new constitution; the use of ‘cardinal laws’, which require a twothirds, 
rather than the typical simple majority, for passage in parliament; the limitation of the independence of three 
ombuds institutions; the protection of Hungarians living abroad; the exercise of government control over the media; 
and the free exercise of religion.” Equinet Annual Report 2012 - FOCUS: The European Union as a Community of 
values: safeguarding fundamental rights in times of crisis 
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1. Gender domain 
 
Major differences emerge between the austerity measures introduced under the two 
governments. The Bajnai package mainly affected redistributive aspects of gender equality but 
brought improvement in recognition terms that is in institutional, policy and consultation matters.  
The Orban government in power from 2010 made fundamental changes to the legal 
framework which mark a strong conservative turn. The new Fundamental Law had several points 
which impacted on gender and family life. It removed the previous explicit protection of equal 
pay between men and women as the former constitution did. It stated that the family shall be 
based on the marriage of a men and a woman (Article L) thus excluding non-heterosexual 
relationships from constitutional protection. Also its “General Principles Guiding Hungary’s 
Constitution” a specific provision protects the fundamental human right to life from the moment 
of conception. Resonating with the new Constitution the new Family Protection Bill in force 
since 2014 was framed in strongly Catholic terms both in its definition of marriage, and 
concerning protection of foetal life from conception. A significant amendment of the Labour 
Code was accepted which allows the dismissal of employees raising children under 3 years with 
justification, which was prohibited earlier. The protection from dismissal for expectant mothers 
and mothers on maternity leave was also endangered by the plans, but was kept partially. 
Meanwhile from 2012, the Labour Code obliged employers to accommodate requests for part-
time jobs for parents of under 3. Another problematic amendment in 2012 stipulated that 
recipients of maternity related social benefits could not be registered as job seekers.3 This was 
particularly problematic because education programmes, trainings were only offered for 
jobseekers, meaning that parents (mainly mothers) who are at home with children lost the 
opportunity to benefit from courses provided by employment services. 
It was during the Hungarian Presidency that the EU’s Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and domestic violence was signed by some member states, 
but Hungary was not among them. Hungary signed in 2014, and has not ratified yet the 
Convention. In fact during 2011, the government closed off 40 places for battered women in 
crisis shelters from the previous 80, although according to international standards there should be 
more than 1000 in a country the size of Hungary.  
 
Strategy 
The Bajnai government adopted the Hungarian National Strategy for the Promotion of 
Gender Equality – Guidelines and Objectives 2010-20214 which was the first comprehensive 
Hungarian gender equality strategy since 1997. The first action plan referring to the first 2 years 
has also been accepted just before the second round of the national elections in April 2010. 
Although the Strategy is still in force the new government completely blocked its 
implementation and its cabinets repeatedly brought measures that went against its guidelines. 
According to the Strategy the government was supposed to be mainstreaming gender in its 
																																								 																				
3 Act about the advancement of employment and social support for unemployed A foglalkoztatás elősegítéséről és a 
munkanélküliek ellátásáról szóló 1991. évi IV. törvény 
4 1004/2010. (I. 21.) Korm.határozat a Nők és Férfiak Társadalmi Egyenlőségét Elősegítő Nemzeti Stratégia - 
Irányok és Célok 2010-2021 
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activities5. Women’s NGOs took active part in preparing the Strategy and the government 
incorporated most of their observations and suggestions.  
Contrary to its predecessor in the centre of the Orban cabinet’s mission is to stop the declining 
birth rates, to reach a boom in fertility rates. Women are seen primarily in their reproductive 
capacities. In government communication, the Hungarian family is a core value and the state 
supports it in different ways. Gender mainstreaming was now replaced with ‘family 
mainstreaming’ as a strategic principle. The Orban government also maintains that the 
’liberalization’ of family relationships is the main reasons behind declining birth rates. This leads 
to the strategic priority to reinstate traditional family values and fight gender equality and non-
heterosexual relationships (Szikra, 2014). These strategic principles inform legal and policy 
changes on gender equality since 2010.  
The present head of the sub-department ’Women Policy’ within the State Secretary of 
Family and Population Policy declared6 stated that in Hungary the problem of equal 
opportunities is not primarily the problem of women and men but is one between employees with 
children and those without. During the Hungarian Presidency of the European Council in 2011 a 
high-level gender themed meeting was organized ’Europe for Families-Families for Europe’ 
which solely concentrated on demography, work-life balance and motherhood. As the expert of 
the Hungarian Women’s Lobby  puts it; „the Hungarian message was clearly that only an 
increased birth rate can fight against demography decline in Europe (as opposed to 
immigration)” (Juhász, 2012). In one instance the government went directly against EU norms in 
this domain. In the spring of 2011 the government launched an anti-abortion and pro-adoption 
campaign for which it use European Union's Progress fund under the heading ‘improvement of 
gender mainstreaming in national policies and programmes.’ The Commission has contacted the 
Hungarian authorities to stop the campaign immediately, and informed about the consequences 
of inappropriate use of Progress funds7.  
 
Institutional infrastructure 
Prior to 2010 a small and relatively marginal yet operational department for Gender 
Equality existed within the Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs. The conservative downsized 
the department and its portfolio to ‘policies affecting women’ (Nőpolitika) and transferred it 
under Deputy State Secretary of Family and Population Policy in the Ministry of Human 
Resources. Currently the body concentrates primarily on the role of women as mothers within 
the family of their motherly responsibilities. The minister of National Economy in 2012 
appointed a Ministerial Commissioner in charge with Advancing Women Participation on the 
Labour market with a 2-year length mandate. Her role was to identify barriers to women’s 
participation in the labour market and initiate programmes. According to civil stakeholder’s 
reports8 this position has no weight, and during its mandate the question of gender equality has 
never been raised.  
																																								 																				
5 The Strategy centres around six main objectives: to reach the economic independence of genders; to achieve a 
balance of private and family life with professional career; to decrease the disproportion of participation level	
between	 genders	 in	 political	 and	 economic	 arena;	 to	 fight	 for	 ending	 violence	 against	 women;	 to	 support	
eradicating	gender	stereotypes;	the	planning	of	social	equality	strategy	should	be	based	on	professional	merits.	
6 dr. Kormosné Debreceni Zsuzsánna in her official presentation (19 February 2014) - available online – stated in 
Hungarian: „Jelenlegi értelmezésünk: a férfi és a nő közötti egyenlőség és harmonikus együttműködést 
hangsúlyozzuk, familista megközelítésben” 
7 http://www.womenlobby.org/EU-Commission-calls-on-the-Hungarian-authorities-to-stop-anti-abortion-campaign  
8Alternatív Jelentés ENSZ CEDAW Bizottsághoz, 2013 
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The equality body in charge for the enforcement of anti-discrimination policy in Hungary 
is the Equal Treatment Authority.9 Was set up in 2005 to receive and deal with individual and 
public complaints on unequal treatment and to implement the principles of equality and 
nondiscrimination. The anti-discrimination act lists 19 protected grounds including sex, gender, 
motherhood and pregnancy (being under reproductive treatment) and familial status. Gender 
based claims are not frequent, mainly including equal pay and sexual harassment cases. The 
Authority favors the ground of motherhood thus communicating widely those cases in which it 
has terminated employer practices hindering women’s employment. The financial independence 
of the Authority was increased in 2013 when it became a central budgetary agency invested with 
the legal status of a managing body. Thus the Authority has a separate line within the budget. 
Austerity impacted its budget to a limited extent only in 2010-11. Its planned budget since its 
foundation was the lowest in 2010:198,5 Million HUF and in 2011:187,4 Million HUF. (2009: 
204M; 2012: 210M; 2013: 210M; 2014: 265,8M). A decrease can be found in the number of the 
Authority’s staff dealing with equality issues during the so- crisis years (2010:13, 2011:11, 
2012: 8, 2013: 10, 2014: 9, 2015: 10). The Equal Treatment Advisory Board was also removed 
in the first half of 2012. It consisted of outstanding experts and gave opinion primarily on 
concepts and regulatory plans related to the enforcement of equal treatment and laws affecting 
the protection of vulnerable groups of the society.  
 
Civil Participation 
A major retrenchment in the field came in consultation processes. In 2011 the Law on 
Civil Societies about financing and administration of NGOs, was also amended. As a result many 
NGOS (including women’s rights groups) lost their „public interest” status, and small income 
NGOs (typically women and gender NGOs) were cut off from state funding (mainly from the 
National Civic Fund). State political control increased to the disadvantage of civic control 
(Juhász, 2012). The Council for Gender Equality existent since 1998 and re-established in 200610 
was a tripartite body including representatives of ministries, NGOs and of independent experts 
serving as a consultative forum for discussing issues of gender equality. The Council operated as 
a consultative body discussing legal and policy proposals and evaluating the impact of past and 
current policies about women and men. Under the Bajnai crisis government the Council was very 
active, political intention was to include its members consultations about the New Hungary 
Development Plan 2007-201311. Since the change of government in 2010 the Council was not 
convened, thus interaction between the government and women’s organizations has stopped 
(Juhász, 2012; Szikra 2013). According to OXFAM/EWL 2010 report12 observations, women’s 
NGOs do not get any funding from the national or local governments. The only project calls 
open to women’s groups are from EU development funds, but few women’s NGOs have the 
necessary cash flow to avoid bankruptcy. The second Orban government is the first Hungarian 
government for many years without any female member.  
 
																																								 																				
9	The	Act	CXXV	of	2003	on	Equal	Treatment	and	Promotion	of	Equal	Opportunities	 (the	general	Hungarian	anti-
discrimination	act,	so	called	Ebktv.)	came	into	force	on	27	January	2004.	The	Hungarian	Equal	Treatment	Authority	
has been working since 1 February 2005 chaired by Judit Demeter who has been replaced by the conservative 
government to Ágnes Honyecz. 
10 Based on the founding government decree 1089/2006 (IX.25. 
11 ’Új Magyarország Fejlesztési Terv’ (2007-2013) Bajnai Gordon as a Government Commissioner for Development 
Policy attended the inaugural meeting with the minister of Social and Labour Affairs, Péter Kiss 
12 Invisible crisis? 2010 
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Provisions 
Welfare provisions serving gender equality were cut under both governments. The Bajnai 
austerity package shortened the length of the paid parental leave from 3 years to 2 years in order 
to increase the participation of women on the labour market. The pack rendered the amount of 
the family allowance (which is an automatic entitlement for families raising children in 
Hungary) frozen for 2 years. Together with the above-mentioned cuts, the government 
announced its intention to extend the infrastructure of early childhood care, since measures like 
creation of new crèches, and the development of the family day care system with targeted 
allowances could contribute to women re-entering labour market. More complex and targeted 
employment programmes were also announced, which could help the most vulnerable groups: 
citizens with lower educational level, citizens above 50 years, women and Roma.  
The Orban cabinet restored long parental leaves to give back the ’right of mothers’ to stay at 
home with their children (Szikra, p 9). A time limit has also been introduced for work in parallel 
with receiving parental allowances: the mother who is on leave and whose child is older than one 
could do no more than 30 hours a week paid work. Meanwhile the ombudsman reported in 2010 
that the day care system for children could not provide equal access and quality for all.    
As numbers indicate: out of the 3145 towns of the country, only 230 had its own crèches, 
thus only 9% of the children aged between 0-3 had a place within the system. The development 
of the family day care system was disregarded without governmental intention to support it. As 
the 2013 CEDAW shadow report says policy „gradually pushed the financial burden of 
reconciliation of work and family on the family: first by increasing the prices of meals in 
nurseries, kindergartens and schools (these state institutions are free of charge, only charge for 
meals), then, by amendment plan made public in November 2011, by making it possible for self-
governments to charge parents for the nursery, up to 25% of the per person income of the 
family.” As a perfect example of ‘family mainstreaming’ in January 2011, a 16% flat personal 
income tax was introduced with generous child tax credits in line with the number of children. 
Another manifestation is an amendment made in pension law (in December 2010) covering the 
opportunity of women’s retirement after 40 years of work, regardless of their age (the pension 
limit is 65 since 2010 for both sexes). These years include the time spent on maternity leave but 
not the time spent in higher education. This confirms the idea that the government appreciates 
women through motherhood. Somewhat contrary to this the cabinet introduced a new Start 
Bonus programme which provides the opportunity to employ (new contracts) returning mothers 
for a year without the obligation of paying allowances. Since 2011 those who re-employ mothers 
could apply for a special support for a 3-year length period if the employment is part-time and 
creates another part-time job.  
 
 
2. Race/ethnicity domain 
 
The Socialist Party between 2002 and 2010 introduced policies sensitive to the special needs 
of the Roma community. The second socialist-liberal government (2006-2009) paid high 
attention to fighting against discrimination in parallel to providing protection against hate 
speech. In 2008, the Ministry for Social and Labour Affairs introduced an equal access based 
financial supporting system in the distribution of the EU structural funds. The Bajnai government 
(2009-2010) started crisis management interventions by implementing short-term measures. 
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Parallel to this, it also embarked on using the EU Structural Funds for territorially targeted 
development programs for localities of sizeable Roma communities.  
 
 
 
Legislation, strategy and institutional framework  
The most significant changes in the legal system under the conservative-liberal (second 
Orban) government started with passing the Fundamental Law in April 2011. The text renders 
the process of ‘catch-up’ (felzárkóztatás) equally relevant to the principal of equal opportunities. 
Further, citizens are entitled to social assistance only if they fulfil their work responsibilities. 
Article 19 limits social rights to a ‘set of risks’ including employment, but only in cases of ‘not 
caused by citizens’ own actions’. Furthermore, the nature and extent of social subsidies are to be 
determined according to ‘the usefulness of the beneficiaries’ activities for the community. In 
2013, the Act on Equal Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities was amended, 
introducing the principle of ‘catch-up’. Roma rights groups expressed concern that a ‘catch-up 
opportunities’ approach could confer legitimacy to de facto segregation which affects Roma 
children. 
Under the Hungarian presidency of the EU, in 2011 the European Commission adopted 
the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 2011-2020 focusing on four key 
areas: education, employment, healthcare and housing. Accordingly, Hungary prepared its long-
term strategy for Roma inclusion adding two extra policy areas: public security and culture. The 
National Social Inclusion Strategy of Hungary (NSIS): Extreme Poverty, Child Poverty, the 
Roma (2011–2020) was followed by an action plan for the period of 2012-2014 and a second one 
for 2015-2017.13 This could be conceived as a major policy progress in the middle of the crisis 
period by massive EU backing. The implementation of the NRIS primarily relied on the sources 
of the EU Structural Funds, of which Hungary was a major beneficiary in the financial cycle of 
2007-2014. The government signed a framework agreement in 2011 with its exclusive Roma 
consultation partner, the by-partisan National Roma Self-Government (NRSG).14   
Under the socialist-liberal government, the Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs was 
responsible for coordinating the Roma inclusion policy. In 2010, a State Secretariat for Social 
Inclusion was created in the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. Later the Secretariat 
was moved to the Ministry of Human Affairs. An Interdepartmental Committee for Social 
Inclusion and Roma Issues was also established as the main governmental coordinating tool 
specifically for the execution of the National Roma Integration Strategy. Parallel to this, in 
November 2011, the National Anti-Discrimination Network were also terminated, which 
provided legal aid and counselling for free in 44 offices across the country since 2001. In 2012 
the formerly independent institution of Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National 
and Ethnic Minorities was abolished and became a Deputy Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights, responsible for the protection of the rights of nationalities living in Hungary. The Equal 
																																								 																				
13	See: National Social Inclusion Strategy: Extreme Poverty, Child Poverty, the Roma.  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/roma_hungary_strategy_en.pdf 
14 Framework Agreement Between the Government of Hungary and the National Roma Self-Government 
http://romagov.kormany.hu/keretmegallapodas-intezkedesi-terve/download/a/5f/10000/Korm%C3%A1ny-
OR%C3%96_2011%2005%2020%20.pdf   
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Treatment Authority15 faced a decrease in staff dealing with equality issues during the crisis 
years (2010:13, 2011:11, 2012: 8, 2013: 10, 2014: 9, 2015: 10)16. The Equal Treatment Advisory 
Board ceased to exist in the first half of 2012. It was consisted of outstanding experts and gave 
opinion primarily on concepts and regulatory plans related to the enforcement of equal treatment 
and laws affecting the protection of vulnerable groups of the society.  
 
Civil participation 
The fourth amendment of the Fundamental Law (2011), by changing the terminology of 
the Equal Treatment Act, relabelled the by-partisan National Roma Self-Government as a civil 
society organisation paving the road to a hand-picked and exclusive status of the organization to 
represent the Roma. The organization, which looks as an exemplary democratic institution, in 
almost all election cycles it has been led by a prominent personality supported by one of the 
parties. In the current cycle, the president of the NRSG is also the head of the Lungo Drom 
National Gypsy Advocacy and Civic Association, which has been in permanent election 
cooperation with the current governing party for 12 years. The NRSG acts as a national political 
representation body, a policy coordination agency, and a larger project beneficiary. The 
experiences show that the NRSG does not have the competence to fulfill the latter two functions.  
The NRIS Strategy states that it is key to the long-term success that the Romani 
community at all levels of policy-making, implementation and evaluation of the policy-making 
actively participates. The Strategy names the National Civil Program (recently renamed as 
National Cooperation Fund) as the key funding resource for civil society support. The funding 
decisions of this Program became more and more by-partisan after 2010 through non-transparent 
and clientelistic resource allocation for civil society actors. In June 2013 the government 
established an Anti-Segregation Roundtable with the involvement of several church 
representatives, educational experts and NGOs. The goal is to review current issues of 
educational integration and segregation; to discuss civil, religious, local and state government 
actors’ competencies and role-taking opportunities; to jointly review current professional 
standards; and, where appropriate, to propose new directions. Since its start, two NGO rep-
resentatives have resigned from the roundtable, referring to the thin policy content of the 
meetings and non-responsive attitude of the government.17  
 
Social benefits and inclusion 
Hungary’s Public Education Act of December 2011 sought to optimize the Hungarian 
educational system. Among its legislated changes was a lowering of compulsory school-age 
from 18 to 16, making it easier for students who were struggling in school to opt out of 
education.18 The maintenance of education institutions, formerly decentralized, was re-
centralized under the Public Education Act of 2011. The declared objective was to equalize 
																																								 																				
15 The Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities (the general Hungarian anti-
discrimination act, so called Ebktv.) came into force on 27 January 2004. The Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority 
has been working since 1 February 2005.   
16 Its planned budget since its foundation was the lowest in 2010:198,5 Million HUF and in 2011:187,4 Million 
HUF. (2009: 204M; 2012: 210M; 2013: 210M; 2014: 265,8M). 
17 Civil Society Monitoring report 2012. p 11.  
18 2011. évi CXC. törvény a nemzeti köznevelésről (Law on education No. CXC. 2011). Accessible at:    
https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100190.TV 
 
9	
	
funding and professional oversight. Notwithstanding, every fourth school in smaller settlements 
face segregated education to growing over-representation of Roma in primary education due to 
white flight which is not only not tackled but endorsed by educational policy management. By 
the summer of 2015, in response to an unfavorable European Court of Human Rights verdict, the 
government of Hungary essentially legalized segregation with another amendment to the Public 
Education Act, allowing it to redefine what equal treatment means. Disturbingly, it allows 
classes to be segregated on the basis of religion, ideology or ethnicity, and has led to more 
church-run schools opening across the country. 
It was already under the socialist-liberal government that social benefits became tied to 
active labor participation. Long-term unemployed started to propel to public work jobs with low 
perspective of reintegration into the regular labour market. After 2010, the conservative 
government declared a significant attitude-change regarding the social benefit system to enhance 
individual responsibility and non-cash benefits. The amount of the universal family allowance 
(which is an automatic entitlement for families raising children in Hungary) has not been indexed 
since 2009 and has lost about 20% of its value. Modification to the public work program in 2012 
introduced Subsidiary Assistance Replacing Employment conditioned on that the recipient must 
have had an employment relationship at least 30 days in the previous year.19 Those who are no 
longer eligible for social benefits lose their eligibility for state-funded health-insurance, too. 
Local governments of the settlements may impose an additional requirement that the recipient’s 
living environment must be kept tidy. Unemployment insurance was reduced from 9 to 3 months 
which is the shortest period within the EU. From 2012 local governments were not allowed to 
provide local housing allowance. From 2011 better-off working families have been able to claim 
remarkable financial resources through tax credits, whereas the earlier compensation for low-
income earners was terminated. All these measures together siphoned further resources from 
social assistance to the most vulnerable and left them in more and more miserable coping 
conditions.    
 
Employment incentives 
Before 2009, the focus of the policy on stimulating labour market supply included the 
reduction in the amounts of numerous benefits, the strengthening of job seeker’s activity and 
services offered by the Public Employment Services. In 2009, the Way to Work complex 
program was introduced aiming to reintegrate those depending on the permanent social 
assistance and long term unemployed. A supply-driven labor market measure was introduced 
called Start program which provided support for employers who hire members of disadvantaged 
groups. The program also exempted employers from paying employer’s contribution for 3 years. 
The conservative government replaced the active labour market policies with a punitive public 
works program. The proportion of funds spent on public employment from the fund available for 
labour market instruments increased to a record high amount. The number of participants in 
public work was 186,000 in 2010, 265,600 in 2011, and 311,500 in 2012. Sub-national 
Employment Centres are involved in organising public work on the operational level, whereas 
the mayor’s office make decisions about the recruitment, tasks, and working conditions in 
																																								 																				
19 According to the main civil society monitoring report, it is practically impossible to meet by those unemployed 
people who live in tiny villages and cannot get into public work. Civil Society Monitoring Report 2012, available at: 
http://romadecade.org/cms/upload/file/9270_file8_hu_civil-society-monitoring-report_en.pdf. 
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smaller (thus most of the) settlements concerned. Thus, the opportunities for employment 
depends on arbitrary decisions with no chance for legal remedy. As a conclusion of a project 
entitled Dignity of Work, the opinion of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights and a 
TÁRKI-TUDOK survey revealed, Romani job seekers may become subject to direct, indirect 
discrimination and possibly victimization on several occasions. Public workers are not protected 
by the labour code, and refusing public work offered or violating the obligation to cooperate with 
the Public Employment Centre could be sanctioned by two years of exclusion from the system.  
Until very recently, Hungary did not have any overall policy document on migration and 
integration. However, in October 2013 the Government adopted a Migration Strategy for the 
years 2014 to 2020, setting out actions and goals in the fields of admission, residence, 
integration, international protection and return. Basic legal and policy infrastructure for 
migration and refugee affairs was measured as lower average in European terms according to the 
MIPEX index. Until 2014-2015, the country received low number of migrants and refugees 
which did not create major policy challenge. This fundamentally changed in 2015. 
 
 
3. Disability domain 
In Hungary, the medical approach to disability still holds in policies despite the 
pioneering adoption of a law on Equal Opportunities for Disabled Persons as early as 199820 
(henceforth Disability Act). The Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights stated in his 
report called ‘Dignity of Work’21 (2013:51) that the effective legal background on disability does 
not correspond fully to the Europe 2020 Strategy, furthermore it does not comply with important 
UN endorsed principles such as independent living or inclusion by the community. The basic 
elements of regulation are available, but these are not synchronized, and consequently their 
effectiveness is low. Hungary ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (hereinafter referred to as CRPD or Convention) among the very first state parties in 
2007. However since ratification there was limited political will to upgrade the structure and 
transform professional and public discourse in the spirit of the Convention. As the Hungarian 
Disability Caucus says: “Hungarian law and policies consider persons with disabilities, above all, 
a burden for society. They do not actively respect the difference of the person with disability, nor 
do they recognize his or her value as part of human diversity. They attribute essential 
significance to the prevention of disability, to normalization and to rehabilitation.” (2013:17) 
The most problematized dimension of the disability policy during the years of the crisis 
was the high financial burden imposed on the state by allowances for disabled persons. The 
proposed objective was to cut the burden on the state budgets by fighting against inactivity rates, 
(re)integrating those who were capable to work. The responses varied from cutting subsidies to 
narrowing entitlements or encouraging employers to integrate disabled persons with incentives. 
The socialist-liberal coalition governing in 2008/09 used the narrative that Hungary could not 
anymore afford the high budget for social disability pensions as it did in the past. They 
committed to filter out those who were receiving the state aid illegitimately and to advance the 
labour market integration of those who were still capable of work. The cabinet introduced (in 
January 2008) austerity measures – the so-called disability reform – which reduced significantly 
the number of those who were entitled for state allowance based on their impairment or reduced 
																																								 																				
20 Act XXVI of 1998 on Equal Opportunities for Disabled Persons.  
21 AJB Projektfüzetek, 2013/4: A Munka Méltósága projekt 
11	
	
work capacity. The austerity pack of Bajnai’s crisis government (2009) declared the intention to 
continue the reconstruction of the social disability pension system started in 2008. The FIDESZ 
government’s CRPD country report (2012)22 stated the objective to return people with “poor 
health” to active labour market positions, to thus replace their passive disability pension. The 
conservative government now framed the system of subsidies as a form of sickness-allowances.  
 
 
 
Disability equality law, strategy and institutional framework  
The process of harmonization between the UNCRPD and Hungarian disability law was 
the main disability policy priority for Hungary during the crisis period. Progress in policy 
commitments through the ratification took place along with backsliding on certain aspects of 
disability rights and stalled implementation. Ratification of the conventions was not followed up 
with harmonization of the Disability Act23 . The Hungarian act continued to use an exhaustive 
medical definition, considerably restricting the circle of persons with disabilities, failing, for 
instance, to include psychiatric patients with (long-term) mental impairment. Other definitions 
also remained in use, for example in the field of employment the term ’employees with 
changed/reduced work capacities’. The medical model used prescribes a threshold criterion for 
the impairment in contrast with the UN CRPD human rights approach to disability. The policy 
also prioritizes the “correction” of the individual, rather than the transformation of the 
environment, as a solution for equal opportunities. The issue remains for now in the charitable 
domain rather being a fundamental rights question.24  
This has consequences for compliance with EU acquis. The Anti-discrimination act 
provides for the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability (in accordance with EU 
Employment Directive), however the problematic definition of disability makes submission of 
claims problematic. Paper based medical evidence of the nature and scale of impairment is 
required to bring a claim. The concept and requirement of reasonable accommodation is included 
in the Anti-Discrimination Act and in the Labour Code but the content specifications are still 
missing. Thus, when implementing employers face not only financial challenges but they are 
without proper guidance on how to fulfil this obligation.  
According to the disability act the Parliament is obliged to pass long-term strategy 
documents on disability: National Disability Programmes every seven years in order to establish 
the framework for disability policy. Unlike in the field of gender equality, strategic programming 
in disability policy remained continuous during the crisis: the National Disability Program 2007-
201325 was followed after a short interruption by a new program for 2015-2022.26  
No major backsliding can be noted in the institutional structure in charge for disability 
policy either. Moreover after 2015 some progress can be noted. The governmental agency in 
charge for disability policy is located within the Ministry for Human Resources, and the State 
																																								 																				
22 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities Initial reports submitted by States parties under article 35 of the Convention – Hungary -  
23 1998. évi XXVI. törvény a fogyatékossággal élő jogairól és esélyegyenlőségük biztosításáról 
24 As the Hungarian Disability Caucus (in its CRPD alternative report, p 17) says: “Hungarian law and policies consider persons 
with disabilities, above all, a burden for society. They do not actively respect the difference of the person with disability, nor do 
they recognize his or her value as part of human diversity. They attribute essential significance to the prevention of disability, to 
normalization and to rehabilitation.” 
25 Országos Fogyatékosügyi Programról szóló 10/2006. (II. 16.) OGY határozat 
26 Országos Fogyatékosügyi Programról szóló 15/2015. (IV. 7.) OGY határozat 
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Secretariat for Social Inclusion and Social Affairs which is responsible for advancing social 
equality. It oversees the areas of equal opportunities and employment rehabilitation of disabled 
persons and ‘employees with changed working capacities’. In addition to the executive agency in 
2015 the Interdepartmental Disability Commission (Fogyatékosságügyi Tárcaközi Bizottság) 
was created27 to coordinate the work of several ministries on disability issues and help 
mainstream the priorities of the disability programme. According to the initial proposal to 
establish this body constant cooperation and communication was foreseen between this 
Commission and the National Disability Council which is the main consultative body for 
disability policy. The adopted version of the decree creating the Commission does not mention 
this cooperation, which is a signal of downscaling the importance of consultation.  
 Indeed, consultation mechanisms witnessed serious downscaling during the years of the 
crisis. According to the 24. és 25. § of the Disability Act until 30 September 2013 the National 
Disability Council (Fogyatékosságügyi Tanács) (NDC) was a consultative body serving the 
government. Initially its 17 members consisted of representatives of 7 ministries (represented by 
state secretaries) and civil society organizations of disabled persons. The council was in charge 
for drafting the national disability program for the Parliament. Based on a government decree 
about the revision of public bodies28 the Council members’ governmental representation was 
terminated in 2011, dismantling the legal basis for this consultative platform. Articles 24. § and 
25. § were also removed from the disability act in 2013. The mandate and operational conditions 
of the Council are since defined by a government decree29, which means a lower level of legal 
regulation. The Council remained a consultative body, its president is the minister and its 
members are delegated by formally accepted national disability interest groups covering all field 
of impairments. Consultation processes exclude all other civil society groups including the main 
disability rights groups. The budget of the NDC was almost halved from 9.1 Million in 2009 to 5 
Million HUF in 2011 and cut altogether in 2012. The CRPD Committee’s response to the 
Hungarian CRPD report 201230 regretted the insufficient participation of persons with 
disabilities and their representative organizations in the review and design of disability-related 
legislation and policies. Their recommendation for the government was to take effective 
measures to consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, furthermore provide 
them adequate funding. In the national budget (for the period 2009-2012) there are 7-8 
permanent disability interest organizations which received state support continuously. The 
budget allocated dropped in 2010, but in the following years it was corrected to the pre-crisis 
levels31 Organizations funded by the state did not include disability rights groups.   
 
																																								 																				
27 Gov. Decree 1432/2015. (VI. 30.)  
28 A jogszabállyal vagy közjogi szervezetszabályozó eszközzel létrehozott testületek felülvizsgálatáról szóló 
1158//2011. (V. 23.) Kormány határozat 
29 Országos Fogyatékosságügyi Tanácsról szóló 1330/2013. (VI. 13) Korm. határozat 
30 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2012) Concluding observations on the initial periodic 
report of Hungary, adopted by the Committee at its eighth session (17-28 September 2012). 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD%2fC%2fHUN
%2fCO%2f1&Lang=en  
31 The Hungarian Association for Persons with Intellectual Disability received 138 HUF Million in 2009 and 70 
HUF Million in 2010. The Hungarian Association of the Deaf and Hard of Hearing received 177 HUF Million in 
2009 and 70 HUF Million in 2010. The National Federation of Disabled Persons’ Associations received 160 HUF 
Million in 2009 and 105 HUF Million in 2010. The Hungarian Federation of the Blind and Partially Sighted 
received 207 HUF Million in 2009 and 97,5 HUF Million in 2010. 
13	
	
Provisions 
Disability provisions were dramatically transformed to serve activation, numbers of 
beneficiaries reduced during the period of the crisis. Before 2008 the state subsidy based on the 
scale of impairment and the personal capacity for rehabilitation was the disability pension.32  The 
pre-2009 socialist liberal government introduced the rehabilitation annuity33 for those who were 
deemed to be potentially rehabilitated. They also initiated periodic obligatory re-examinations of 
benefit recipients to filter out those who benefitted unlawfully. In 2012, the Fidesz government 
continued the revision of the disability pension' system. They were driven by the same purposes 
as their predecessor: (re)integrating those who are capable of work and filtering out free-riders. 
Disability subsidy started to be contextualized as a kind of sick-allowance. The Constitutional 
Court opinion34 confirmed by arguing that disability pension is not a basic right but a 
replacement for the loss of income caused by health damage provided for those in active age. 
From January 201235, the disability pension was abolished. In the new system, those who were at 
the age of retirement started to receive a regular pension. Persons with changed/reduced working 
capacities were entitled to receive rehabilitation subsidy if rehabilitation was possible (for about 
a period of 1-3 year) and to receive disability subsidy if rehabilitation was not suggested. The 
amount of the benefits was decreased. Based on MEOSZ36 statistics the average amount of the 
disability pension in December 2011 was around HUF 70.000, in the first quarter of 2012 the 
new disability subsidies was around HUF 55.500. Compulsory re-examinations continued, 
speeded up and extended to all the beneficiaries. As a result, one fifth of all beneficiaries (38.000 
persons) was cut from further disbursement because of not reaching the required 40% threshold 
of impairment and around 15% of them were declared capable of rehabilitation.  
No alternative benefits were introduced to help those who were left without any kind of 
support as a consequence of the reform. The act about social care37 lists ‘basic services’ aimed to 
give assistance through social work. Support service cover daytime care or home assistance 
service and emergency home assistance service. From 1 January 2009 support services and from 
1 January 2010 emergency home assistance services started to be tendered instead of given 
previously used regular grants. Because of limited absorption of financial resources the number 
of social workers was significantly decreased; their working hours dropped. The national budget 
line for ‘other medical services aid’ highly relevant for disabled persons also dropped in 2010, 
but was levelled back by 201238.  
The most significant changes took place in incentives for employers provided to advance 
labour market participation of disabled persons. These included the wage support which was 
initially introduced in November 2005 and could grant up to 40-100% of the wages for disabled 
employees. This was suspended from 1 September 2009 with the possibility to prolong existent 
																																								 																				
32 rokkantsági nyugdíj 
33 rehabilitációs járadék  
34 “A rokkantsági ellátás ugyanis jövedelempótló jellegű ellátás, amely abban az esetben segíti a megváltozott 
munkaképességű személyt, ha az állapota miatt egyáltalán nem képes arra, hogy keresőtevékenységet folytasson, 
vagy képes ugyan munkát vállalni, de az abból származó jövedelme a megélhetési minimumot sem biztosítja 
számára.” 40/2012. (XII. 6.) AB határozat (utólagos normakontroll; indítványozó: Dr. Szabó Máté, az alapvető 
jogok biztosa 
35 According to the Act CXCI. (2011)  
36 National Federation of Disabled Persons’ Associations (MEOSZ) – Beadvány az Ombudsmanhoz available: 
http://msmke.hu/hirek/pdfs/MEOSZ%20beadv%C3%A1nya%20az%20ombudsmanhoz.pdf 
37 1993. évi III. törvény a szociális igazgatásról és szociális ellátásokról 
38 Was 37 005 HUF Million, in 2010: 28 185 HUF Million, in 2011: 38 872 HUF Million, in 2012: 38 213 HUF 
Million.	
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contracts until 30 June 2012. Rehabilitation contribution increased significantly as of January 
2010 and now equals the minimum wage (2009: 177,600 HUF; 2010: 964,500 HUF/year). This 
encourages employers with more than 20 employees to meet the requirement of filling 5 percent 
of their positions with disabled employees, though only for part time work. According to the 
Hungarian CRPD report (2012), those persons living with disability who are unable to enter the 
open labour market can appear in various sectors of the protected labour market. Financing for 
social employment is available for them, although in a tender-system since 1 January 2010.  
During the post 2010 period two notable progressive processes could be noticed in the 
disability policy field. Both of these are drawing on UN CRPD principles. One is support for 
independent living. The program of Deinstitutionalization – transformation of large disability 
institutions into community based settings – has started after 2011. Unfortunately, according to a 
recent TASZ report (2016)39 implementation is slow and there is a little chance to terminate the 
first phase of the process in accordance with Article 19 of CRPD. The government has spent 
significant amount of EU sources between 2007 and 2013 on supporting community-based 
living, but the effects of these remained largely invisible because of underfinanced 
complementary basic services. The report stated that provisions were changed positively and 
professionals have learnt a lot about the essence of deinstitutionalization but this was not 
sufficient for a quality planning and coherent execution. The designated coordination bodies 
(Intézményi Férőhely Kiváltás Koordináló Országos Testület (IFKKOT) and Fogyatékos 
Személyek Esélyegyenlőségéért Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft. (FSZK) 40) were not capable of 
coordinating the operative process. 
Move towards the principle of supported decision-making (to replace substitutive 
decision-making) was the other important shifts that the CRPD brought to the Hungarian policy 
paradigm, meaning the legal recognition of interdependent autonomy. At first time, the 2001 
amendment of the Civil Code41, then the new Civil Code42 introducing an option to the chapter 
on legal capacity as of restricting it for certain types of cases and rendering the social, familial 
background of the persons to be investigated also, which were important steps towards the new 
paradigm, so it was welcomed by civil society actors in the field. However, as the Hungarian 
Caucus stated, to this day, most orders for placement under guardianship involve the deprivation 
or the general limitation of the legal capacity (2010:21).  
 Overall disability was a controversial field which witnessed some important progress and 
somewhat less backsliding than gender in formal policy terms. However de facto retrenchment 
and restructuring of benefits ultimately limited autonomy and independence of disabled persons, 
despite the stated objectives of the government of labour market activation and independent 
living. 
 
Conclusions 
																																								 																				
39 Az Európai Unió támogatásainak a szerepe az intézménytelenítésben és a férőhelykiváltás eddigi tapasztalatai, 
Kozma Ágnes – Petri Gábor – Balogh Attila – Birtha Magdolna, TASZ, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért (2016)  
40 FSZK is a non-profit organization with the task of advancing equal opportunities, social integration and complex 
rehabilitation of the disabled. Development programs guided and executed by the organization are funded by the 
national domestic budget (Új Széchenyi Terv, az Országos Fogyatékosságügyi Program). Their professional work 
based on the UN Convention and the EU Disability Strategy 2010-2020. Their high priority projects are about 
developing employment opportunities, supporting the entrance into labour market, providing quality education and 
equal access, working for social inclusion and strengthening participation.   
41 2001. évi XV. törvény a cselekvőképességgel, gondnoksággal összefüggő egyes törvények módosításáról 
42az új Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 2013. évi V. törvény	
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In Hungary backsliding first took the form of a neo-liberal austerity package with some 
openness and sensitivity to equality concerns. From 2010 a conservative-nationalist approach 
took over, which subordinated cuts and restructuring to a nationalist agenda in which gender 
equality ethnic diversity were seen to undermine national sustainability. Cuts in the first wave 
left equality institutions and programming untouched or even improved across all three grounds 
though with more limited budgets. The second wave established a hierarchy in which disability 
remained a politically acceptable inequality ground, though framed in medical terms, but gender 
and ethnicity were hit hard, by blocked consultation, dismantled institutions and also 
ideologically driven reframing of social policies reaching to these groups. The two sets of 
responses differ significantly in their framing: the first set of austerity measures were framed 
with some sensitivity to inequality and gender issues despite the extensive budget cuts (2009-10). 
The second wave of retrenchment was framed in nationalist, familialist terms with particularly 
negative effects on gender and race issues. The conservative coalition continued with austerity 
provisions in certain social policy fields but also engaged in a drastic turnover of the whole 
political and welfare system.  
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B. Poland Case Study  (by Joanna Kostka) 
 
In Poland welfare reform measures have been systematically applied to social policy areas 
related to care, education and welfare payments. Their origins can be traced back as far as the 
1990s (shock therapy43) and while the recent global economic crisis has often served as 
justification for the ongoing neoliberal drive, there has been little evidence of "backsliding” in 
terms of the states’ commitments to equality measures.  In fact in the period of 2007-2014 
Poland has made some progress in strengthening its anti-discrimination law and equality 
infrastructure (in all three domains of gender, race and disability). The introduced changes, 
however, were formalistic, limited to legislative alterations, and diverged from trends unraveling 
across the EU.  As numerous member states (including France, Ireland, Spain and UK) 
progressed to cut back their equality infrastructure, Poland demonstrated a high degree of 
‘resilience’.  However, it is important to note that Poland has not experienced negative growth of 
the GDP during the crisis. The situation was instead interpreted as an economic slowdown.  
Although the spill-over of the crisis was reflected in unemployment and absolute poverty 
statistics in year 2008-2011,  according to the CIA World Factbook44, Poland experienced 4.8%, 
1.7%, 3.8% and 4.4% growth in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. The same source 
shows that the EU as a whole experienced 0.8%, negative 4%, 1.8% and 1.6% growth in the 
same years.  This situation at least partially could explain Polish resilience.  This case study takes 
an in-depth look at the developments of this period.    
Political Context  
On October 21, 2007 the center-right party the Civic Platform (PO), gained more than 
41% of the popular vote in parliamentary elections. PO proceeded to form a majority governing 
coalition with the agrarian Polish People's Party (PSL), with PO leader, Donald Tusk, taking 
over the prime ministerial office.  European issues had a high profile in the elections and the pro-
EU attitudes were espoused by the newly formed government. While equality issues were not 
prioritized in electoral campaign, the PO’s program showed strong commitment to 
‘Europeanization’ of national policies.  Moreover, the government vouched to bring greater 
predictability and professionalism to foreign policymaking and shed Poland’s image as an 
‘awkward partner’ within the EU. While the raise of PO was celebrated by civil society and 
equality advocates it is important to remember that PO’s social opinions remained conservative. 
Social liberalism has not been promoted within PO, thus the legalization of homosexual 
marriages, church separation from state, soft drugs legalization or euthanasia stood outside the 
party’s agenda. 
The 2011 parliamentary elections saw a clear victory for the centrist Civic Platform (PO) 
and continuation of European-friendly policies (predominately in the field of foreign policy).   
However, the major story of this election was the success of the Palikot Movement (RP), an anti-
																																								 																				
43 "Shock Therapy" was a method for rapidly transitioning from a communist economy, based on state ownership 
and central planning, to a capitalist market economy.  It was based on the release of price and currency controls, 
withdrawal of state subsidies, and immediate trade liberalization. It also included large-scale privatization of 
previously public-owned assets. 
44 Central Intelligence Agency (2011). The World Factbook, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
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clerical liberal party formed by the controversial businessman Janusz Palikot. The party 
proposed a socially liberal program that included reducing the influence of Poland’s powerful 
Catholic  
Church in public life, the de-criminalization of so-called ‘soft’ drugs, abortion on 
demand, and more rights for sexual and other minorities including the legalization of same-sex 
civil unions. The Palikot Movement attracted a significant number of younger voters who wanted 
efficient government but also had socially liberal views on lifestyle issues and felt that Civic 
Platform and the Democratic Left Alliance were too establishment-oriented and deferential 
towards the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the presence of a liberal voice in the parliament has 
not generated profound changes in political discourse.  In fact,   during the 2015 vote on civil 
partnership the majority of MPs voted against it (including 70 MPs from PO) demonstrating that 
progressive reforms in equality legislation faced deeply entrenched opposition.  
Given the hostile environment (especially pronounced in the field of gender equality) the 
developments in the above mentioned period are startling. The most substantial accomplishments 
took place in the anti-discrimination framework, which include the creation of Equality Bodies, 
introduction of electoral gender quota system, ratification of Istanbul Convention and 
amendments to the Labor and Penal Codes.  Less attention has been given to the ‘soft indicators’ 
accounting for welfare provisions and integration measures (targeted at minorities and disabled 
persons).  However, even in these areas the cuts were avoided and efforts were made to 
strengthen reconciliation of family and working life and activation of disabled persons on the 
labor market. Finally, this period opened up a dialogue with civil society and allow for creation 
of platform(s) where issues related to gender equality, non-discrimination, and treatment of 
minorities and disabled persons could be openly discussed.   
 
Gender Domain  
 
In gender domain Poland emerged as one of the most resilient countries in the EU showing 
no backsliding on any indicators.  While the budget-related provisions of the laws of 2009-
201045 indicated ongoing ‘budget slimming’ and the search for opportunities to increase State 
revenue (i.e. introduction of Value-added tax in 2011) neither equality infrastructure nor equality 
strategies faced cutbacks.  Moreover, despite prognosis that the greatest savings were to take 
place in social welfare spending, no cuts were made to family benefits and child care services.  
In fact, between 2009 and 2011 Poland extended parental leave46, and introduced reforms to 
support development of early childhood education and care47.  The public sector also emerged 
fairly untouched (especially when compared to other EU member states). Following the 
European trend since 2010, Poland’s total pay budget for public administration (which includes 
the civil service) has been frozen and since 2009 there has been no automatic increase of 
individual pay. However, since 2010 there have also been no limits on the numbers employed in 
the civil service and the share of employment in public administration in total employment 
remained stable.  In a third quarter of 2013 public sector employed 3 925 000 people which 
																																								 																				
45 The Law of 19 November 2009 amending certain acts relating to the implementation of the Budget Act 
(Dz.U.2009 No. 219, item 1706). The Law of 26 November 2010 amending certain acts relating to the 
implementation of the Budget Act (Dz.U.2010, No. 238, item 1578). 
46 Szelewa,D. (2015) Dangerous Liaisons: Maternity, Paternity and Politics [Niebezpieczne Związki. 
Macierzyństwo, ojcostwo i polityka] Warsaw: University of Warsaw Publishing.     
47 Since 2011, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy has been implementing the programme 'Toddler' [Maluch] 
which seeks to help local authorities increase the number of ECEC places for the under-3s.  
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accounts for 25.3% of total employment in Poland48.  Given that the public sector in Poland is 
feminized (in 2009 almost 60% of employees in the public sector were women49) absence of 
mass layoffs might have contributed to a stable unemployment rate among women.   Yet it is 
important to note that the women age group 24- 35 was the biggest group of registered 
unemployed, growing from 261,000 in 2008 to 366,000 in 201250.   
 
Developments in Equality Infrastructure  
 
The promotion of equal opportunities for women and men in employment and other 
spheres of public life has not been a priority in any of the governments since EU accession.51  
Nevertheless this domain saw the most profound developments taking place, particularly 
following the 2007 elections and a clear change in policy approach to gender equality and anti-
discrimination.  Before 2007 the government promoted largely pro-family policy in traditional, 
catholic understanding and did not actively combat gender discrimination (it was also openly 
against gay rights, same sex marriage, abortion, and in-vitro).  Government under PO instigated 
(if reluctantly) pro-equality moves, predominately in the area of employment.   The critics 
maintained that the legal and institutional changes to anti-discrimination field resulted from the 
obligations linked to the membership in the European Union rather than from a political 
conviction or will of political leadership52.  
In spite of its presence in the EU since May 2004, Poland had been delaying full 
implementation of the EU anti-discrimination regulations, which resulted in the European 
Commission instigating several criminal proceedings related to non-fulfillment of this obligation.  
Hence the final adoption of anti-discrimination law should be considered a major breakthrough 
in Polish governments’ approach to the principle of equal treatment.   The Act of 3 December 
2010 (also called ‘anti-discrimination’ law) was the first legal Polish act which attempted to 
thoroughly regulate the issue of counteracting discrimination. It generated amendments to the 
Labor Code, setting up of equality body (the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment) 
and the Human Rights Defender (who has received new competencies to counteract 
discrimination).  However, according to NGOs working on equal status of women and men, the 
Act proved to be minimalistic as it protected against discrimination based on gender only in the 
area of employment and access to good and services53.   
In 2013 the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment presented to the Council of 
Ministers a document called the National Program for the Promotion of Equal Treatment 2013-
2016,54 which is coherent with the priorities and directions defined in the European Strategy for 
																																								 																				
48 Central Statistical Office of Poland, 2013 
49 Gajderowicz, T.,  Grotkowska, G., and Wincenciak, L. (2012) The premium wage of higher education according 
to occupational groups  [Premia płacowa z wykształcenia wyższego według grup zawodów]  Ekonomista 5:577-603.   
50 Central Statistical Office (2012) Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2012 [Mały Rocznik Statystyczny] 
Warszawa, 2013, available at: http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-
statystyczne/maly-rocznik-statystyczny-2012-r,1,13.html  
51 European Gender Equality Law Review — No 1/2008 
52 CEDAW Coalition of Polish NGOs (2014) Alternative Report on the Implementation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Poland 2014, available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/POL/INT_CEDAW_NGO_POL_18378_E.pdf   
53 CEDAW Coalition of Polish NGOs (2014)  
54 The Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment (2013) The National Programme for the Promotion of Equal 
Treatment 2013-2016 [Krajowy Program Działań na Rzecz Równego Traktowania na lata 2013-2016], Warsaw, 10 
December 2013,  available at:  
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Equality between Women and Men 2010-2015 and the European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-
2010.  The program has been greeted with enthusiasm because this was the first instance in the 
history of the Polish legal order of introducing such a solution.  However, it should be mentioned 
that the legislation was worded in a very general manner and gender mainstreaming has not been 
set as a priority.    
Finally, on April 27, 2015 Poland ratified the Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women, and Domestic Violence (Istanbul 
Convention). In the course of parliamentary debates, arguments were raised that the Istanbul 
Convention was unconstitutional and posed a threat to Polish tradition and family. Opposition 
was strongest from the political right and the Catholic Church cumulating in the intimidating 
“anti-gender” campaign that constituted an intensive attack on the principle of gender equality.  
The campaign aimed at reinforcing the traditional social roles of women and men and opposed 
all kinds of gender equality policies, including combating violence against women.    
 Poland ranked 49 out of 134 in the 2013 “political empowerment” sub-index of the 
Global Gender Gap Index.  Over the last two decades Polish feminist groups faced difficulties 
mobilizing mainstream support and influencing equality policies.  Nevertheless, the equality 
movement has been steadily on the rise, resulting in initiatives such as creation of Feminoteka 
Foundation (2005) and The Congress of Women (2009).  One of the reasons is the 2010 Act 
which made the cooperation with the civil society in the area of equal treatment a legal 
obligation55.  Most of the consultation mechanisms have been put in place and are being used, 
but there is still no formally established advisory body where they could be represented on a 
regular basis.  The new found dialogue platform allowed for pushing through the quota system 
on electoral list56 and restoring the Alimony Fund for single parents, scrapped in 2004. 
 
Race/Ethnicity Domain  
 
Poland is a nationally and religiously uniform state without a long tradition and 
experience of combating racial discrimination and running integration programs. National and 
ethnic minorities constitute about 3.5% of the population and that percentage is one of the lowest 
in Europe. According to Eurostat, citizens of other countries make only 0.1% of Polish 
population57.  Despite these small numbers Poland has seen extreme nationalistic movements and 
right-wing organizations and parties gain influence inside and outside the parliament over the 
last decade.  Right-wing politicians and media consistently and forcefully deny the existence of 
problems such as hate crime and xenophobia in Polish society. This approach is frequently 
reflected in activities (or lack thereof) of the judiciary and other state institutions, including local 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
http://www.spoleczenstwoobywatelskie.gov.pl/sites/default/files/krajowy_program_dzialan_na_rzecz_rownego_trak
towania_przyjety_na_rm_10.12.13.pdf    
 
55 ACT of 3rd December, 2010 on the implementation of some regulations of European Union regarding equal 
treatment. 
56 In accordance with the Act dated January 5, 2011, an electoral list of candidates for any party has to include at 
least 35% of either gender.  If the electoral list does not fulfil this requirement, the electoral commission will not 
register it.  Fuszara, M. (2011) “Case Study Poland: It’s Time for Women: Gender Quotas on Electoral Lists” In 
Electoral Gender Quota Systems and their Implementation in Europe. European Parliament, Brussels: Directorate 
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs. 
57 Eurostat: Population and social conditions, 31/12: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Category:Population_and_social_conditions_-_statistical_publications   
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authorities. The voices of the targeted groups remain weak and are almost never heard by 
politicians. This ‘silence’ is exaggerated by ethnic and religious biases strongly embedded within 
the majority of the population58.  
Despite this hostile context (which escalated following the “refugee crisis” in many ways 
mirroring rising hostilities across EU) Poland has not experienced ‘backsliding’ in the domain of 
race and ethnicity.  Commentators maintain that adherence to EU anti-discrimination legislation 
and stronger commitment to the development of integration policies, once again stemmed from 
the obligations linked to the membership in the European Union.   
 
Anti-discrimination infrastructure  
 
The 1997 Polish Constitution contains a general anti-discrimination clause: “all people 
shall be equal before the law and have the right to equal treatment by public authorities and no 
one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason 
whatsoever”.59  However, until 2011 there was no single act comprising a general ban on 
discrimination on racial/ethnic grounds.  This changed in 2011, with an approval of the Act 
Implementation of Certain Provisions of the European Union in the Field of Equal Treatment 
that transposed and implemented EU Anti-Discrimination Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78.  The 
transposition occurred in strictly formalistic manner, with only basic amendments to the Labor 
Code and Penal Code.  However, the existence of new legislation opened the door for further 
amendments.  On numerous occasions the Ombudsman for Civil Rights Protection expressed 
hopes that anti-discrimination measures now legally recognized could strengthen the fight 
against hate crime.  This is important given that research conducted by the Association of Anti-
Semitism and Xenophobia has demonstrated that most reported incidents of hate crime and hate 
speech are not taken seriously by Polish law enforcement agencies: it stated that crimes that fall 
within the ambit of Articles 256 and 257 are rarely investigated and its perpetrators are rarely 
prosecuted60  
 
Social Integration of minorities    
 
In 2005 Poland passed a new law protecting the rights of national and ethnic minorities61. 
Article 6 of the Act specifically prohibits discrimination based on national or ethnic minority 
status providing national minorities with the full scope of legal protection and state aid.  Article 
18 of the Act imposes on public authorities to take appropriate measures to promote activities 
aimed at the protection, preservation and development of cultural identity of minorities62. The 
commitment to integration was further expressed in 2014 amendment.  The amendment 
introduced the social integration of minorities as a duty for public authorities (previously, civic 
integration existed). Social integration has been defined as efforts to improve important aspects 
																																								 																				
58 Grell, B., Köhler, T., Pankowski, R., Sineaeva, N. and Stranawski, M. (2009) Hate Crime Monitoring and Victim 
Assistance in Poland and Germany. Warsaw:  Foundation Nigdy Więcej. 
59 Polish Constitution (1997), Act 32, Par. 2. Available at: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/2.htm.  
60  Bodnar, A. and Jagielski, M. (2010) Crimes of Hate in Poland Based on Research of Court Records from the 
Years 2007-2009. [Przestępstwa z Nienawiści w Polsce na Podstawie Badań akt Sądowych z lat 2007-2009] 
Otwarta Rzeczpospolita, available at: http://otwarta.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Raport09-
Przest%C2%A9pstwa-z-nienawi%CB%9Cci-lekki.pdf  
61 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] No 17, item 141, as amended) 
62 Article 18, Paragraph 2 Section 10 of the Act. 
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of the lives of people belonging to minorities, in particular living conditions and access to the 
education system, the labour market, social security and healthcare.  The amendment was 
executed due to strong lobbying efforts of civil society groups; however the law has been 
restricted to the Polish citizens and therefore does not apply to immigrants – an issue strongly 
criticized by the Ombudsman.  
Despite neoliberal character of Polish social policies, the Polish state showed 
commitment to the integration of the most excluded Polish minorities, the Roma.  Largely due to 
the availability of European Structural Funds, Poland developed National Roma Inclusion 
Strategies which generated minor improvements and instigated a dialogue between Roma 
community leaders and public authorities.  A true success arrived with the decision of Ministry 
of Education to abolish all forms of segregated education (including creation of ‘remedial 
classes’). As of 2011 no ‘official’ Roma classes were in operation. In 2014 the Ministry of 
Education funded 53 local initiatives/activities facilitating the integration of Roma children into 
the education system.  
 
Immigrants and foreigners  
 
The most important event concerning Poland’s migration policy was the adoption of the 
first comprehensive strategic document ‘The Polish migration policy: current state of play and 
further actions’63. The document was developed by the Working Group operating within the 
inter-ministry Team for Migration coordinated by the Ministry of Interior and Administration. 
The strategy is the first comprehensive document on migration policy, which states that Poland 
should be more open for immigrants with needed skills and not causing integration problems. 
That is why the document also addresses the issue of immigrants integration (e.g. voluntary 
integration courses for all categories of immigrants, knowledge of the Polish language 
requirement for settlement and, optionally, for citizenship).  In December 2014, the action plan 
was developed by the Committee and was approved by the Polish government. It specified ways 
to implement the recommendations contained in the document, costs, sources of financing, 
responsible institutions and deadlines for implementation. The majority of actions which address 
the recommendations concerning integration were due to be completed by the end of 2016. The 
introduction of the migration policy demonstrated some political willingness to prepare for a 
likely inflow of immigrants.  However the policy remained strictly formalistic and as a 
consequence was easily dismantled following the coming to power of right-wing Law and 
Justice Party.  
 
Disability  
 
While policies directed at persons with disabilities have not been high on the 
government’s agenda, the field escaped serious retrenchment that took place in other member 
states.  One argument is that the provisions were set at a minimum level thus any further 
cutbacks would mean a total abandonment of policies and financial support in this area.     
In the last decade Polish policies have focused on activation of people with disabilities in 
the labor market.  Issues related to rehabilitation, independent living, social assistance, and 
																																								 																				
63 Europejska Sieć Migracyjna (EMN) (2011) Inter-ministerial Committee on Migration Agreed on “The Polish 
Migration Policy: Current State of Play and Further Actions”, available at: 
https://emn.gov.pl/ese/news/8765,dok.html  
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communication have not been prioritized although numerous NGOs and associations have been 
actively promoting such course of action.  While direct cuts were avoided, some positive trends, 
such as deinstitutionalization processes and transition from institutional to community-based 
form of care have been interrupted due to lack of financial resources64.  However it is difficult to 
link abandonment of deinstitutionalization process with financial crisis as there is lack of 
statistical data and in-depth research.  It is more probable that the resistance to provide funds for 
independent living stemmed from prevalence of the medical model of disability in public policy 
making.    
 
Infrastructure  
In Poland, legal protection of persons with disabilities is above all guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Art. 69 states that “authorities should provide assistance to disabled people to 
secure subsistence, adaptation to work, and improve the social communication”.  The most 
important legal act on the rights of disabled people, incurring legal liability of the State Parties, is 
the international Convention of the United Nations on the Rights of People with Disabilities of 
2006, ratified by Poland in 2012. Transposition of the Directive 2000/78/EC which prohibits 
inter alia discrimination due to the disability at the workplace and in other occupational activities 
resulted in new provisions inside the Labour Code. Civil society and activist maintain that the 
new provision offer only limited and highly formal assistance.  They also argue that there is a 
limited possibility to claim discrimination due to disability with the use of general type remedies, 
like the protection of personal rights, provided in the Civil Code65.  
The body responsible for disability policy is the Government Plenipotentiary for Disabled 
People (since 2007). The Plenipotentiary, formally a part of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy, is primarily responsible for implementing the Act on the Vocational and Social 
Rehabilitation and Employment of Disabled Persons66.  While the office receives ‘stable’ 
financial assistance there has been no substantial increases in staff or budget since the creation of 
the office.   
 
Provisions  
From 2007 to 2011 there have been little legislative developments in the field.  First 
action came in 2013 and concerned the Act of Family Benefits to support parents and careers of 
the disabled.  Generally, changes in the Act on Family Benefits have been aimed at increasing 
the amount of nursing benefit to the amount corresponding to the minimum remuneration for 
work (net).  However the amendments introduced new regulations which limited the circle of 
people who were entitled to nursing benefit (mostly to parents) and approximately half of the 
beneficiaries lost their right to this provision.  Amidst protests the amendment was proved to be 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal (K27/13 and K 38/13) and the government was 
forced to amend the act yet again. In accordance with the Act of 14 April 2014 on determination 
and payment of carer’s allowance persons who lost their rights the nursing benefit due to the 
																																								 																				
64 European Disability Forum (2014) “Report on the impact of the crisis on the rights of persons with disabilities”, 
available at: http://www.edf-feph.org/economic-crisis  
65 Bodnar, A., Sledzinska-Simon, A., Osik, P. and Zima, M. (2009) “Thematic Legal Study on Mental Health and 
Fundamental Rights” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, available at: 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/2158-mental-health-study-2009-PL.pdf  
66 Ustawa z dnia 27 sierpnia 1997 r. o rehabilitacji zawodowej i społecznej oraz zatrudnianiu osób 
niepełnosprawnych.   
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changes introduced in 2013, have been entitled to the carer’s allowance. Furthermore, on 
November 2014 the income threshold level (per person) entitling to receive other family benefits 
have been increased.  In 2011 the state budget for the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities 
transferred to local authorities was PLN640 million67.   
While three years ago, spending for this purpose reached billion according to the 
government the decrease is related to the budgetary shift and higher subsidies for salaries of 
disabled employees (a move to activate disabled persons in the labor market).  According to the 
2009 study “The situation of people with disabilities in the Polish labor market”68 the economic 
activity rate of people with disabilities is very low and the huge majority of this group of people 
[76%] is excluded from the labor market. The rate of economic inactivity is higher among people 
whose disability is assessed as ‘significant’, rather than ‘moderate’ or Minor’.  However data 
also suggests that there has been a shift towards employment in open market enterprises.  
According to the State Fund for Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons, the number of employees 
with disabilities employed on the open market registered in the system of subsidized 
employment has been steadily growing and in 2014 for the first time reached and exceeded 
100,000 while those employed in sheltered enterprises dropped below 150,000. Changes in 
legislation aimed at equalizing opportunities for employees with disabilities in both the open and 
sheltered labor markets which Poland has been implementing in recent years might be the reason 
behind this. This might also be a reason why Poland showed decrease on supported employment 
indicator.  Rather than clear cuts the money was re-directed towards promotion of employment 
in the open market. This redirection was praised by the Government Plenipotentiary Office for 
Disabled People, who long been holding a position that the labor market situation for disabled 
people in Poland depends much more on economic factors and general labor market conditions 
rather than on changes in the system supporting employment opportunities for persons with 
disabilities69.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Poland was the only economy in the European Union that avoided recession during the 
2008 global financial crisis.  Even in 2009, when the whole EU went into recession, Poland 
continued to grow at 2.6%. This resilience could at least partially explain the absence of 
backsliding in terms of the states’ commitments to equality measures. In fact, during the 2008-
2015 period Poland completed the transposition of EU anti-discrimination regulations, and 
showed unprecedented attention to gender equality, minority issues, and labor activation of 
persons with disability. While the budget-related provisions of the laws of 2009-201070 indicated 
ongoing ‘budget slimming’ no cuts were made to social support and care services, and in fact 
certain areas (i.e. childcare services) saw increase in spending.  Finally Poland was one of only 
few member states that did not curb public employment.  
																																								 																				
67 Glapiak, E. (2011) Government saves on the disabled [Rząd oszczędza na niepełnosprawnych] Rzeczpospolita 
2011-04-26, available at: http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/1043178-Rzad-oszczedza-na-niepelnosprawnych.html 
68 Wapiennik, E. (2009) “Employment of Disabled People in European countries:  Poland” The Academic Network 
of European Disability experts (ANED), VT/2007/005. 
69 Conference Social Integration and Activation of People with disability  (2008) [Konferencja "Integracja społeczna 
i aktywizacja zawodowa osób niepełnosprawnych”] http://www.niepelnosprawni.gov.pl/index.php?c=article&id=63  
70 The Law of 19 November 2009 amending certain acts relating to the implementation of the Budget Act 
(Dz.U.2009 No. 219, item 1706). The Law of 26 November 2010 amending certain acts relating to the 
implementation of the Budget Act (Dz.U.2010, No. 238, item 1578). 
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While these were all positive development they remained formalistic with insubstantial 
transformative impact.  The legal framework offered minimal protection against discrimination, 
finding it difficult to overcome deeply embedded conservative values promoted by right-wing 
political elites and the Catholic Church.  The critics of Polish reforms maintained that reforms of 
the anti-discrimination fields resulted from the obligations linked to the membership in the 
European Union rather than from political convictions and grassroots demands.   Moreover, the 
social welfare provisions while more sensitive to reconciliation between work and family, 
continued to promote traditional family values and entrenched medical model, refraining from 
extending social support to immigrants and asylum seekers.   
Given the formalistic nature of the anti-discrimination and equality reforms, it is not 
surprising that the new right-wing, Euro-skeptic government, elected in 2015, began to swiftly 
dismantle equality infrastructure particularly in the gender domain.   In a matter of weeks Poland 
saw a return of pro-family policy in traditional, catholic understanding and full abandonment of 
anti-discrimination measures (felt across all three domains).   
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C. Romania Case Study (written by Oana Baluta, edited by Andrea Krizsan)  
 
Context 
In Romania, European integration stands as an important framework and benchmark for 
both legislative and institutional changes in the field of equality policy. Austerity measures 
targeted policy and institutional achievements that were the outcome of European integration, 
rather young and feeble constructions, unable to stand against sever retrenchment.  
The financial crisis hit Romania in late 2008, impacting public finances and increasing 
debt. After the political recognition of the economic crisis, starting in 2009, the neoliberal 
Government enacted a series of measures, many of them under the supervision of the Troika, that 
increased the social vulnerability of citizens and accelerated the risk of poverty.  In May 2009 
the Government signed an agreement with the IMF mandating austerity measures directed at the 
public sector. Measures included budget cuts, reduction in public expenditure, freezes of public 
sector wages and minimum wages affecting public services, such as education, health, social care 
(including the abolition of a wide range of bonuses and 13th monthly pay), income reduction 
(salaries, pensions); cuts of social benefits (including parental leave allowance), raises of VAT, 
restructuring public administration including equality bodies and various institutions supporting 
social inclusion for Roma, persons with disabilities and other social and economic vulnerable 
groups. In the name of shock therapy, the Romanian Government implemented some of the 
harshest austerity measures in EU.  
In the period of the crisis Romania is governed by several governments using somewhat 
different crisis frames. The beginning of the economic crisis was marked by a ‘no crisis’ political 
framing. Following November 2009 presidential elections and the formation of a new coalition 
government led by the Democratic Liberal Party the political discourse changed and austerity 
measures were implemented. The neoliberal government dismantled the entire equality 
institutional infrastructure and introduced sever austerity measures. Measures were mainly 
adopted without prior public consultation or any impact studies, through governmental 
emergency ordinances. The neoliberal Government and the President of the country assumed a 
leading role, while the Parliament was left behind together with the opposition political parties. 
During this period the power of unions to negotiate deteriorated and “in Romania, cross-sectorial 
bargaining was essentially abolished by the government’s unilateral introduction of the Social 
Dialogue Act in 2011” (Natali, Vanhercke, 2013: 197). The Romanian Constitutional Court 
engaged in the process by issuing a ruling in 2010 “condemning a law establishing a cut in 
wages and pensions in order to return to a balanced budget. In the view of the court, the 
government could take restrictive measures since the economic crisis constituted a ‘threat to 
economic stability’. It therefore found the temporary 25% cut in wages to be in conformity with 
the Constitution, since it was proportionate to the desired purpose. It also, however, ruled that a 
reduction in retirement pensions, with no indication of the amount or duration of the measure, 
was disproportionate and therefore anti-constitutional […]” (Ghailani 2016: 173)   
Outspoken protests were a key feature of the Romanian response to the economic crisis. 
Opposition occurred in 2010 against cuts of income, then in 2011 in response to cuts in gender 
based violence policies. The peak was reached in January 2012, when massive protests erupted 
in some major cities, with Bucharest as the core. The trigger was a new draft law aiming to 
reform the healthcare system that was perceived by many as a strategy to privatize the system. If 
initially, the slogans showed support for the former health secretary of state and people chanted 
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against president Băsescu and other party members, now slogans diversified and the protests was 
directed not only at reforms in the health care system, but against austerity measures more 
generally, the lack of respect for rights and dignity and corruption  (Norocel 2012).  
Feminist resistance71 was most forcefully displayed and was successful in achieving the 
inclusion of women’s groups into policy discussions. In February 2012, the neoliberal 
Government enacting the austerity measures resigned and months of political changes and 
instability started.  
After several intermediary governments, elections at the end of 2012 brought a series of 
Social Democratic Party led governments under Prime Minister Ponta, until December 2015. 
Ponta governments reinstated some of the previously cut elements of the equality policy regime. 
However the 2012 protests marked the beginning of a culture of protest in Romania with more 
and more people mobilizing against political decisions perceived as affecting rights, 
environment, or fostering corruption.    
 
Gender 
Women were one of the groups hardest hit by the austerity measures introduced in 
relation to the crisis. Measures had a devastating impact on equality institutions and policies 
(Baluta 2011).   
Prior to the crisis Romania had a series of institutions tackling different aspects of gender 
inequality. The National Council Combating Discrimination (NCCD) was in charge for the 
enforcement of the anti-discrimination law combating discrimination on a variety of inequality 
grounds including gender. Law no. 202/2002 on Equal Opportunities between Women and Men 
set key priority areas for gender equality policy and established The National Agency on Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men (ANES) which also had local offices. ANES was in 
comparison with its peers in the region a functional structure able to meet its gender equality 
objectives, even if NGOs criticized it numerous times. It was initially created with the support of 
1.8 million Euros contribution from the European Commission in the form of a Phare Project. 
Another gender equality related institution was the National Agency for Family Protection 
established in 2003 for the enforcement and coordination of Law 217/2003 on the Prevention and 
Sanctioning Domestic Violence. 
In July 2010 austerity driven restructuring of the public administration dismantled ANES. 
ANES was re-designed with considerably smaller competences and budget as a Directorate 
under the Ministry of Labor, and only the central structure was maintained, while the local 
structures were dissolved72. As part of the 2009 austerity package the National Agency for 
Family Protection was also restructured and one year later dismantled together with ANES. The 
decision of the Government was strongly criticized by NGOs, academics, national and European 
MPs and considered a threat to gender equality objectives assumed by Romania73. 
																																								 																				
71 The most active and visible group were the members of FILIA NGO. They also displayed antiracists, anti-
homophobic messages.   
72 Governmental Decision no 728 from July 21, 2010 to amend and complete Governmental Decision no 11/2009 
regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection 
73 On July 5 2010, a protest letter was sent by NGOs to the President, Prime Minister and the Ministry of Labor, 
Family and Social Protection.    http://www.mediafax.ro/social/posturile-restructurate-de-la-anph-anpfdc-si-anes-
sunt-de-la-administrativ-financiar-si-relatii-cu-publicul-6672716   
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2009 has also brought the Parliamentary Commission on Equal Opportunities for Women 
and Men in the Chamber of Deputies under attack in the Parliament. The proposal of dismantling 
faced strong criticism from Romanian NGOs and the initiative was abandoned74. 
Institutional restructuring severely affected Romanian gender equality policies.  
According to the 2010- 2011 Activity Reports elaborated by the Directorate the objectives of the 
2010-2012 National Strategy could no longer be met. Two gender equality projects also had their 
contracts cancelled in 201175. In addition expert staff from closed down county offices either lost 
their job or were redirected in other local agencies. Dismantling of the National Agency for 
Family Protection led to stalled implementation of the domestic violence policy.  
Following forceful protests by women’s groups together with diverse other human rights 
organizations following 2012 under the new social democratic government a series of 
progressive changes took place.    
In 2014 the Directorate became a Department coordinated by a state secretary who had 
the administrative power to issue specific decisions and orders in the field. In 2015, ANES was 
reinstated, this time with extended competences including the field of combating and preventing 
violence against women thus merging into ANES competences of the previous National Agency 
for Family Protection76. Domestic violence law and policies were also amended in 2012 and 
2013 (Popa 2015). 
The National Council for Combating Discrimination (NCCD) is the equality body 
established under the EU acquis for the enforcement of anti-discrimination law in Romania. No 
disruption is noted in relation to the crisis in the activity of NCCD. The 2011 Report of NCCD 
states that the institution received 9 petitions on gender discrimination in 2009, 18 in 2010 and 
15 in 2011, on disability 49 in 2009, 34 in 2010 and 42 in 2011 and on ethnicity 62 in 2009, 55 
in 2010 and 62 in 201177.  
At the same time strategic planning for gender equality continued. The National strategy 
on equal opportunities between women and men 2010-2012 was adopted in the midst of the 
crisis together with an Action Plan for its implementation78. Gender based violence and domestic 
violence policy was one of the gender equality fields that were most hard hit by the crisis in 
Romania (Baluta 2011). Following the initial dismantling of the institutional infrastructure and 
the financial support availably for victim support, in response to sustained struggles of civil 
society’s actors, the field of combating gender violence has witnessed important progress during 
the years of the Social Democratic governments. In 2012, the 2003 law was amended to include 
the order of protection, and improved funding for organizations running shelters. In 2015, new 
																																								 																				
74 In September 2009, an MP from the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania argued that the Commission 
should be dismantled. On September 28, a protest letter was sent to the leaders of political parliamentary groups,	the 
Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies, Commission on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men and to the 
Commission in charge with Procedures within the Chamber of Deputies. Also two NGOs, FILIA- Center for 
Curricular Development and Gender Studies and Juridical Resources Center asked to participate at the parliamentary 
debates on the topic.     
75 Oana Baluta personal communication.  
76 The legal provision establishing the Agency was Law no 229/2015 from October 5, 2015 amending Law no 
202/2002 on equal treatment and opportunities for women and men  
http://www.mmuncii.ro/j33/index.php/ro/comunicare/comunicate-de-presa/4082-ip-reinfiintare-anes-
07102015?highlight=WyJhbmVzIl0= 
77http://api.components.ro/uploads/1d3a0bf8b95391b825aa56853282d5da/2016/10/Raport_de_activitate_CNCD_pe
_anul_2011.pdf , p. 16 
78http://www.mmuncii.ro/pub/imagemanager/images/file/Domenii/Egalitate%20de%20sanse/PREZENTARE%20S
TRATEGIA%20NATIONALA%202010-2012.pdf 
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legislative provisions adopted by the Parliament obliged judges to use expedite decision 
processes for cases of violence. In 2016, The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and domestic violence was ratified by the Romanian 
Parliament (Popa 2015, Krizsan and Roggeband 2017)).  
 
Provisions 
According to a 2011 research report that analyzed the impact of the economic crisis on 
women, in the field of gender equality in Romania, in addition to institutional restructuring 
austerity measures affected women especially through labor market policies, income, pensions, 
healthcare, education policies and family policies (Băluță, 2011).  Part of this impact was 
indirect, falling disproportionately on women as a particularly vulnerable group, part of it related 
to policies designed without taking into consideration gender equality aspects of the problem. 
Measures included a 25% cut of salaries in the feminized public sector, a cut of pensions of 15% 
and a 5% increase of VAT. No progressive cuts were considered, irrespective of the horizontal 
and vertical segregation of the labor market. Also, Law 277/2010 decreased social transfers- for 
a range of social categories, from single parent families to families whose children have a poor 
school attendance record. (Iancu, 2011, p. 9-40) 
Parental leave and childcare services were particularly hard hit. This field was 
characterized by a critical gap between the state supply of child care services and the demand 
from families, prior to the crisis already. Families relied largely on informal care provided by 
grandparents, other relatives or on baby-sitters, if income permits. Austerity measures resulted in 
the elimination of the package for newborns including clothes and hygiene products starting with 
December 2010, and a reshuffling of the parental leave scheme.  The 2010-2011 budgetary cuts 
affected the length of parental leave and the terms of financial compensation during the leave. 
First the parental leave allowance was cut with 15%, next the allowance was reduced from 85% 
of the 12-month average earnings before birth to 75% and a lower ceiling introduced. Parental 
leave allowance was now higher for those who stayed out of the labor market no longer than one 
year, and lower in case of two year parental leaves.  The government argued that these reductions 
were the outcome of agreements with the Troika. The changes encouraged sooner return of 
women to the labor market as benefits were correlated with the length of parental leave and 
financial stimulus were introduced for early returning parents. At the same time poor provision 
of childcare services showed a contrary tendency (Băluță, 2011, p. 41-76). Legislative 
predictability worsened during the crisis, as family policies, especially parental leave provisions, 
underwent numerous changes. Widespread protests indicated the popular discontent with these 
measures.   
The health sector underwent a restructuring process. In 2008 already Romania had the 
lowest public spending rate for healthcare in the entire EU. Cuts in public expenditure impacted 
“women as patients, women as informal caretakers and women employees in the health public 
system” (Iancu, 2011, p. 111). Also, outmigration of workers and nurses following the austerity 
measures made the lack of health personnel a chronic issue of the Romanian health system.  
The crisis provided an opportunity for longer-term retrenchment in the public pension 
system (Adăscăliței, 2015: 16- 18) following the agreement with the IMF. These reforms had 
gendered impacts as well as impacts on disabled persons. One of the discussed issues was to 
increase the retirement age for women to 65 years and the contribution years to 35. The reform 
stirred debates and opposition. President Băsescu, vetoed the proposed law, arguing that the 
increase in the retirement age for women to 65 years would ignore the social reality where 
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women are confronted with a double burden as they work on the labor market and at home. The 
debate that followed concentrated on the retirement age and no consensus was reached. The law 
was passed unilaterally by the governing coalition at the end of 2010 and introduced higher 
retirement ages for men and women (65 and 63 years) (Adăscăliței, 2015:20). Other measures 
included an increase in contribution rate by 3.8%, gradual shift to price indexation, recalculation 
of pensions regulated by special laws (military, police, and national security officials) and 
integration of these schemes into the public pension system (Adăscăliței, 2015:18).  
 
Disability  
 
In the midst of the economic crisis one major document coordinated policies for persons 
with disabilities: The National Strategy “Equal opportunities for disabled people – towards a 
society without any discrimination.” It was adopted in 200579 for a seven-year period (2006-
2013) to ensure both protection and social inclusion of disabled people. In January 2011, 
Romania ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).  
The implementation and monitoring of the National Strategy falls under the supervision 
of The National Authority for the Disabled People (NADP).  NADP is the specialized institution 
within central administration that elaborates and coordinates specific policies and promotes the 
rights of disabled people80. In 2005 the National Institute for Prevention and Combating Social 
Exclusion of Disabled People was established under the coordination of NADP81 as an agency 
charged primarily, though not exclusively, with research. Between June 2003 and July 2010 
NADP functioned within the Ministry of Labor, Social Solidarity and the Family. NADP 
similarly to ANES, the gender equality body, was heavily targeted by the austerity measures. It 
was disintegrated in 2010 and redesigned as a smaller office within the Ministry of Labor.82 As 
the institution was reorganized and downgraded it could only reach its objectives to a limited 
extent. In January 2015, the NADP was reinstated as the main coordinating body for disabled 
people (with the word handicap from the previous established institution replaced by disability).  
Austerity measures had critical impact on people with disabilities. People with disabilities 
were the beneficiaries of different social transfers and, specific social services, and persons with 
severe disabilities could opt for a personal assistant (usually a family member, who worked 
under a contract signed with local authorities) or for a caregiver allowance83. Payments - which 
were ridiculously small- were provided by local authorities due to previous decentralization. Not 
only social transfers per se were cut, but also the salaries of the professional caregivers were 
diminished with 25%. People with disabilities were affected both as beneficiaries of social 
transfers and of professional care.  
																																								 																				
79 Decision of the Government no 1175 from September 29 2005 approving the National Strategy for the protection, 
integration and social inclusion of disabled people for 2006-2013.   
80  Ordinance no 14/2003 on the set up, organization and functioning of the National Authority for Persons with 
Handicap. 
81 Oder no 245 from September 2005 issued by the President of the National Authority for Disabled People 
concerning the approval of the Organizing and Functioning Regulations of  the National Authority for Disabled 
People and the National Institute for Prevention and Combating Social Exclusion of Disabled People 
82 Governmental Decision no 728 from July 21, 2010 to amend and complete Governmental Decision no 11/2009 
regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection; 
http://www.mediafax.ro/social/posturile-restructurate-de-la-anph-anpfdc-si-anes-sunt-de-la-administrativ-financiar-
si-relatii-cu-publicul-6672716  
83 Law no 448/2006 on protection and promotion of disabled people - incorporating additional changes. 
http://www.mmuncii.ro/pub/imagemanager/images/file/Legislatie/LEGI/L448-2006_rep.pdf  
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Payments were delayed by public authorities. Moreover, irrespective of the low wages 
“providers were only paying the social security contributions of their staff without paying out the 
salaries for several consecutive months” (Hauben et. al. 2012:46).  Availability and timely 
provision of social services for people with disabilities were affected by lack of financial 
backing/resources at lower levels of government. Dedicated NGOs issued warnings concerning 
the lack of resources that triggered dismissal of personal assistants. Cuts in health care spending 
also had disproportionate impact on the lives of people with disabilities, including the lack of 
compensated drugs. At the same time there was little change in the employment status of people 
with disabilities or in approaches to promoting social inclusion (Hauben et. al. 2012). The 
research of SAR NGO (2009) concluded that when it comes to labor market, the economic crisis 
seems to have affected job loss of disabled people almost at the same level (7%) as the overall 
population (6.1%).  
Persons with disabilities face a 2.9% higher poverty risk in Romania than persons without 
disability (Hauben et. al. 2012:23). The austerity measures deepened poverty for disabled people 
and for their households. Any progress made in the area was either slowed or faltered.  There has 
also been registered discontinuation of services established previously with ESF funding and “in 
September 2012, Romanian NGOs, many of which are social service providers, formed a 
coalition in order to campaign against the huge delays in payments from ESF funding from the 
government” (Hauben et all, 2012, p. 43). NGOs also asked that disabled people be exempted 
from the 25% cut of income84. A 2014 national research monitoring the implementation of the 
Convention for People with Disability showed that in 2013, the number of institutionalized 
persons increased (from 1564 to 1875), and the reasons for this trend include lack of family 
support, impossibility to provide for oneself and even lack of a place to live (Tudose, Totoliciu, 
2014:16-17). 
Romania has also introduced the requirement of re-examination of disability status.  One 
third of those re-assessed lost status (Hauben et. al. 2012:105) and as a consequence funding and 
support.  
Austerity and crisis hit disabled persons through general measures that affected disabled 
people disproportionately, measures targeted specifically at disabled people as well as through 
the retrenchment of the dedicated disability agency. While during the same period Romania 
ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities among the first member 
states of the EU, it is important to note the 2015 end-of-mission statement of Philip Alston, 
United Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights 
on Romania: “the situation of persons with disabilities is far from the world that the Romanian 
Government has pledged to realize through the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2010”85.         
 
Ethnicity/Race domain  
 
Policies on race and ethnicity in Romania address both the sizable Roma minority as well 
as several other ethnic minorities living in the country. While both aspects represent important 
policy issues in Romania, equality policy commitments vis a vis the EU concern mainly Roma 
inclusion.   
																																								 																				
84	http://mures.citynews.ro/eveniment-29/scrisoare-disperata-handicapatii-ii-cer-ajutor-lui-basescu-92351  
85 For	the	complete	statement,	see:	 	
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16737&LangID=E.		
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Several institutions play a role in implementing the Strategy of the Government on ethnic 
minorities. Within the General Secretariat of the Government, there is a Department for 
Interethnic Relations established in 2004 whose role is to implement policies for ethnic 
minorities, to elaborate dedicated strategies, and to monitor the implementation of national and 
international legislation concerning ethnic minorities, etc.86. The National Agency for Roma 
(NAR) was established at the end of 2004, as the central public administration body, with 
responsibility for coordinating public policies for Roma. Unlike the main gender or disability 
bodies that were downgraded in 2010, NAR was the site of political battles after the 2012 
elections when its “transfer” under the control of the Senate was discussed. Local actors 
criticized the political game as it weakened policy implementation (Decade Report 2013:9). At 
the same time, it was planned that the Department for Interethnic Relations would be placed 
under the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament (Decade Report 2013:9).  
The National Council for Combating Discrimination (NCCD) has the responsibility of 
enforcing Romania’s anti-discrimination policy by prevention, mediation, investigation and 
sanctioning, for discrimination on a variety of inequality grounds including ethnicity/race 
criteria. In contrast with dedicated gender and disability bodies the austerity measures package 
did not dismantle the NCCD. However a budgetary analysis for the period between 2002 and 
2011 shows a fluctuation of public financing for the institution with a peak in allocation in 2008 
followed by a gradual decrease in the coming years. In addition the government failed to 
nominate members to the Board of NCCD starting with autumn 2009. In the circumstances of the 
political blockage the institution worked without a Board for 8 months.  
While there was no institutional retrenchment in the field the sanctions applied for race 
discrimination as defined by the Race Directive were found to be “immaterial and insufficiently 
dissuasive” in Romania (Decade Report 2013:21). To address this issue in 2013 the government 
initiated consultation on a draft emergency ordinance amending the anti-discrimination leg-
islation. The initiative came “in response to the European Commission’s notification to the 
Romanian government concerning a series of provisions that breach the EU Race Directive. The 
amendments included an increase in the value of sanctions applied in cases of discrimination 
against individuals (1,000-30,000 RON) as well as against groups or communities (2,000-
100,000 RON)” (Botonogu et. al.2012:50)87. 
The Shadow Report published by the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) for 
2010-2011 concludes that “political and economic developments in 2010 have facilitated a 
growing trend of racism and discrimination” in Romania (Botonogu et. al.2012:3). Austerity 
measures were implemented in a context already characterized by poverty and social exclusion. 
In addition to the disproportionate impact of austerity measures taken by the Government on 
Roma a retrenchment of integration policies and a backsliding of some policies uniquely 
designed for Roma can also be noted.  
Two main policy documents were applicable to Roma inclusion policy in the immediate 
context of the crisis. The Government’s Strategy to Improve the Condition of Roma for 2001-
2010 was the first programmatic, political commitment assumed by the Romanian Government 
during the EU integration process. The main aim of the Strategy was to stimulate Roma’s 
participation in different societal layers (economy, social, education, culture, politics) and also to 
combat poverty and discrimination (Preoteasa, Cace, Duminică, 2009, p. 33). In line with the 
EUs Framework Roma Strategy the Romanian government prepared in 2011 The Strategy of the 
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87		Unclear	if	adopted	ultimately	(editor)		
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Government of Romania for the Inclusion of Romanian Citizens Belonging to the Roma 
Minority for the Period 2012-2020 (NRIS).  
The economic crisis affected budgetary allocations made for integration commitments. In 
2012 there were no substantial actions taken to implement the NRIS. Budget allocations for the 
implementation of the strategy were inconsistent.   Adoption of NRIS in 2011, prior to the 
adoption of the 2012 State Budget, led to measures included in the policy without clear 
allocation of funding. Funding was also problematic from the 2013 State Budget (Decade Report 
2013:8). Backsliding was noted in the decrease in number of Roma school mediators and 
Romani language teachers employed within the education system (Decade Report 2013: 12-13). 
Cuts for healthcare affected the positions held by health mediators. (Decade Report 2013:124) If 
in 2008, 688 health mediators were registered; in 2012 only 420 health mediator positions were 
budgeted (Decade Report 2013:16). As in the domain of disability, the decentralization of 
services generated backlash as it made health mediators dependent on local authorities’ capacity 
to understand their role and scope of activities (Decade Report 2013:16). 
In 2010, the Romanian Government decided to cut public spending on education and at 
the same time combat school absenteeism by correlating family allowances with school 
attendance of children.88 In 2010, UNICEF showed that absenteeism increased with 10% and as 
the number of people facing poverty will grow during the economic crisis, it will also impact 
drop out (Iancu, 2011, p. 30). 
At the same time progress of educational policies can also be observed. The crisis did not 
affect the Romanian government’s affirmative action measure in education aimed at Roma 
students, thus the places reserved for Roma students in the public education system were 
maintained.  
Overall however taking into account the nature of the austerity measures and the 
precarity of the majority of the Roma population at the time when the crisis hit it can be argued 
that the social exclusion of Roma worsened during the crisis, austerity measures and particularly 
the retrenchment of the social protection system increased social exclusion. The impact of the 
crisis is more severe for people already experiencing poverty and social exclusion.  
At the same time the crisis led to an increase of anti-Gypsyism, in political discourse and 
the media.(Botonogu 2012:49) The increase of anti-Gypsyism was also supported by the French 
government decision to expatriate Romanian and Bulgarian Roma in 2010. Local politicians also 
failed to assume responsibility for an absence of a working Roma active integration policy in 
Romania. According to ENAR, “Roma are portrayed as the scape-goat for the economic crisis, 
for the alleged alteration of the Romanian identity abroad and for the failure of Romania to 
become member of the Schengen area.” (Botonogu 2012:36) In September 2010, one MP 
submitted a legislative proposal89 asking to change the terminology in official documents from 
Roma to Gypsy in order to overcome alleged confusions between Roma and Romanians. The 
proposal was rejected by the National Roma Agency, the Inter-ethnic Relations Department, the 
Government's Secretariat General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NCCD and later on by the 
Romanian Senate. During the economic crisis, there were no special measures taken by the 
government to combat racism (e.g., public campaigns), though NCCD was an active institution 
both monitoring and sanctioning public racist interventions of public figures and, politicians. 
																																								 																				
88	See	Law	277/2010	regulating	the	family	allowance,	art	28	(2),		http://www.prestatiisociale.ro/wp-
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89	Silviu	Prigoană,	member	of	the	Liberal	Democratic	Party	at	that	time		
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Romanian President, Băsescu was for example sanctioned in 2010 by NCCD for saying that 
“very few Roma want to work” and “traditionally many of them live off stealing.”90 
During the economic crisis cases of hate speech were registered in the public discourse 
and they correlated with racist political decisions. In 2013, a local official91 stated that Roma 
women should be sterilized if after the birth of the first child, social investigation concludes the 
woman lacks adequate financial resources; and that the state should not have to provide social 
benefits.  
Scandalous eviction cases were another aspect of public racism during this period. In 
2010, 75 Roma families were evicted from their homes in Cluj and taken at the outskirts, near a 
dump site, to live in inhuman conditions in an area also lacking public transportation. The Court 
of Justice in Cluj decided the eviction was illegal. In 2011, the mayor92 of Baia Mare built a high 
meters wall to separate an area where Roma were living from the rest of the city. NCCD 
sanctioned the official. One year later in the same city, 38 Roma families were moved into a 
building filled with toxic wastes. The decision to evict Roma families in Cluj generated a 
powerful grass roots movement mobilizing local activists and academics against environmental 
racism in the area.93 Experts warned that number of ghettoes in Romania is expected to grow 
significantly in the coming years (Botonogu 2012:15). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Policies addressing economic crisis reflected, reinforced, and reconstituted long-
established patterns of inequality in Romania. In the urgency of the crisis, little attention has 
been given to the fact that budget cuts, retrenchment of gender equality bodies and strategies, 
reduction in family benefits, reduction in parental allowance and disability allowance, pension’s 
cuts, reforms of the public sector (wages/personnel), retrenchment of ethnic integration policies 
could harm these vulnerable groups disproportionately. We notice further a failure to address 
structural issues of inequality, a lack of impact assessments of policy changes, and an overall 
backsliding on equality.  
Not all the fields were hit the same, especially if we look at infrastructure and policy 
provision in the gender, disability and race/ethnicity domains.  
In terms of infrastructure, disability and gender equality bodies were dismantled, thus 
opening wide doors for the retrenchment of gender equality and disability strategies. Their 
dismantling conveyed a negative message as these domains were perceived as second class 
policies. On the other hand we see partial alterations of NCCD in terms of financial allocation, 
but no attempts to dismantle the antidiscrimination body as was the case with the other two 
bodies. The ethnicity/race dedicated institutions suffered due to budgetary allocations that 
impeded the implementation of strategies but also due to political battles. Still, ethnicity/race 
dedicated institutions were not dismantled by the austerity packages. Prior to the crisis, NCCD 
and NAR had a different degree of administrative independence. At the same time the 
antidiscrimination coalition and Roma NGOs were more powerful than disability and gender 
																																								 																				
90	http://stiri.botosani.ro/stiri/actualitate/basescu-amendat-pentru-afirmatii-rasiste-dupa-ce-a-spus-ca-romii-
quottraiesc-din-ce-furaquot.html,	his	declaration	dates	from	November	3,	2010.		
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91		Rareș	Buglea	is	a	member	of	the	local	council	in	Alba	and	a	member	of	The	National	Liberal	Party.		
92	Cătălin	Cherecheș	won	a	second	mandate	as	a	mayor	in	2012	supported	by	The	Social	Liberal	Alliance.	,		
93	http://blog.activewatch.ro/freeex/rasismul-la-romani/  
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equality NGOs. Even if the NGOs movement may not have played the most important role, its 
role should not be neglected either. Women’s NGOs proved more active and powerful in altering 
gender-based violence policies. Nevertheless, they were less influential in regards to preserving 
the status quo of gender equality or gender-based violence bodies.   
Policy provision encountered transformations in all three domains. The austerity 
measures comprised not only of general policy changes (cuts in salaries, pensions, raise of VAT 
to 24%), but also more specific ones that targeted the three inequality fields specifically. 
Changes with regards to educational and health mediators, of parental leave provisions, or public 
provision of care affected these groups in a targeted manner. Governance worsened by the crisis, 
with decentralization of services affecting particularly Roma and persons with disabilities. Also 
supranational governance played an important role. The measures enacted in Romania reflected 
the economic and social preferences of the Troika and particularly the IMF towards austerity and 
public cuts. The color of the Government also had a role since most cuts were executed under a 
neoliberal government and the following social democratic Government reinstated the gender 
and disability bodies a few years later.  
Social dialogue was also affected by the political response to the crisis. Lack of social 
dialogue fed into powerful protest reactions with 2012 considered as a landmark for the 
beginning of a culture of protests in Romania. 
The economic crisis was also a social and moral crisis as the austerity measures eroded 
even more the social and moral solidarity among groups. Some individuals or groups became 
future scapegoats for economic and political faltering. Politicians themselves amplified the social 
cleavages when they tried to legitimate austerity measures as necessary interventions. The 
political dichotomy deepened the disconnection between groups and frayed the social fabric. It is 
a moral, social, political dichotomy that that has been amplified by the political communication 
of the crisis and the austerity measures. With each election cycle the ‘backward voters’ (usually 
old and poor) oppose progress of the country. This rhetoric has its roots in the context of the 
crisis.  
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D. Spain Case Study (by Joanna Kostka) 
 
According to Eurostat, between 2008 and 2012 Spain’s Gini Coefficient increased from 31.9 
to 35.0, making it one of the EU member states with the highest level of inequality (measured as 
equivalent disposable income). At the same time, in 2014 Spain’s ranking in the Global Gender 
Gap Index dropped 14 places: from 12 to 26.  These disheartening statistics indicate the negative 
impact of austerity policies adopted in response to Spanish financial crisis, which began in 2008 
and reoccurred in 2012.  Despite repeated calls from the United Nations and European human 
rights bodies, Spain has continued with the implementation of harsh budget cuts and other 
austerity-driven reforms that are depriving people of their basic human rights.  The austerity 
measures have unleashed dramatic backsliding in equality regime, which have seen positive 
developments under the socialist government.  The mapping exercise demonstrates severe 
retrenchment in both gender and disability domains.  While race/ethnicity domain appeared more 
resilient, by 2011 the new conservative government began to dismantled integration programs 
and initiatives.    
 
Political Context  
The development of the Spanish economy from the second half of the 1990s until 2007 
resulted in the increasingly higher levels of employment, wealth and welfare state development, 
which translated into higher standard of living for the vast majority of Spanish citizens.  Under 
the socialist government of Zapatero (2004 - 2010) gender equality, social inclusion and 
integration policies gained political leverage, leading to a significant expansion of equality 
infrastructure (in all equality fields) and transposition of European anti-discrimination 
legislation. By 2008, Spain's equality laws and increased social spending in support of working 
parents had begun to perform a double fiscal function: the programs supported women's entry 
into paid work while funding for care workers created new employment opportunities.  In this 
context the number of women in a paid job doubled, increasing from 4.1 to 8.2 million and the 
employment rate gap between Spanish women and the average in EU countries diminished 
sharply, falling from 18 percentage points in 2000 to only 4.1 in 200794.  This meant that in a 
relatively short time span Spain has become a model in legislative policies for gender equality at 
the international level. While the social security system remained means-tested and 
underdeveloped for the needs of the population95, progressive developments took place 
particularly in child care, disability care (including funding for independent living) and social 
support for the elderly.  Moreover, since at least 2003, the government begun to recognize the 
reality of cultural diversity and has focused attention on the social integration and inclusion of 
immigrants and minorities.    
However, the country’s achievements across different equality fields have been severely 
endangered by the policies adopted in response to the economic crisis in Europe.  In 2008 Spain 
simultaneously experienced economic, financial and fiscal crises with two peaks that created a 
very difficult environment for the government and triggered policy changes across different 
																																								 																				
94Eurostat (2016) Employment statistics, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Employment_statistics     
95 See, Guillén, A. and León, M. (eds.) (2011) The Spanish Welfare State in European Context. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
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sectors96.  In 2009, Zapatero’s government adopted an economic stimulus plan, worth an 
estimated 5% of gross domestic product, including 8 billion euro of infrastructure products and a 
2,500 euro cash transfer, 'Baby Cheque', for each new-born child.  However, these measures 
proved unsuccessful in curbing escalating unemployment97 and mounting public deficit - 11.2% 
of GDP in 2009.  In May 2010, after initially denying Spain was in trouble, Zapatero announced 
a slew of austerity measures worth around 1.5% of GDP, including wage cuts for civil servants, 
cancellation of the "Baby Cheque" and public pension freeze.  Amidst protests and general 
strikes, the government also introduced a two percentage point rise in Value Added Tax and 
increased the retirement age to 67 from a previous 65. 
“The Spanish Constitutional Court concerned itself with the right to health protection, in 
relation to policies restricting the level of healthcare costs borne by the State and reducing access 
to care for nonnationals with no legal right of residence (Roman 2014). It assessed the 
advantages and disadvantages of the measures taken, referring to the link between protecting the 
right to health and protecting the right to life36. In 2013, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) ruled against contractual clauses imposed upon a debtor who had been evicted 
from his house due to insolvency37. This decision led the Spanish Supreme Court to annul a 
number of measures relating to contractual interest rates, and to establish criteria applicable to 
future disputes (González Pascual 2014; Roman 2014).” Ghailani 2016:174) 
 On November 20, 2011 Mariano Rajoy's centre-right People's Party won an absolute 
majority in parliamentary elections as voters punished the outgoing Socialist government for the 
worst economic crisis in generations and the EU's highest unemployment rate.  In his first 
comments, Rajoy called on all Spaniards to work together to overcome the debt crisis and 
promised a new economic policy.  Shortly after, Rajoy government, under much pressure from 
EU institutions, begun passing a package of tougher policy measures aimed at regaining the 
confidence of the markets and the EU.  In 2011, under the Budget Stability Organic Law [Ley 
Organica de Esatilidad Preupustaria] the government approved public spending cuts amounting 
to some 22 billion euro, and increased VAT to 23%.  This has been accompanied by an anti-
fraud plan against undeclared work and people receiving unemployment benefits unlawfully.  
Although the introduced measures detailed beneficiary impact statements, despite long-standing 
Spanish commitments to gender budget analysis98 these impact statements did not address 
gender, and gender-neutral language and concepts were used throughout. 
 In the same year, a small group of activists launched Spain's anti-austerity Indignados 
movement that quickly grew in strength, spreading beyond the country and shaking the very core 
of politics.  Indignados movement has managed to block some of the most drastic reforms.  It 
also filtered into city halls in major cities like Madrid and Barcelona, with activists now holding 
prominent positions after municipal elections.  In a historic move, the December 2015 polls put 
an end to Spain's long-standing two-party system thanks to the rise of Podemos (a far-left, anti-
austerity party inspired by the Indignados movement) as well as that of Ciudadanos, another new 
grouping considered more to the right, leading to a hung parliament.   But this sweeping change 
has yet to make an impact. Spain is still being ruled by a caretaker conservative government 
blamed for the very austerity that the Indignados movement wants to quash. 
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4.6 million people unemployed. 
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Gender Domain  
 
In gender domain, Spain has backslided on five out of six indicators, demonstrating a 
dramatic retrenchment of gender equality schemes.  A 2015 report prepared by the United 
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,  states that the 
economic and financial crisis and the austerity measures implemented in 2008 have had negative 
effects on all spheres of women’s lives.  The analysis of the 2011 and 2012 Council’s 
recommendations to Spain, and the studies of the 2011 national reform programs in the EU-2799, 
show that gender has not been mainstreamed in the design of policy responses to the crisis in 
Spain.  
The high level of unemployment in Spain has brought new scrutiny of women's economic 
status.  Early in the recession Spanish women did not face more unemployment than men, as job 
losses were concentrated in construction and industry, both of which were heavily affected by 
severe reversals in Spain's domestic housing market and were dominated by men 100.  However, 
once the recession began to affect the service sector, (in particular education, health and social 
work), women's unemployment rose rapidly and by 2010, surpassed men's (19.72% for men; 
20.56% for women)101.   It is important to mention that whereas men have reacted to their 
massive job losses in part by retiring from the labor market (300,000 men became inactive 
during the four years), some 800,000 women have in contrast entered the labor market to 
counteract family income losses102.  However, these working women (especially those with 
lower qualifications) faced increasingly precarious working conditions, characterized by fixed-
term employment contracts offered for short period103, and jobs in the informal economy.  In this 
context feminists have criticized the Labor Reform (RD 3/2012) approved by the Spanish 
government in 2012 because of its negative impact on women. The Labor Reform increases 
unilateral opportunities for employers to introduce more flexible employment conditions, 
without having to respect collective agreements. This makes it easier for employers to fire 
employees, especially those who take on most of the burden of care, i.e. women104.  Women 
employed in the public sector were further affected by the cuts in public employees’ wages (by 
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more than 5% on average) in 2010 and the blocking of public employment recruitment in 
2011105.    
While austerity measures did not explicitly target existing family and childcare benefits, 
dismantling was introduced as a strategy of reducing policy density by eliminating instruments 
and programmes considered discretionary. Thus direct transfers, “Baby Check”, were stopped, 
while the provision of other benefits in kind – namely childcare services – slowed down106.  At 
the same time the extension of paternity leave was delayed and eventually abandoned.  
Dismantling strategy also affected the health sectors, as spending on health was reduced by more 
than 15% in real terms in only two years, (between 2010 and 2012). The long-term care benefits 
governed by the 2006 Dependency Law [Ley de Dependencia] were also suspended and the 
assigned budget cut.  This corresponded with decreasing funding of regional retirement homes 
and social services centers; cancelling of public assistance to dependent people; and eliminating 
home assistance.  The payment to family carers (mainly women) has also been cut by 15% and 
their social security contributions have been eliminated107. In addition, pensioners became 
subjected to a co-payment of 10% of their costs of medicines, up to a monthly maximum of 8 
euro (for those with annual pensions below 18,000 euro). Among these pensioners 59% of 
women receive less than the minimum wage (641.4 euro/month in 2012); that is far below the 
income limit, so that the chronically ill elderly will bear a high cost108. 
Women’s economic situation was also disproportionately affected by the dwindling 
purchasing power of the minimum wage (not full in line with the costs of living) and the VAT 
rise (from 16% to 18% in 2010 and to 23% in 2011).  This is because women tend to hold lower-
paid jobs and are more dependent on non-contributory benefit schemes, which use the minimum 
wage as a reference for calculating payment109. Additionally, in response to the erosion of 
household incomes and cuts in care services women were forced to pick up the unpaid domestic 
and informal work (as household responsibilities continue to be not shared equally110).    
 Finally Spain has increased the retirement age, from 65 to 67 years, while also raising the 
number of years of contribution needed to collect 100% of the amount from 35 to 37 years.  
Public pensions were frozen in 2011 and the new government raised them in 2012 by only 1%, 
when average pensions in Spain stand at only 63% of the EU-15 average111.  In fact, persons 
solely dependent on non-contributive funds – particularly represented by female widows – only 
receive 357.7 euro a month, an amount that is far below the poverty line112.  
 
Development in Equality Infrastructure  
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In 2010, equality infrastructure also began to be dismantled as part of ‘public saving 
strategy’. The central government budget dedicated to gender equality policies decreased at all 
governmental levels.  Paleo and Alonso113 show that between 2002 and 2008 the budget 
dedicated to gender policies increased by 57.2% at the central level, yet in the 2009–13 period 
the budget decreased at all governmental levels (except for Andalusia), reaching 34.1% at the 
central level.  It has been argued that these cuts led to dismantling of equality infrastructure and 
decreased consideration of gender problems in public policies114.  The Report of the CEDAW 
Committee115  lists a number of negative elements of the new Spanish policies of gender 
equality, which include the elimination of the Ministry of Gender Equality116, the replacement of 
the Women’s Institute by the Institute of Women and Equality Opportunities117 and the 
withdrawal of gender institutions in some regional administrations (Galicia, Murcia and Madrid).   
Subsequently, the gender equality policy has been transferred to the Health and Social Services 
and Equality Ministry, resulting in de-prioritization of gender equality objectives, and removal of 
short term goals and quotas.  The report also notes that as of 2010 there is no consistent strategy 
on gender equality at the state level and an appropriate coordination between the central 
government and the Autonomous Communities is missing. At the local level, Law 27/2013 of 
‘rationalization and sustainability of local administration’ has eliminated article 28 of Law 
7/1985, which granted local government the power to realize activities for the promotion of 
women118. 
The right-wing government’s secretary of state for social services and equality justified 
these retrenchments by referring to the economic crisis and the supposedly poor administration 
of the former government. Similarly, EGGSI (the European Commission’s network of experts in 
the fields of employment, social inclusion and gender equality issues) insisted that: ‘the reason 
put forward for this change was savings in administrative costs within the context of the fiscal 
austerity demanded by the current economic crisis’119. However, critics maintain that downsizing 
and downgrading have neither generated significant savings nor improved efficiency of service 
provision.  Civil Society Shadow Report 2008–13120 strongly criticized both the budget cuts in 
equality policies and the restructuring of the equality machinery at the central and regional 
levels.  Feminist organization also stress that the austerity measures reinforce traditional division 
																																								 																				
113Paleo, N. and Alonso, A. (2014) ¿Es solo una cuestión de austeridad? Crisis económica y políticas de género en 
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114 Gonzalez Gago, E., Segales Kirzner, M. and Castellanos, S. (2011) ‘The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the 
Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies. National Report: Spain’ in F. Bettio, M. Corsi, M. 
Samek, A. Verashchagina (2011) The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on 
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115 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Sixty-First Session (06 Jul 
2015 -24 Jul 2015) available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=944&Lang=en 
116 Equality Ministry was established only in 2008.  
117 The Women Institute now depends on a Directorate General (DG) for Equal Opportunities (located within the 
Secretariat for Social Services and Equality); thus, it was downgraded to being dependent on a DG whereas it was 
formerly dependent on a higher-rank State Secretariat. (Lombardo 2016)  
118 Lombardo (2016) 
119 Bettio, F., Corsi, M., D’Ippoliti, C., Lyberaki, A., Lodovici, M.S. and Verashchagina, A. (2012) “The Impact of 
the Economic Crisis on the Situation of Women and Men and on Gender Equality Policies” Brussels: European 
Commission, pg. 114. 
120 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2014) Sixty-First Session (06 
Jul 2015 -24 Jul 2015)Civil Society Shadow Report, Spain 2008-2013, available at:  
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of gender role: that of ‘female caregiver’ and ‘male breadwinner’121.  This is evidenced by the 
dismantling of measures promoting reconciliation of work and family life (i.e. breastfeeding 
leave can no longer be simultaneously taken by mothers and fathers, and deferment of paternity 
leave) and the raise of conservative attitudes regarding individual freedoms and abortion 
rights122. 
Austerity measures continue to be resisted by various grassroots feminist organizations, and new 
gender-friendly social movements (i.e. Indignados). There is also limited evidence that the crisis 
curtailed political participation of women.  In fact, women were able to secure significant if not 
equal representation in formal political structures.  Under Spain’s equality laws, neither sex can 
make up more than 60% of the electoral lists. In 2015 the 605 lists included 2,263 men (52%) 
and 2,090 women (48%). It is Podemos, the left-wing party that rose out of Spain’s anti-austerity 
protest movement, which has won the most seats for women – 49.28% of their 69 
seats.  Podemos also made history when one of its candidates became Spain's first ever black 
MP. Rita Bosaho from Alicante is also the first woman to head a party's electoral list in the 
region and win a seat in parliament.  Following the 2016 parliamentary election 39% of seats 
were secured by women.  While inequality persists, the number of women in parliament 
continues to grow.  However, women represent only 12.3% of board members of the largest 
publicly listed companies in Spain (IBEX35 index). This proportion is below the EU average 
(15.8%). The percentage of women board chairs and CEOs in Spain (2.9%) is closer to the EU 
average in both cases123. 
 
Race and Ethnicity Domain  
 
Traditionally, Spain has been considered a country of territorial cultural diversity, rather 
than a country with cultural minority diversity. Although there has not been a constitutional 
affirmation of multiculturalism at the national level, the government has, since at least 2003, 
begun to recognize the reality of cultural diversity and has focused attention on the social 
integration and inclusion of immigrants and minorities. This has largely been under the auspices 
of its National Action Plans on Social Inclusion, which have been released since 2001. The 
current institutional framework took place with Law 2/2009 (Title IV, reforming Organic Law 
4/2000). This legal measure introduced a framework of multilevel governance of migration 
based on cooperation among central administration institutions, local governments and civil 
society. The integration model established by Spanish policymakers presents itself as diversified 
and responsive to the different dimensions related to integration. The main focus is on the areas 
of reception, education and employment, with employment representing the destination of most 
financial allocations. The main political tool is represented by the Strategic Plan for Citizenship 
and Integration (PECI), whose action is complemented by other measures addressing specific 
ethnic minority and immigrant communities. Also in 2009, the government has increased 
investment in broader activities to combat racism and xenophobia, as well as to address the 
																																								 																				
121 Ciccia, R. and Verloo, M. (2012) “Parental leave regulations and the persistence of the male breadwinner model: 
using fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to assess gender equality in an enlarged Europe”, Journal of European Social 
Policy 22(5): 507–28. 
122 Lombardo (2016) 
123 European Commission’s Database on Women and Men in Decision-Making, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/index_en.htm   
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situation of Spain’s Gitano population124. As such, in the beginning of the recession Spain has 
not shown severe backsliding in race/ethnicity domain.  In fact, in 2011 Spain finally adopted 
legislation to comply with the requirements laid down in EU Directive 2000/43/EC (Racial 
Equality Directive) and Directive 2000/78/EC (Employment Equality Directive) and established 
Non-Discrimination Council/Racial and Ethnic Origin.  However, the second wave of recession 
resulted in backsliding on all previous integration commitments, hitting immigrant communities 
especially hard. While the formal anti-discrimination framework has not been dismantled, budget 
earmarked for integration of ethnic minorities (i.e. Gitano [Roma]) and immigrants has been 
substantially reduced in 2012 (by 17%)125.   
 
Integration policies  
Spanish integration policy is coordinated within the Ministry for Employment and 
Immigration, although its practice involves a wide range of government departments as well as 
the Autonomous Communities and municipalities. Following a lengthy consultation process 
started in 2005, the Ministry published its Strategic Plan on Citizenship and Integration (2007-
2010)126.  Based on this plan, the budget of the General Directorate for the Integration of 
Immigrants has increased between 2005 and 2009, reaching a peak of 308.5 million euros in 
2009. However, the crisis has had a significant impact on this funding stream: for the period 
2011-2014 funding was reduced first to 166 million euros, and then, to 141 million euros127. At 
the same time the Ministry for Employment and Immigration with collaboration of the 
International Organization of Migration began to implement a program of voluntary return for 
unemployed immigrants. This program shows a clear political preference for the short-term 
option of favoring return instead of thinking about the possibility of adopting ‘re-skilling 
measures’ or continuing its inclusion policies128.  As ‘home returns’ continue to receive funding,  
the last National Action Plan for Social Inclusion finished in 2010 without a successor, as has 
been demanded by civil society. 
 Within the general budget, the Spanish Integration Fund forms the bulk of spending, 
much of which is disbursed to municipalities and regions. The Spanish government began 
allocating funding to Autonomous Communities, reaching a plateau of 200 million euros by 
2009129.  Many of the Autonomous Communities (i.e. Catalonia, Andalusia) took the lead on 
various aspects of integration and co-founded integration policies from their own budgets.  
However, in February 2009, the Spanish government cut this fund by half, from 200 million 
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http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/roma_country_factsheets_2014/spain_en.pdf  
125 Benitez, I. (2012) Spain Slushes Funds for Integration of Immigrants, Inter Press Service, News Agency, 
available at:   http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/04/spain-slashes-funds-for-integration-of-immigrants/  
126Ministerio de Trbajo y Asuntos Sociales [Ministry of labor and social affairs] (2007) “Strategic Plan for 
Citizenship and Integration” Catálogo general de publicaciones oficiales, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-
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128 Parella, S. and Petroff, A. (2014) “Return migration in Spain: immigrant departures and return programs in a 
crisis context” [Migración de retorno en España: salidas de immigrantes y programas de retorno en un contexto de 
crisi].  In J. Arango, D. Moya, and J. Oliver (eds.) Immigration and emigration: myths and realities [Inmigración y 
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129 Davis, A. (2008) “Multi-nation building? Immigrant integration policies in the autonomous communities of 
Catalonia and Madrid”, Paper for the Economic and Social Research Council, Sheffield University, UK.  
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euros to 100 euros.  In 2011 the budget dropped to 70 million euros.  In 2012 the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security eliminated the fund’s entire resources in the general budget. This 
suppression has been seen as one of the hardest cuts delivered to public policies for immigrant 
integration in recent years.  
 
Gitano Population [Roma] 
 The cut was a huge blow to Roma inclusion programmes long recognized as ‘a model’ 
for integration.  The reduction in co-financing of Structural Funds programmes (i.e. ACEDER 
program one of the most successful employment initiative for Roma community) together with a 
general reduction in welfare provisions (in particular 2012 cutbacks of 13.2 million dollars in 
health and education) not only threatens to derail decades of progress towards equal opportunity 
but also points to a regression in employment, education, health and housing objectives130.   
According to Fundación Secretariado Gitano, the rate of unemployment in the Gitano 
community is 36.4% and 80% of Gitano students do not finish secondary school; hence any cuts 
to these policy fields disproportionally affect this community131. It is worth mentioning that these 
cuts also affected Spain’s role as a facilitator of pan-European Roma inclusion programmes, and 
good practice exchange. Unfortunately, comprehensive data on the impact of austerity measures 
on Roma population is still absent.  However, Roma advocates insist that the impacts are 
severe132.  
 
Immigrants  
Immigrant population have been particularly hard-hit during the recession, with the 
unemployment rate soaring to over 37% for foreign-born workers vs. 24% for native workers133.  
Such figures are particularly striking if we take into account that in 2007 the unemployment rate 
of immigrants was only 12.5%. Perhaps due to the reduced economic demand, the number of 
new arrivals in Spain has also decreased significantly and shifted from non-EU labor to family 
reunion of children and spouses of former labor and regularized migrants settling long-term134.  
Immigrants have also been negatively affected by the health sector reforms - particularly Royal 
Decree Law 16/2012 which excludes almost a million undocumented migrants from accessing 
healthcare services, save for very exceptional circumstances: in the case of emergencies, 
pregnant women and children.  As of 2012 foreigners without work permits in Spain have to pay 
the bills for any health care received and pay an insurance quota of 710 euros a year to maintain 
health care in the public network.  
In relation to this, at a time when NGOs play an essential role, the most recent reform of 
the immigration law, Organic Law 2/2009, of 11 December, introduced what is commonly 
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known as the ‘crime of solidarity’. According to this, a simulated employment relationship 
undertaken for reasons of altruism (technically ‘intention of profit’), in order to help someone 
obtain regularization and rights under (Article 54(f)), is considered a breach of the law, and 
incurs a fine of up to 100,000 euros. Furthermore, according to the draft of the penal code reform 
approved in December 2012, to harbor and protect an undocumented immigrant is a felony, 
rendering humanitarian aid and acts of solidarity punishable by the law. 
 
 
 
 
Disability Domain  
 
Over the past 3 decades Spain has made considerable progress in developing measures 
targeted at disabled population, showing commitment to social model and independent living 
arrangements.  While the employment rates for disabled people in Spain are lower compared 
with other EU countries (in 2008 62.12% of the active disabled population were unemployed, 
43.74% wanted non-qualified jobs and 16.68% lacked a previous employment background135) 
the investment in various services has been increasing steadily, reaching 38.6% in 2008 (with six 
EU countries investing more than Spain)136.  The austerity measures have seriously jeopardized 
these positive developments.  Between 2008 and 2010 the poverty risk-rates sharply increased 
(+11.35%) and people with disabilities now have more than a 25% chance of being at risk of 
poverty137.  While the income of people with disabilities has remained at pre-crisis levels the 
prices are higher and thus pending power has been reduced. The worsening living standards of 
people with disability have generated mass protests across Spain138.   
 
Infrastructure  
Since the 1980 Spanish government has been involved in promoting the evolution of the 
treatment of disability towards a social model.  This evolution commenced with passing of the 
Law 13/1982 of 7 April, of Social Integration of Disabled Persons (LISMI), the Law 51/2003, 2 
December, of equal opportunities, non- discrimination and universal accessibility of people with 
disability, the 2007 Equal Opportunity Act, and culminates with the ratification of the 
International Convention on Human Rights of People with Disabilities.  The Ministry of Health 
and Social Policy assumes responsibility for co-ordinating sectoral policies on disability, which 
is exercised by the Directorate General for the Coordination of Sectoral Policies on Disability.  
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Within this structure, the Instituto de Mayores y Servicios Sociales, IMSERSO (Institute on 
Social Services and Aging) has responsibility for social security issues. While legislative 
framework is in place, the implementation of policies came to a halt.  
 
Provisions  
In 2012 Spain implemented national budget cuts of 13.65% and regional budget cuts of 
up to 10% to health and social care services (including direct cuts in salary packages to 
professional staff).  As an immediate result of these cuts, Spanish commitment to independent 
living was put at risk.  Faced with slimmer budgets local authorities have postponed (or paused) 
the construction of residential care facilities while the implementation of the law entitled 
“Promotion of the Autonomy and Care for Persons in a Dependent Situation” has been delayed. 
Government funding provided under this law to Autonomous Communities was reduced by 
between 22% and 29% in 2012 compared to the previous year in most regions139.  Moreover 
employment services - including supported employment (provided by Special Employment 
Centres) saw 25% cut in funding (a decrease that was compensated for by the ESF). The 
National Observatory of Disability (OED) also noted an increase in temporary contracts for 
workers with disabilities140.  Finally,  earlier investment plans aimed at improving the 
accessibility of public buildings, services and transport have been virtually paralyzed, further 
hindering independent living. 
Since 2011 there has also been a trend to tighten entitlements to benefits for mildly 
dependent people with disabilities (including those affected by mental distress). That access to 
habilitation and rehabilitation services for people with disabilities has been restricted. Some 
groups, such as persons with disabilities due to mental illness, face particular challenges in 
accessing benefits141 and as a result only 1-4% of these persons are protected by the 2006 Law 
for the Promotion of Personal Autonomy and Care for Dependent Persons.142  Recent budget cuts 
to social benefits have resulted in a moratorium of one year being placed on coverage to new 
beneficiaries. Social protection schemes also economically penalize persons living with 
disabilities, as the system requires that they partially self-finance their benefits thorough 
unaffordable co-payments, a situation which has been taken to court by CERMI.  Moreover there 
has been a shift away from personalized services for individual clients towards more 
standardized minimum services, a pattern that directly undermines the fundamental cornerstone 
of living independently.  At the same time the salaries of professionals working with disabled 
persons have been decreased by 5%. 
The local authorities have reported substantial cuts in budgets for independent living and 
community inclusion in terms of supports, services, facilities and direct payments as well as a 
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reduction on new investments. Currently the law on the promotion of personal autonomy and 
care for dependent persons is under review which is likely to result in higher co-payment levels 
and an increased number of persons who will be included into the list of persons who are subject 
to co-payment requirements. The changes envisaged will also result in a lower coverage of 
primary caregivers who may lose their entitlements to financial support.  
Non-for-profit sector has been playing a major role in advocating for the rights of the 
disabled people, providing alternative services, and forming partnerships with local, regional and 
national agencies.  This resulted in a wide network of professional and non-for-profit disability 
organization, with ONCE emerging as a leader and main partner of statutory services.  However 
the financing of these organisations has decreased by 20% in 2012143.  The austerity measures 
have caused significant delays in payments from the public sector to non-profit social service 
providers. In Spain, the public administration’s debt towards these organisations has put them in 
jeopardy, and as a result social services to people with disabilities are endangered (in fact reports 
of termination or collapse of providers and services have been reported in Valencia and 
Andalusia). In addition, banks have decreased financing facilities and in some cases eliminated 
funding options - as a result many of these entities have difficulty accessing the credit needed to 
ensure their survival and their provision of social services.    
 
Conclusions  
 
Overall, the adherence to austerity in Spain has generated backsliding in all equality 
domains.  Measures introduced by central and regional governments are threatening the 
principles of equity and social cohesion underlying the welfare state.   Although cutbacks in 
services and benefits will have a negative impact on everyone, this impact has been uneven. 
Budget deficits are being covered mainly from the pockets of those with least access to the tables 
where economic decisions are made. Women, racial and ethnic minorities, and people living with 
disability are most affected, and lone mothers are among those who suffer most.  Yet to date, 
Spain has assessed the impacts of the proposed cuts in public spending from an equality 
perspective, neither of the individual measures nor of their cumulative impact.   
It could be argued that the gender and disability domains experienced the most considerable 
setbacks in the last few years.  The gender mainstreaming infrastructures, the sensitivity to 
gender and disability issues and the role of the welfare state in promoting equality have all been 
seriously damaged.  It is also apparent that even though most setbacks have taken place during 
the economic crisis, they clearly covariate with the presence of conservative party in office. This 
fact allows concluding that the crisis has acted as a window of opportunity which has permitted 
to call into question a policy sector that had experienced a 20-year expansion period. 
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E. United Kingdom Case Study (by Joanna Kostka)  
 
The international economic crisis that erupted in 2008 ushered in the longest period of 
economic downturn in the UK in modern history.  Since 2010, austerity – primarily in the form 
of deep spending cuts with comparatively small increase in tax144 - has been the UK 
government’s dominant fiscal policy, with far fewer measures to stimulate the economy. The 
adherence to austerity measures negatively affected country’s commitments to equality fields. 
The mapping exercised showed considerable backsliding in both gender and disability domains. 
Race domain appeared relatively ‘untouched’, however an in-depth scrutiny unveiled that while 
legal anti-discrimination framework has not been undermined, integration programs have faced 
tremendous challenges due to the withdrawal of state funding.  UK also faced unprecedented rise 
in hate speech and violent acts against racial and ethnic minorities, and rising xenophobic 
attitudes, a dynamic exploited by advocates of Brexit145.     
 
Political Context  
 
During the years 1997-2007, government under Labor leadership significantly increased 
public spending, though as a percentage of GDP the rise was less marked146. The explosion of 
the economic crisis in 2007 prompted the Labor government to implement a stimuli package, 
following a ‘weakened’ Keynesian model.   Worsening economic prognosis, however, largely 
discredited increase in public spending and in 2009 the term "age of austerity" was popularized 
by British Conservative leader David Cameron.  In his keynote speech to the Conservative Party 
forum in Cheltenham on 26 April 2009 he committed to end years of what he characterized 
excessive government spending147.   
Following parliamentary elections in 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government announced the biggest cuts to state spending since the Second World War148, 
including significant cuts to social security and the planned loss of 900,000 public sector jobs 
between 2011 and 2018149. The coalition claimed they had no choice because the previous 
government had left them with a large deficit.  In effect those already in poverty have seen their 
impoverishment worsen, and millions more have become vulnerable.  The Institute for Fiscal 
Studies found that the net direct effect of the coalition government’s tax and benefit changes will 
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increase both absolute and relative poverty150. The 2013 polls suggested support for the 
Conservatives among women was 15 points behind Labour, while it was roughly neck and neck 
among men – -one reason given is that the coalition's austerity measures have cut public sector 
jobs and services that largely support women. 
 
Gender Domain  
 
In the mapping exercise UK demonstrated backsliding on all indicators, a dramatic turn 
of events in a country once considered a solid performer on gender equality151.  Oxfam152 
reported that of the £8.1bn in net personal tax increases and benefit cuts, an estimated £5.8bn 
(72%) will impact upon women.  Since 2008 female unemployment has risen from 678, 000 to 
1.08 million in 2013 – a level last seen in 1988153.  This is expected to further rise to 1.5 million 
by 2018 as the remainder of public sector cuts will take effect. Women also suffered to a great 
degree from cuts to public services, due to their comparatively higher representation in the public 
sector.   
Erosion of household incomes as a result of austerity measures (through taxes and 
benefits reforms) has been well documented154. The underlying rationale for all introduced 
restrictions was to strengthen work incentives and self-reliance. Very limited attention was paid 
to gender inequalities (weather pay gap, segregated employment, part-time work, care 
responsibility) hence the proposed measures not only penalized women (leaving them without 
necessary care benefits) but failed to create jobs for women.  It has been demonstrated that of the 
800,000 jobs created in the private sector 56% have gone to men and that overall for every 100 
new (net) jobs created 63% went to men and 37% to women.     
An element of 2010 Spending Review that particularly affected women was the 
retrenchment in family and childcare provisions. Childcare subsidies (delivered through 
vouchers and tax credits) were effectively reduced.  The proposed changes to the child element 
of Working Tax Credit (WTC)155 were announced in 2011.  The government reduced the 
proportion of childcare costs that were being paid (from 80% to 70%) and increased the 
minimum number of hours a couple with children needed to work to be eligible for WTC. It also 
abolished the Child Trust Fund stripping parents from access to investment vouchers.  Finally it 
proposed (in 2013) a Universal Credit to replace six benefits and tax credits (including 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, Housing Benefits, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, Employment 
and Support Allowance and Income Support).  
These changes had adverse effect on women with children in at least two ways:  
																																								 																				
150 Brewer, M., Browne, J. and Joyce, R. (2011) “Child and Working-Age Poverty from 2010 to 2020”, London: 
IFS, available at:  http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm121.pdf. Relative poverty amongst working-age adults is 
expected to rise from 16.7% (2011/12) to 18.5% (2014/15). By 2020, relative poverty is expected to rise between 
three to four percentage points to 24.4% among children and 20% among working-age adults. 
151 The only other country to backslide on all indicators was Latvia, a country with a poor record of gender equality 
measures.   
152 Oxfam (2013) “The True Cost of Austerity and Inequality”, UK Case Study, available at: 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/cs-true-cost-austerity-inequality-uk-120913-en.pdf  
153 Office of National Statistics (2013) “Labour Market Statistics”, available at:  
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_315111.pdf,   
154 Annesley, C. and Himmelweit, S. (2010)  “The Impact on Women of the Coalition Spending Review 2010”, 
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155 Working Tax Credit: a means-tested subsidy restricted to lone parents and couples in which both parents are in 
employment for at least 16 hours a week each. 
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• In families where the man works and the woman stays home, this reform reinforces traditional 
gender roles and further reduces the incentive for women to take paid employment, since the 
reduction in support for childcare costs will decrease the gains from employment; 
•  In families where both partners work, the increased hours eligibility may require more hours 
of paid childcare and, combined with a reduction in the proportion of childcare costs which 
WTC will pay, may end up with parents working more hours for no extra net pay156.  
 
The government also abolished the Health in Pregnancy Grant, and restricted the Sure 
Start Maternity Grant for low-income parents to first babies or multiple births.  At the same time 
the Statutory Maternity Pay and Maternity Allowance increased by 1% only, fare lower than 
living costs. A 2012 report evidencing the impacts of the UK Government’s austerity measures 
upon women in the North East of England highlights the devastating impacts of the above 
mention measures and welfare reforms upon already unacceptable levels of gender inequality157. 
 
Developments in Equality Infrastructure  
  
According to the CEDAW158 Committee159 the UK may be seen as providing an example 
of achievement in terms of the laws and regulations supporting women’s human rights and 
equality in general. However, the reality for women living in the UK is that there is incomplete 
realization of these rights and serious attitudinal and behavioral barriers to substantive equality 
for all women. The 2013 report, produced by an umbrella organization representing 42 women's 
and human rights groups, including Women's Aid and the Fawcett Society160, demonstrates that 
gender stereotypes abound in all areas of British society and intersectional discrimination against 
women who have diverse and intersecting identities under a number of ‘protected 
characteristics’161 is also commonplace. There still is a frustrating lack of continuous monitoring 
and periodical evaluation of the implementation of laws and measures, and in the collection and 
evaluation of disaggregated data to ensure that these are meeting women’s diverse needs.   
Since 2010 the national machinery to promote women’s equality has been subject to 
persistent attack. The main UK level government body dealing with women’s equality, the 
Government Equalities Office, previously a dedicated government Department, has been 
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downgraded to become a unit of the Home Office and more recently moved to the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport. The UK Women’s National Commission (WNC), the only UK-wide 
machinery dedicated to women’s equality, which was responsible for coordinating the UK’s 
independent shadow report to CEDAW, was abolished in 2010. The Welsh Women’s National 
Commission, which fulfilled a similar advisory function in Wales, lost its funding from the 
Wales Assembly and also closed down in 2010.  This means that since 2010 there is no 
independent national body open to all women and their organizations.  
Women’s organizations are also hamstrung by the loss of funding and infrastructure.  The 
women’s NGO sector has been a leader in bringing about positive changes to women’s (and 
men’s) lives and improving gender equality in the UK, yet it has faced the worst funding crisis in 
recent history and its sustainability has been seriously undermined while demand for services has 
increased. Since 2011 there is a trend across central government whereby specialist services are 
being overlooked for funding and investment in favor of large, generic providers who are being 
awarded contracts for the delivery of specialist women’s services.  Research in 2012 has found 
that about one in three Rape Crisis Centers in England and Wales have been challenged by 
funders about the fact that they provided women-only services.162  Moreover, in 2012 the process 
of consultation with the Government has been undermined as the statutory 12 week minimum 
consultation period, which forms part of the Compact163 agreement between government and the 
voluntary sector has been removed. It was even stated that consultations are not needed in many 
circumstances. This removed the ability for women to be involved in the decisions that affect 
their lives and to ensure that these decisions do not go against CEDAW principles and reduce 
equal engagement. 
Women continue to be missing from politically powerful positions. 22.5% of all MPs are 
women, which is an increase from 19.7% at the General Election in 2005.164 However, the 
number of female members of the Cabinet was reduced by 20% in the 2012 reshuffle, with 
women now only comprising 17.4% of all Cabinet members.165 The level of women MPs has 
increased by only 3.9% since the year 2000, whilst the percentage of women in the Cabinet has 
decreased by 4.3%. All the political parties have improved to some degree but none will achieve 
50:50 male/female representations in the near future. The Government has extended the ability 
for political parties to use women-only shortlists until 2030 alongside other voluntary action and 
encouragement. However, this binding temporary special measure will not lead to substantive 
change as it does not address the institutional discrimination and barriers to women’s 
participation and progression. Moreover, UK Government has been vocal about its objection to 
introducing binding temporary measures to promote women’s equality.  
 It is important to note that as the Government’s report notes, BAME women represent 
5.8% of the UK population, but remain heavily under-represented in political and public life 
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comprising less than 1% of councilors.166  Muslim women in particular face barriers in accessing 
political and public life.  
 
Race/Ethnicity Domain  
 
UK has a long tradition and experience of running integration programmes.  However with 
the economic crisis the main political parties, starting with the coalition government, have begun 
to feel the impact of the rise in the opinion polls of UKIP, a political party of clear anti-European 
and anti-immigrant stance.  The cuts in integration programs while not ‘excessive’ do reflect 
broader fiscal tightening, a decline in community support and a change in political philosophy 
and prioritizing with respect to the integration of migrants.  While anti-discrimination legislation 
remained intact, integration funding has been chipped away in numerous ways, notably:  
• The department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) was ordered to trim 
£1.116 billion in 2010167 and lost over half its resource budget by 2014-2015 (which 
included a transfer of funding to local government). This has resulted in the termination 
of several community cohesion programs, such as Connecting Communities, which 
included core integration funding. 
• Within CLG, the £50 million Migration Impacts Fund, raised through a levy on 
immigrant visa fees, has been scrapped (the money was used to fund non-governmental 
and local government projects aimed at easing the impact of new immigrants in 
communities) 
• In 2011 English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) program faced both budget 
cuts and limitations on eligibility, including the loss of a £4.5 million Learner Support 
Fund, to help low-income migrants with course fees.   Similarly, the Ethnic Minority 
Achievement Grant (EMAG), which was frequently used to support the integration of 
new arrivals, has been mainstreamed into general education allocations, which has led to 
local staffing cuts for schools’ language support.168 
• Like in gender domain, NGOs working with BAME communities were hard hit by cuts in 
funding, some affecting core support, others directed at service provision.  Refugee 
integration support services faced particularly severe pressure, with the Refugee 
Council’s state funding reduced by 62% in 2011.  In addition, the Refugee Integration 
and Employment Service ceased to exist after September 2011.  
It is important to mention that migrant women, refugee women and asylum seeking women 
are amongst the most vulnerable groups in the UK. They are subjected to multiple-discrimination 
on the grounds of their gender, race and migration status. Black minority ethnic (BME) mothers 
are highly likely to experience poverty in the UK, both as a direct result of racial and gender 
discrimination, and through the very fact of being a mother. Many BME mothers have unequal 
access to the household purse, have limited access to money and experience material 
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deprivation.169 Many BME women have extremely limited access to money thus their husbands 
are in control of all aspects of their lives.170 Inequality within households has allowed the active 
abuse and control of BME women’s access to money by their partners.171 This situation will be 
exacerbated by the single payment of Universal Credit going to the highest earner, most likely to 
be a man, and will make many BME women even more vulnerable to financial and other forms 
of violence and abuse.  Furthermore the new child tax credit criteria mean that BME families 
will see a cut to their income if they've decided to have more than two kids. 24% of BME 
families have three of more children, compared to 8% of white families172. 
In their text titled “Layers of inequality”173 Kalwinder Sandhu and Mary-Ann Stephenson 
draw attention to the specificity of minority ethnic women’s experience in relation to the 
austerity cuts in spending. From the time that the coalition government announced public 
spending cuts in 2010, their predicted severe impact on women was a source of significant social 
and political comment. However, there was little discussion of the likely effects of the cuts on 
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) women. This research is one of the first that 
foregrounds the ways in which BAME women have fared under the weight of policies of 
austerity. One of the key features of the women’s experience is that they often face several cuts 
all at once, and the effects are made worse by the simultaneous operations of the social divisions 
of gender, race, ethnicity, class, disability and so on. For, instance, BAME women are more 
likely to be living in poverty, working in the public sector, and to receive a higher proportion of 
their income from working age benefits or tax credits, and they are more likely to confront 
radicalized forms of discrimination and disadvantage in the labor market. The research found 
that cuts are already and will continue to disproportionately affect BAME women. It is the 
combination of cuts that is particularly damaging. 
 
Disability  
 
Disabled people are twice as likely to live in relative poverty as non-disabled people and 
when the additional costs disabled people face as a result of their impairment are factored in, 
figures suggest that well over half of disabled people in the UK could be living in poverty.174 
While disabled people have entered the recession on a profoundly unequal footing to non-
disabled people their interests have been largely absent from national debate arising from the 
downturn.  Yet the government’s benefit cuts are hitting disabled people hardest of all.  The 
welfare reforms have reduced the numbers of people eligible for incapacity benefits, have cut 
spending on care support services and independent living programs, and have launched an 
aggressive work activation programs (which raised concerns about those who face significant 
barriers to work and could potentially miss out on extra support from the benefits system). 
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According to the 2012 report “The Tipping Point”175, drawn up by a coalition of over 90 
disabled people's organisations and charities, disabled people have experienced a massive drop in 
income of £500 million since the Emergency Budget of 2010 (cuts range from £200 to £2,065 
for typical disabled households per year).  Half of the total cuts have been taken from the welfare 
budget.  For example £2bn has been taken out of care budgets by local authorities even though 
demand for care series continues to grow176. This was coupled with vast hikes in charges for 
essential services, including a £77million rise in charges for care177, a 13% increase in meals on 
wheels charges, and a 33% increase in transport fees178.  Moreover, ADASS reports that 85% of 
councils now restrict care to people with ‘substantial’ and ‘critical needs’. This negatively 
impacts mental health funding.  In 2011, the implemented 2% cut resulted in closure of 2100 
beds in mental health units, over 10% of the total179.  In the same year the number of nurses 
working in mental health services has fallen by 3640 and the number of doctors has dropped by 
213180.  This has led Simon Wessely, President of the Royal College of Psychiatry, to describe 
services as ‘running dangerously close to collapse’181 
The 2010 Emergency Budget has set in motion an aggressive campaign to curtail 
eligibility criteria and force labor activation.  The introduction of the Universal Credit removed 
financial benefits for disabled people who do not reach the required level of functional 
impairment in the work capability assessment (WCA). Those who were deemed fit-for-work 
were to benefit from work related activity or the support group.  There are widely reported 
problems in the WCA that result in thousands of disabled people not having needs identified in 
the assessment and being prevented from accessing appropriate support as a result. For example, 
the design of the WCA means that a wheelchair user who can self-propel (a non-motorized) 
wheelchair 50 meters could be found fully fit for work under the assessment and will not receive 
any more financial support than a non-disabled person – despite all the higher costs and other 
(physical and attitudinal) barriers to participation.  It has been estimated that 450,000 disabled 
people could stand to lose out under Universal Credit182.  In the 2012 survey183 more than three 
quarters (78 per cent) of disabled people said their health had got worse as a result of the stress 
caused by their Work Capability Assessment (WCA) for Employment and Support Allowance 
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(ESA).  Furthermore, the shift of resources to better target disabled people with the greatest need, 
meant cuts to families with disabled child (around £1,500 per year). Ironically, the abolition of 
the severe disability premium meant that even those with the most serious health conditions or 
the greatest level of impairment now receive £28 less a week if they live on their own184. Finally, 
in 2013 the government replaced Disability Living Allowance (DLA) with Personal 
Independence Payment (PIP). The reform of the benefit designed specifically to support disabled 
people with higher living costs, including disabled people in work, has lowered numbers of 
disabled people eligible for support. The IPI now targets only those ‘with the greatest needs’ 
resulted in more than 500,000 disabled people losing eligibility for support.  The reform saved 
the Government over £2bn185.    
Other reforms to welfare support which risk intensifying disability poverty include; 
• Introduction of the Bedroom Tax186 
• Closure of the Independent Living Fund (which directly leads to re-institutionalization)  
• The removal of automatic entitlement to Housing Benefit for young people 
• Reductions in Disabled Student Allowance 
A growing number of organizations and advocacy groups insist that the government's benefit 
cuts are hitting disabled people hardest of all. There is a common understanding that unless 
government takes firm and urgent action to remedy the situation, the reforms are set to adversely 
affect disabled people for many years.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Overall, the endorsement of austerity policies in the UK has negatively impacted all three 
domains.  In the last 6 years government support to equality and diversity issues, not just around 
gender but more broadly, has been cut back at a time where tougher labor market conditions 
have possibly raised the salience of such issues.  The Emergency Budgets has not only generated 
extensive cuts to safety nets, and welfare provisions but also spawned specific attacks on public 
sector employment and integration programs (targeted at both ethnic/racial minorities and 
persons with disabilities).  It has been widely documented that these measures disproportionately 
affected women, racial minorities, and persons with disability, thus showing how intersections 
among various social dimensions need to be considered for understanding the impact of the 
economic crisis.  Furthermore  the use of a voluntary rather than compulsory legislative approach 
to equality policies (including flexible working, some aspects of the parental leave provision and 
equality and diversity policy) has allowed for dismantling of progressive equality and diversity 
policies (most acutely felt in the gender domain).  Not surprisingly since the 2008 financial crisis 
began, those already in poverty have seen their impoverishment worsen, and millions more have 
become more vulnerable. As expressed by Simon Duffy, the director of the Centre for Welfare 
Reform "The past six years of austerity have seen the UK Government intentionally diminish the 
rights of its own citizens. 
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